Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server
io.github.jueluddinsf/handoffjueluddinsfstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned
Send a file to a user or agent as a share link with expiry, max opens, approval, revoke and logs.
14 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 6 change things and 5 only read.
- Reads private data · 4
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server can do
The Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account jueluddinsf. It has 14 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: deny_share, revoke_share and delete_file) and create or change data (6 tools: share_file, signup, save_file, create_share_link and 2 more). 5 tools only read.
4 tools read private data (list_files, get_share_status, fetch_shared_file and 1 more); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (share_file and fetch_shared_file).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
14 tools
Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
delete_fileDelete a file you own.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "delete_file" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Delete a file you own. The bytes are removed and existing share links stop working. Requires your API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Delete a file
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
save_fileSave a private file for this account.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "save_file" says "save": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Save a private file for this account. Pass name and content_text or content_base64. Returns the file id and metadata. Does not share the file. Requires your API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Save a file
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
signupCreate a Handoff account and return an API key once.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a Handoff account and return an API key once. No Authorization header is required. Save api_key. On later calls send Authorization: Bearer <api_key>, the bare key in Authorization, or X-Handoff-Api-Key. Pass api_key only if you cannot set headers. share_file can create this key for you. The key is a secret. Do not put it in a file you share.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Create an account
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
get_access_logRead the latest 1000 access attempts for an owned grant, including refused downloads.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_access_log" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the latest 1000 access attempts for an owned grant, including refused downloads. Use this to see whether a share was opened. Requires your API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get access log
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
list_filesList this account's files, newest first, up to 1000.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_files" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "list_files" says "list" and "file": it reads files.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it List this account's files, newest first, up to 1000. Use this to find a file_id before sharing. Returns metadata only, never bytes or download URLs. Requires your API key.
Annotations the server declares
- title: List files
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data4
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 9
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (3 destructive, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://hand-off.space/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including deny_share (destructive), revoke_share (destructive), delete_file (destructive), share_file (write), signup (write) and 4 more
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 9
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools3 added, 11 changed.+3 added~11 changedView diff
- Added:delete_fileDeletes or cancels
- Added:list_sharesOnly reads
- Added:update_shareChanges things
- Changed:approve_shareChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:create_share_linkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:deny_shareDeletes or cancelsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:fetch_shared_fileOnly readsannotations
- Changed:get_access_logOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:get_share_statusOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:list_filesOnly readsannotations
- Changed:revoke_shareDeletes or cancelsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:save_fileChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:share_fileChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
- Changed:signupChanges thingsannotations
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 -> 9.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 9
Tools1 added, 10 changed.+1 added~10 changedView diff
- Added:share_fileChanges things
- Changed:approve_shareChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:create_share_linkChanges thingstitleannotations
- Changed:deny_shareDeletes or cancelstitleannotations
- Changed:fetch_shared_fileOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:get_access_logOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:get_share_statusOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:list_filesOnly readstitleannotations
- Changed:revoke_shareDeletes or cancelstitleannotations
- Changed:save_fileChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
- Changed:signupChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchemaannotations
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http handoff https://hand-off.space/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http handoff https://hand-off.space/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__handoff__list_files",
"mcp__handoff__get_share_status",
"mcp__handoff__get_access_log",
"mcp__handoff__fetch_shared_file",
"mcp__handoff__list_shares"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__handoff__share_file",
"mcp__handoff__signup",
"mcp__handoff__save_file",
"mcp__handoff__create_share_link",
"mcp__handoff__approve_share",
"mcp__handoff__update_share"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__handoff__deny_share",
"mcp__handoff__revoke_share",
"mcp__handoff__delete_file"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as handoff. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__handoff__share_file untrusted-input
- mcp__handoff__list_files private-data
- mcp__handoff__get_share_status private-data
- mcp__handoff__fetch_shared_file private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__handoff__list_shares private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff/verify?hash=89f396d201f3fc071767ae427b334d0be417d1fa7e00bb02d7f2b5860231dce9" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 89f396d201f3, from Nov 11, 2026, 10:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: deny_share, revoke_share and delete_file.
Can the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server have?
- 14 tools: 3 destructive, 6 write, 5 read. deny_share, revoke_share, delete_file, share_file, signup, save_file, create_share_link, approve_share and 6 more.
Does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.