case-doha-record MCP server
io.github.klmlfl/case-doha-recordklmlflstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Search 30,000+ decided U.S. DOHA security-clearance decisions, cited to the public record.
7 tools: 1 change things and 6 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the case-doha-record MCP server can do
The case-doha-record MCP server is published by the GitHub account klmlfl. It has 7 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: similar_cases), but cannot delete data. 6 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
7 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
similar_casesThe most similar decided cases to a given case, ranked by how alike the ALLEGATIONS read (never by outcome).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it The most similar decided cases to a given case, ranked by how alike the ALLEGATIONS read (never by outcome). Same list shown on the case page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
get_candor_outcomesHow cases with a candor allegation (falsification, omission, or lack of candor) were resolved in the decided record: the favorable rate with vs without such an allegation, when the…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_candor_outcomes" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How cases with a candor allegation (falsification, omission, or lack of candor) were resolved in the decided record: the favorable rate with vs without such an allegation, when the judge found a deliberate falsification vs when the applicant rebutted it, and when the applicant corrected the record before being confronted. Counts and denominators throughout. Descriptive, never a prediction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_caseFetch one decided DOHA case in full: what was alleged, the judge's findings per allegation, per-guideline formal findings, outcome, judge, representation, and appeal history.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_case" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one decided DOHA case in full: what was alleged, the judge's findings per allegation, per-guideline formal findings, outcome, judge, representation, and appeal history. Use case_id from search_cases.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_conduct_recencyHow much time had passed between the most recent conduct and the decision, measured from dates stated in the decisions, for the incident-type concerns (drugs, alcohol, criminal con…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_conduct_recency" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it How much time had passed between the most recent conduct and the decision, measured from dates stated in the decisions, for the incident-type concerns (drugs, alcohol, criminal conduct, sexual behavior, protected information, IT misuse). Reports median years before favorable vs unfavorable decisions, with counts. Descriptive association, never a prediction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_statisticsGrant/denial statistics over decided hearing-level DOHA cases, grouped by year or by guideline, always with sample sizes.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_statistics" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Grant/denial statistics over decided hearing-level DOHA cases, grouped by year or by guideline, always with sample sizes. Same population rules as the site's Insights page.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_timelinesMeasured DOHA timelines: median days from Statement of Reasons to hearing and to decision, from dates stated in the decisions themselves.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_timelines" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Measured DOHA timelines: median days from Statement of Reasons to hearing and to decision, from dates stated in the decisions themselves. Optionally scoped to one decision year.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
search_casesSearch 30,000+ decided public DOHA security-clearance decisions (1996 to present).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_cases" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search 30,000+ decided public DOHA security-clearance decisions (1996 to present). Full-text query plus filters. Returns matching cases with outcome, date, guidelines, and a citable URL each.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.clearancesearchengine.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including similar_cases (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http case-doha-record https://www.clearancesearchengine.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http case-doha-record https://www.clearancesearchengine.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__case-doha-record__search_cases",
"mcp__case-doha-record__get_case",
"mcp__case-doha-record__get_statistics",
"mcp__case-doha-record__get_timelines",
"mcp__case-doha-record__get_conduct_recency",
"mcp__case-doha-record__get_candor_outcomes"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__case-doha-record__similar_cases"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as case-doha-record. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.klmlfl/case-doha-record/verify?hash=9b07a52d121e62c2da622717e880b518304da7ebe6ca81abb28d4c7eb58dcbf3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 9b07a52d121e, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.klmlfl/case-doha-record/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.klmlfl/case-doha-record)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:37 UTC.
case-doha-record MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the case-doha-record MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the case-doha-record MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the case-doha-record MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the case-doha-record MCP server have?
- 7 tools: 1 write, 6 read. similar_cases, search_cases, get_case, get_statistics, get_timelines, get_conduct_recency and get_candor_outcomes.
Does the case-doha-record MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the case-doha-record MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the case-doha-record MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.