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ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server

io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridgejdhart81streamable-httpv0.2.1Scanned

MCP bridge to ERC-8004 on-chain agent identity, reputation and validation registries.

10 tools: 7 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server can do

The ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server is published by the GitHub account jdhart81. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: import_registration, import_feedback, score_agent, bind_identity and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.2.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • bind_identityBind a fleet DID to an ERC-8004 identity.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Bind a fleet DID to an ERC-8004 identity. Produces an order-independent, content-addressed (unsigned) binding attestation.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Bind identity
  • export_attestationExport the agent's current trust score as an UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry-shaped payload, content-addressed and ready for YOUR OWN signer to anchor on-chain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Export the agent's current trust score as an UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry-shaped payload, content-addressed and ready for YOUR OWN signer to anchor on-chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Export attestation
  • export_validation_responseBuild UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry validationResponse args from an Outcome Receipt (ORC v0.1): responseHash = receipt commitment, tag "orc/0.1", response 100 only if the b…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Build UNSIGNED ERC-8004 Validation Registry validationResponse args from an Outcome Receipt (ORC v0.1): responseHash = receipt commitment, tag "orc/0.1", response 100 only if the bridge re-verifies the receipt AND your replay succeeded. Sign and submit with your own signer; this bridge holds no keys and writes to no chain.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Export validation response
  • import_feedbackImport ERC-8004 Reputation Registry feedback records for an agent.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "import_feedback" says "import": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Import ERC-8004 Reputation Registry feedback records for an agent. Each item: {value: bool|0..1, at: ISO-8601, source?, weight?, feedback_id?}. Idempotent per feedback_id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Import feedback
  • import_registrationImport an ERC-8004 Identity Registry record (chain_id + ERC-721 token_id + agentURI + owner).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "import_registration" says "import": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Import an ERC-8004 Identity Registry record (chain_id + ERC-721 token_id + agentURI + owner). Idempotent: re-import updates in place. Returns the canonical record with its deterministic bridge DID (did:viridis:erc8004:<chain>:<token>).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Import registration
  • score_agentDecay-weighted trust score in [0,1] + tier over the agent's imported ERC-8004 feedback — recent behavior outweighs old; no feedback scores a neutral 0.5 prior (no blind trust, no u…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decay-weighted trust score in [0,1] + tier over the agent's imported ERC-8004 feedback — recent behavior outweighs old; no feedback scores a neutral 0.5 prior (no blind trust, no unfair zero).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Score agent
  • verify_attestationRecompute a payload's content hash and report whether it is intact.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recompute a payload's content hash and report whether it is intact.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify attestation
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • describe_agentReturn the bridge's capabilities and input contract.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_agent" says "describe": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the bridge's capabilities and input contract.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Describe this service
  • list_registrationsList all imported ERC-8004 registrations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_registrations" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List all imported ERC-8004 registrations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List registrations
  • resolve_agentResolve an imported ERC-8004 registration by bridge DID or by (chain_id, token_id).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "resolve_agent" says "resolve": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve an imported ERC-8004 registration by bridge DID or by (chain_id, token_id).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Resolve agent

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/erc8004/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including import_registration (write), import_feedback (write), score_agent (write), bind_identity (write), export_attestation (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools8 changed.~8 changedView diff
  2. Tools10 changed.~10 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-erc8004-bridge https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/erc8004/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-erc8004-bridge https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/erc8004/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__resolve_agent",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__list_registrations",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__describe_agent"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__import_registration",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__import_feedback",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__score_agent",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__bind_identity",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__export_attestation",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__verify_attestation",
      "mcp__agent-erc8004-bridge__export_validation_response"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-erc8004-bridge. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge/verify?hash=b7b226e936edea630c621287ce3f50b27bfcf2231e2c8e2aaa2d1c382275b6f6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b7b226e936ed, from Nov 16, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-erc8004-bridge)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server have?

10 tools: 7 write, 3 read. import_registration, import_feedback, score_agent, bind_identity, export_attestation, verify_attestation, export_validation_response, resolve_agent and 2 more.

Does the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the ERC-8004 Bridge MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.