eatmeprint-ordering MCP server
io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-orderingjump4jumpstreamable-httpv1.10.0Scanned
EatMePrint agent ordering: get_pricing, preview_set, place_order, check_order.
4 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server can do
The eatmeprint-ordering MCP server is published by the GitHub account jump4jump. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: place_order) and create or change data (1 tool: check_order). 2 tools only read.
3 tools bring in text other people can write (preview_set, place_order and check_order).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 1.10.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
place_orderPlaces a REAL order for physical macarons shipped to a real address, and returns a crypto deposit address to send funds to.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The input addresses people (input.recipient): what it sends cannot be taken back.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Places a REAL order for physical macarons shipped to a real address, and returns a crypto deposit address to send funds to. Confirm the total, the delivery address and the allergen warning with the person you are acting for BEFORE calling this. Pass either `images` (nine URLs, simplest — the set is built for you) or the `set_hash` and `add_to_cart_fields` returned by a previous preview_set call. Returns an order id, a crypto deposit address and amount, and a status link that needs no account or password. The order only reaches the bakery after the payment confirms. A recipient phone number is REQUIRED - carriers need it to generate a label, so collect it before calling.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_orderLook up the current state of an order using the id and code from the status link.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_order" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up the current state of an order using the id and code from the status link. Needs no account and no password. Use this to report progress back to the person who asked.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_pricingPrice, shipping cost, lead time and allergen information for an edible photo macaron set.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_pricing" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Price, shipping cost, lead time and allergen information for an edible photo macaron set. Call this before ordering so you can tell the person what it costs and what is in it. Pass the delivery ZIP to get a firm shipping cost and total: it is the same live carrier rate place_order will book for that ZIP. Without a ZIP the reply is "$67 plus shipping".
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
preview_setBuild a printable set from exactly nine public image URLs, in grid order (left to right, top to bottom).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "preview_set" says "preview": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Build a printable set from exactly nine public image URLs, in grid order (left to right, top to bottom). Returns thumbnail previews, the price, and a set_hash to pass to place_order. Images must be JPEG or PNG, up to 10 MB each, reachable over plain https with no redirect. Private or internal addresses are refused. Nothing is charged and no order is created.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including place_order (destructive), check_order (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_order
The server marks "check_order" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:place_orderDeletes or cancelstitle
- Changed:preview_setOnly readsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.10.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http eatmeprint-ordering https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http eatmeprint-ordering https://eatmeprint-mcp.eatmeprint.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__get_pricing",
"mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__preview_set"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__check_order"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__place_order"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as eatmeprint-ordering. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 3 rules
- mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__preview_set untrusted-input
- mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__place_order untrusted-input
- mcp__eatmeprint-ordering__check_order untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering/verify?hash=85251a7c14e05a795f9e64b18ac2d333772447673311a7912e6accc1c3a37045" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 85251a7c14e0, from Nov 10, 2026, 14:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.jump4jump/eatmeprint-ordering)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
eatmeprint-ordering MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: place_order.
Can the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 2 read. place_order, check_order, get_pricing and preview_set.
Does the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the eatmeprint-ordering MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.