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Verified Relay MCP server

io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relayjdhart81streamable-httpv0.1.1Scanned

Wraps any MCP server with tamper-evident delivery receipts, metered fees and disputes.

7 tools: 4 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 4 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

4 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Verified Relay MCP server can do

The Verified Relay MCP server is published by the GitHub account jdhart81. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: register_service, call_verified, verify_receipts and service_stats), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool can send data out of your system (register_service).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 16, 2026, version 0.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
  • call_verifiedRelay a tools/call to a registered MCP service and notarize the exchange: request hash + response hash + outcome land in a tamper-evident receipt chain.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_verified" says "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Relay a tools/call to a registered MCP service and notarize the exchange: request hash + response hash + outcome land in a tamper-evident receipt chain. Idempotent on call_id (a replay returns the original receipt and cached result — the downstream is never double-called). Failures are receipted evidence, not silence.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Call verified
  • register_serviceRegister a third-party MCP server (https, public FQDN only) under Viridis Verified.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Register a third-party MCP server (https, public FQDN only) under Viridis Verified. Returns a content-addressed service_id; idempotent on (url, provider). fee_minor is the per-verified-call fee in cents.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Register service
  • service_statsCall counts, error counts, and accrued fees for one service.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Call counts, error counts, and accrued fees for one service.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • title: Service stats
  • verify_receiptsRecompute a service's full receipt hash chain and fee ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Recompute a service's full receipt hash chain and fee ledger. Any party can audit Viridis Verified from receipts alone.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Verify receipts
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • describe_agentDescribe this agent: name, version, purpose, every action it supports and the inputs each one takes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "describe_agent" says "describe": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Describe this agent: name, version, purpose, every action it supports and the inputs each one takes. Read-only and free; call it first to learn how to use this server.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Describe this service
  • get_receiptFetch a single delivery receipt by id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a single delivery receipt by id.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: Get receipt
  • list_servicesList registered services with call/fee counters.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_services" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List registered services with call/fee counters.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • title: List services

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:28 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/verified/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including register_service (write), call_verified (write), verify_receipts (write), service_stats (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools5 changed.~5 changedView diff
  2. Tools7 changed.~7 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agent-verified-relay https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/verified/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agent-verified-relay https://mcp.viridisconservation.com/verified/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__get_receipt",
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__list_services",
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__describe_agent"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__register_service",
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__call_verified",
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__verify_receipts",
      "mcp__agent-verified-relay__service_stats"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-verified-relay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agent-verified-relay__register_service outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relay/verify?hash=c1bdf6395839bb1fdad8365cee3107feab92fae970507958844cceeb9e390e30" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c1bdf6395839, from Nov 16, 2026, 02:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relay/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jdhart81/agent-verified-relay)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 16, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Verified Relay MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Verified Relay MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Verified Relay MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Verified Relay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Verified Relay MCP server have?

7 tools: 4 write, 3 read. register_service, call_verified, verify_receipts, service_stats, get_receipt, list_services and describe_agent.

Does the Verified Relay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Verified Relay MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): register_service.

Has the Verified Relay MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 16, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.