Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server
io.github.kburrus64-max/prop-firm-ruleskburrus64-maxstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Sourced prop-firm daily-loss and max-drawdown rules and a drawdown-room checker. Read-only, no auth.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server can do
The Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server is published by the GitHub account kburrus64-max. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_drawdown), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_rules).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_drawdownRemaining daily-loss and max-drawdown room in dollars for an account, the binding limit and breach flags, computed with the same model as the FloorGuard calculator.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Remaining daily-loss and max-drawdown room in dollars for an account, the binding limit and breach flags, computed with the same model as the FloorGuard calculator. Same inputs as GET /api/v1/check.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_rulesFull daily-loss and max-drawdown rules for one program (static/trailing mode, lock, reset time, notes, official source links, firm copy-trading/automation policy).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_rules" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "note": it reads notes.
Description, as the server wrote it Full daily-loss and max-drawdown rules for one program (static/trailing mode, lock, reset time, notes, official source links, firm copy-trading/automation policy). Same as GET /api/v1/rules?program=<id>.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
list_firmsList supported prop firms and their programs: program ids, account sizes, verified flags and last-verified dates.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_firms" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List supported prop firms and their programs: program ids, account sizes, verified flags and last-verified dates. Same data as GET /api/v1/firms.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:06 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://floorguard-kappa.vercel.app/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_drawdown (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http prop-firm-rules https://floorguard-kappa.vercel.app/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http prop-firm-rules https://floorguard-kappa.vercel.app/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__prop-firm-rules__list_firms",
"mcp__prop-firm-rules__get_rules"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__prop-firm-rules__check_drawdown"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as prop-firm-rules. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__prop-firm-rules__get_rules private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.kburrus64-max/prop-firm-rules/verify?hash=bc99915f032d6f2bce067ecc855a2b2317340e066ddbf56ce475ef8c477b40f7" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash bc99915f032d, from Nov 20, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.kburrus64-max/prop-firm-rules/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.kburrus64-max/prop-firm-rules)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:37 UTC.
Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_drawdown, list_firms and get_rules.
Does the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Prop Firm Rules (FloorGuard) MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.