ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server
io.github.joelp22-maker/referencesource-registrarsjoelp22-makerstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Is a domain registrar still ICANN-accredited, and has ICANN acted against it? 4,500+ registrars.
5 tools: 2 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server can do
The ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server is published by the GitHub account joelp22-maker. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: verify_quote and watch), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_registrar).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
verify_quoteIs this right?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Is this right? Check a claim about a registrar — its accreditation status, its name, an enforcement date — against the register instead of trusting it. Says whether the claim matches a stored value, appears only in the verbatim source quote, or differs (and then what the register says instead), and returns the source page and quote so the claim can be traced upstream.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a claimed registrar fact against the register
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
watchPolling this register every morning to see whether a registrar is still accredited?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Polling this register every morning to see whether a registrar is still accredited? Watch the record instead. Give a record id (from resolve_registrar or list_enforcement_actions) or an IANA id, and this hands back one URL that answers "has it changed" in a single conditional request: 304 if nothing we hold about that registrar has moved, 200 with the change and the publisher's own sentence if it has. Same feed as Atom for a feed reader. This register records a before and after for each change, so the feed can say what it used to say. We do not push and store nothing about you — the URL is derived from the record id, so this makes your poll cheap and definite rather than notifying you.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Watch one registrar for changes
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_registrarEverything this register holds for one IANA registrar ID: accreditation status, RDAP base URL, and any ICANN breach, suspension or termination notice with the date and the notice P…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_registrar" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Everything this register holds for one IANA registrar ID: accreditation status, RDAP base URL, and any ICANN breach, suspension or termination notice with the date and the notice PDF — each with its source page and a verbatim quote. Returns a LIST: ten IDs today carry two records because ICANN and IANA spell the registrar's name differently, and both are returned rather than one being chosen.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get a registrar's status and enforcement history by IANA ID
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
list_enforcement_actionsWhich registrars has ICANN acted against?No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_enforcement_actions" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Which registrars has ICANN acted against? Lists the Contractual Compliance notices in this register — breach, suspension and termination — newest first, with the registrar, the date as ICANN prints it, the notice PDF and a verbatim quote of the notice line. Filter by action type or by date to see recent enforcement.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List ICANN enforcement notices
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
resolve_registrarWhich registrar is this?No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "resolve_registrar" says "resolve": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Which registrar is this? Search ICANN's accredited-registrar register by registrar name (or part of one, e.g. "GoDaddy", "Tucows", "namecheap") or by IANA registrar ID. Returns the matching registrars with their accreditation status and any ICANN enforcement action, each with the page and verbatim quote it was read from. Use this first when you have a name; use get_registrar when you already have the IANA ID.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Find a registrar by name or IANA ID
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://referencesource.org/mcp/registrars: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_quote (write), watch (write)
Posture changes
- Nov 20, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff
- Added:watchChanges things
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 2.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 2
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http referencesource-registrars https://referencesource.org/mcp/registrarsclaude mcp add --transport http referencesource-registrars https://referencesource.org/mcp/registrarsRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__referencesource-registrars__resolve_registrar",
"mcp__referencesource-registrars__get_registrar",
"mcp__referencesource-registrars__list_enforcement_actions"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__referencesource-registrars__verify_quote",
"mcp__referencesource-registrars__watch"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as referencesource-registrars. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__referencesource-registrars__get_registrar untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.joelp22-maker/referencesource-registrars/verify?hash=d203e4393a475228420452e1ae86a0f1713cc27b7639735b631c825353b9b11d" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash d203e4393a47, from Nov 21, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.joelp22-maker/referencesource-registrars/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.joelp22-maker/referencesource-registrars)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:37 UTC.
ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 2 write, 3 read. verify_quote, watch, resolve_registrar, get_registrar and list_enforcement_actions.
Does the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the ICANN registrar accreditation status MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 21, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.