agent-crm MCP server
io.github.khaoss85/agent-crmkhaoss85streamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Read-only docs for the Accordo CRM framework: what it proves, and where it stops.
3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the agent-crm MCP server can do
The agent-crm MCP server is published by the GitHub account khaoss85. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_job), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (search_docs).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_jobAnswer "can this framework do X?" against the CRM jobs-to-be-done index.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Answer "can this framework do X?" against the CRM jobs-to-be-done index. Returns the matching jobs with their status (not supported / partially supported / technically supported / validated end to end), the tests that prove them, and an explicit answer when the truth is that the job is not supported.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
get_capabilityResolve a capability from the claims ledger by id (C-nn), by standing-limitation id (L-nn), or by topic.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_capability" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Resolve a capability from the claims ledger by id (C-nn), by standing-limitation id (L-nn), or by topic. Every capability is returned together with the evidence that proves it and the limitation that bounds it — this tool cannot return one without the other.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_docsKeyword search across this framework's documentation set (README, AGENTS, ARCHITECTURE, PRODUCT, DECISIONS and everything under docs/).Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "doc": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Keyword search across this framework's documentation set (README, AGENTS, ARCHITECTURE, PRODUCT, DECISIONS and everything under docs/). Returns the file path, the nearest heading and an excerpt for each hit. Read-only; it serves documentation, never customer records.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://accordo.dev/api/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including check_job (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-crm https://accordo.dev/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-crm https://accordo.dev/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-crm__search_docs",
"mcp__agent-crm__get_capability"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-crm__check_job"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-crm. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agent-crm__search_docs private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.khaoss85/agent-crm/verify?hash=414e699ff662f2ed2751201f52defcd5f98b8b20dc5229c298ebff82a1da2f5b" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 414e699ff662, from Nov 20, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.khaoss85/agent-crm/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.khaoss85/agent-crm)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:37 UTC.
agent-crm MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the agent-crm MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the agent-crm MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the agent-crm MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the agent-crm MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. check_job, search_docs and get_capability.
Does the agent-crm MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the agent-crm MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the agent-crm MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.