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webEmbedding MCP server

io.github.jongko54/web-embeddingjongko54streamable-httpv0.3.13Scanned

Clone any web page from a URL into a verified offline HTML copy, embed, or rebuild.

6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the webEmbedding MCP server can do

The webEmbedding MCP server is published by the GitHub account jongko54. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: detect_runtime_capabilities, discover_embed_candidates, classify_clone_mode, generate_embed_snippet and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (inspect_url and discover_embed_candidates); 3 tools can send data out of your system (inspect_url, discover_embed_candidates and generate_embed_snippet).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.3.13.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

6 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • classify_clone_modeDecide whether a reference should be embedded, sourced, locally captured, bounded-rebuilt, or blocked before reproduction.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Decide whether a reference should be embedded, sourced, locally captured, bounded-rebuilt, or blocked before reproduction.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • detect_runtime_capabilitiesReport hosted Apps SDK readiness, read-only runtime capabilities, unsupported capture behavior, and the local stdio command.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report hosted Apps SDK readiness, read-only runtime capabilities, unsupported capture behavior, and the local stdio command.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • discover_embed_candidatesExtract likely embed, preview, viewer, remix, and source URLs from a public or user-authorized page.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Extract likely embed, preview, viewer, remix, and source URLs from a public or user-authorized page.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
  • generate_embed_snippetGenerate an iframe snippet for a known frameable and authorized URL.Can send data out1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "generate_embed_snippet" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Generate an iframe snippet for a known frameable and authorized URL. Does not verify frameability by itself.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • plan_reproduction_pathCreate a source-first plan that separates exact embed/source reuse from local capture and bounded rebuild work.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "plan_reproduction_path" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a source-first plan that separates exact embed/source reuse from local capture and bounded rebuild work.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • inspect_urlFetch a public or user-authorized URL and inspect title, metadata, frame policy, and likely source/embed candidates.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "inspect_url" says "inspect": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "inspect_url" says "inspect" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "fetch" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a public or user-authorized URL and inspect title, metadata, frame policy, and likely source/embed candidates. Does not capture screenshots or persist artifacts.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-03-26
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://webembedding-jongkos-mcp.vercel.app/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including detect_runtime_capabilities (write), discover_embed_candidates (write), classify_clone_mode (write), generate_embed_snippet (write), plan_reproduction_path (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 5
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-03-26

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "generate_embed_snippet" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_embed_snippet" says "generate": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "plan_reproduction_path" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 5 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 402 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 5
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-03-26

Install

Pinned to version 0.3.13. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http web-embedding https://webembedding-jongkos-mcp.vercel.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http web-embedding https://webembedding-jongkos-mcp.vercel.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__web-embedding__detect_runtime_capabilities",
      "mcp__web-embedding__inspect_url",
      "mcp__web-embedding__discover_embed_candidates",
      "mcp__web-embedding__classify_clone_mode",
      "mcp__web-embedding__generate_embed_snippet",
      "mcp__web-embedding__plan_reproduction_path"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as web-embedding. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__web-embedding__inspect_url untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__web-embedding__discover_embed_candidates untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__web-embedding__generate_embed_snippet outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding/verify?hash=52d5f0a149b64dc7780d10e1b0263e5b103318f53ee6fb1a2df7284d6fd896e2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 52d5f0a149b6, from Nov 8, 2026, 15:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.jongko54/web-embedding
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jongko54/web-embedding)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 8, 2026, 15:17 UTC.

webEmbedding MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the webEmbedding MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the webEmbedding MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the webEmbedding MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the webEmbedding MCP server have?

6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. detect_runtime_capabilities, discover_embed_candidates, classify_clone_mode, generate_embed_snippet, plan_reproduction_path and inspect_url.

Does the webEmbedding MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the webEmbedding MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): inspect_url, discover_embed_candidates and generate_embed_snippet.

Has the webEmbedding MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.