RugRadar MCP server
io.github.jimmybr-PDX/rugradarjimmybr-PDXstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned
Solana token danger warnings: rug, token-safety and honeypot checks $0.01; watch alerts $0.05/24h.
4 tools: 4 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 4
- Can send data out · 1
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
4 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the RugRadar MCP server can do
The RugRadar MCP server is published by the GitHub account jimmybr-PDX. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (4 tools: rug_check, token_safety, honeypot_check and watch_token), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
4 tools bring in text other people can write (rug_check, token_safety, honeypot_check and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (watch_token).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Changes things 4Claude Code: ask
honeypot_checkRugRadar honeypot check: can I sell this token?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it RugRadar honeypot check: can I sell this token? Simulated buy/sell and tax on EVM chains, live Jupiter sell quote plus freeze/mint authority and token-2022 transfer controls on Solana; 0-100 risk score. $0.01 per check: 45+ data points per token, including 16 signals RugCheck's free report doesn't show (dev-sold %, sniper and launch-bundle share, a live can-you-sell quote, the creator's past launches, volume vs market cap, bot-trading score), across 5 chains.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
rug_checkRugRadar rug check / rug pull checker: 0-100 risk score with plain reasons and a buyer summary for a token on Solana (incl.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it RugRadar rug check / rug pull checker: 0-100 risk score with plain reasons and a buyer summary for a token on Solana (incl. pump.fun), BNB, Base, Ethereum or Arbitrum. $0.01 per check: 45+ data points per token, including 16 signals RugCheck's free report doesn't show (dev-sold %, sniper and launch-bundle share, a live can-you-sell quote, the creator's past launches, volume vs market cap, bot-trading score), across 5 chains.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
token_safetyRugRadar token safety check: mint/freeze authority, holder concentration, liquidity, age, deployer history, dev holding/sold, snipers, bundles, volume vs market cap, socials; 0-100…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it RugRadar token safety check: mint/freeze authority, holder concentration, liquidity, age, deployer history, dev holding/sold, snipers, bundles, volume vs market cap, socials; 0-100 risk score. $0.01 per check: 45+ data points per token, including 16 signals RugCheck's free report doesn't show (dev-sold %, sniper and launch-bundle share, a live can-you-sell quote, the creator's past launches, volume vs market cap, bot-trading score), across 5 chains.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
watch_tokenRugRadar Watch + Alert: watch one Solana token for 24h ($0.05 = 5 credits) or 48h ($0.10 = 10 credits).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.webhook_url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it RugRadar Watch + Alert: watch one Solana token for 24h ($0.05 = 5 credits) or 48h ($0.10 = 10 credits). Re-checked about every 10 min with the RugRadar engine; signed webhook alert when the dev sells, liquidity drops 30%+, mint/freeze authority appears, risk score jumps 20+ points, or it can't be sold. Pass a RugRadar credit key; without one the tool returns the x402 payment requirement for GET /watch.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write4
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 4
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (4 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://x402-seller-pmlm.onrender.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including rug_check (write), token_safety (write), honeypot_check (write), watch_token (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http rugradar https://x402-seller-pmlm.onrender.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http rugradar https://x402-seller-pmlm.onrender.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__rugradar__rug_check",
"mcp__rugradar__token_safety",
"mcp__rugradar__honeypot_check",
"mcp__rugradar__watch_token"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as rugradar. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__rugradar__rug_check untrusted-input
- mcp__rugradar__token_safety untrusted-input
- mcp__rugradar__honeypot_check untrusted-input
- mcp__rugradar__watch_token untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jimmybr-PDX/rugradar/verify?hash=29fd6d676864a838564162bd44ffc9c233b0619fbe9d888787ba8a36c23ed246" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 29fd6d676864, from Nov 19, 2026, 22:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jimmybr-PDX/rugradar/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jimmybr-PDX/rugradar)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:36 UTC.
RugRadar MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the RugRadar MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the RugRadar MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the RugRadar MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the RugRadar MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 write. rug_check, token_safety, honeypot_check and watch_token.
Does the RugRadar MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the RugRadar MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): watch_token.
Has the RugRadar MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 19, 2026.