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Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server

io.github.jueluddinsf/handoffjueluddinsfstreamable-httpv1.0.1Scanned

Send a file to a user or agent as a share link with expiry, max opens, approval, revoke and logs.

14 tools: 3 can delete or cancel things, 6 change things and 5 only read.

Tools: 3 delete, 0 irreversible, 6 write, 5 read.
  • Reads private data · 4
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server can do

The Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account jueluddinsf. It has 14 tools. It can delete or cancel things (3 tools: deny_share, revoke_share and delete_file) and create or change data (6 tools: share_file, signup, save_file, create_share_link and 2 more). 5 tools only read.

4 tools read private data (list_files, get_share_status, fetch_shared_file and 1 more); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (share_file and fetch_shared_file).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.0.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

14 tools

Deletes or cancels 3Claude Code: deny
  • delete_fileDelete a file you own.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_file" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Delete a file you own. The bytes are removed and existing share links stop working. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Delete a file
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
  • deny_shareDeny an owned grant.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Deny an owned grant. A denied grant stays blocked. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Deny a share
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
  • revoke_sharePermanently revoke an owned share.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "revoke_share" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "cannot be undone".
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Permanently revoke an owned share. Later downloads fail. This cannot be undone and does not delete the file. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Revoke a share
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
  • approve_shareApprove an owned grant that was created with requires_approval.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "approve_share" says "approve": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Approve an owned grant that was created with requires_approval. Opens stay blocked until this succeeds. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Approve a share
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • save_fileSave a private file for this account.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "save_file" says "save": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Save a private file for this account. Pass name and content_text or content_base64. Returns the file id and metadata. Does not share the file. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Save a file
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • share_fileShare a file in one call and get a download link.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Share a file in one call and get a download link. Pass name and content_text (or content_base64). Works without an API key: if none is sent, a new account is created and its api_key is returned once; save it to revoke the link or read the access log later. Default link: anyone with the link, expires in 7 days.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Share a file
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • signupCreate a Handoff account and return an API key once.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Create a Handoff account and return an API key once. No Authorization header is required. Save api_key. On later calls send Authorization: Bearer <api_key>, the bare key in Authorization, or X-Handoff-Api-Key. Pass api_key only if you cannot set headers. share_file can create this key for you. The key is a secret. Do not put it in a file you share.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Create an account
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
  • update_shareSet when an owned share expires.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "update_share" says "update": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Set when an owned share expires. expires_in_hours is measured from now. Example: 168 for 7 days. Does not return the token. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Update share expiry
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
Only reads 5Show 5 read-only tools
  • fetch_shared_fileDownload a file from a share url or token.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "fetch_shared_file" says "fetch": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "fetch_shared_file" says "fetch" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "file": it reads files.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Download a file from a share url or token. Use this when you were given a Handoff url and need the bytes. Honors expiry, open limits, approval, and agent audience. anyone_with_link needs no key. An agent audience uses your API key. Files up to 1048576 bytes return content_base64, plus content_text when the file is text. Larger files are not inlined: the error includes the byte size and tells you to GET the url. A successful inline return counts as an open. A file over the inline limit does not.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch a shared file
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_access_logRead the latest 1000 access attempts for an owned grant, including refused downloads.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_access_log" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read the latest 1000 access attempts for an owned grant, including refused downloads. Use this to see whether a share was opened. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get access log
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • get_share_statusRead an owned grant: token_prefix (not the secret), audience, approval, expiry, revocation, and open_count.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_share_status" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "read" and "secret": it reads secrets.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read an owned grant: token_prefix (not the secret), audience, approval, expiry, revocation, and open_count. Does not download the file and does not return the share URL. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get share status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • list_filesList this account's files, newest first, up to 1000.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_files" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_files" says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "file": it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List this account's files, newest first, up to 1000. Use this to find a file_id before sharing. Returns metadata only, never bytes or download URLs. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List files
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
  • list_sharesList grants you own.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_shares" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe input names a file (input.file_id), and the tool reads: it reads files.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List grants you own. Pass file_id to limit the list to one file. Returns grant_id, status, open_count, max_opens, expires_at, and audience. Does not return tokens or download urls. Requires your API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List shares
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data4
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (3 destructive, 6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://hand-off.space/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including deny_share (destructive), revoke_share (destructive), delete_file (destructive), share_file (write), signup (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 6, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 9

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools3 added, 11 changed.+3 added~11 changedView diff
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 -> 9.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 7 to 9
  3. Tools1 added, 10 changed.+1 added~10 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http handoff https://hand-off.space/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http handoff https://hand-off.space/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__handoff__list_files",
      "mcp__handoff__get_share_status",
      "mcp__handoff__get_access_log",
      "mcp__handoff__fetch_shared_file",
      "mcp__handoff__list_shares"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__handoff__share_file",
      "mcp__handoff__signup",
      "mcp__handoff__save_file",
      "mcp__handoff__create_share_link",
      "mcp__handoff__approve_share",
      "mcp__handoff__update_share"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__handoff__deny_share",
      "mcp__handoff__revoke_share",
      "mcp__handoff__delete_file"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as handoff. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__handoff__share_file untrusted-input
  • mcp__handoff__list_files private-data
  • mcp__handoff__get_share_status private-data
  • mcp__handoff__fetch_shared_file private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__handoff__list_shares private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff/verify?hash=89f396d201f3fc071767ae427b334d0be417d1fa7e00bb02d7f2b5860231dce9" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 89f396d201f3, from Nov 11, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jueluddinsf/handoff)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 21:18 UTC.

Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server delete data?

Yes. 3 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: deny_share, revoke_share and delete_file.

Can the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server have?

14 tools: 3 destructive, 6 write, 5 read. deny_share, revoke_share, delete_file, share_file, signup, save_file, create_share_link, approve_share and 6 more.

Does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Handoff: Send Files to Users & Agents MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.