AgentCrush MCP server
io.github.kristof-sudo/agentcrush-appkristof-sudostreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned
Market intelligence for the AI agent economy: rankings, trust signals, liveness. 13 tools.
14 tools: 1 change things and 13 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 13
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentCrush MCP server can do
The AgentCrush MCP server is published by the GitHub account kristof-sudo. It has 14 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_counterparty), but cannot delete data. 13 tools only read.
13 tools bring in text other people can write (search_agents, get_agent_details, get_agent_history and 10 more).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
14 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
verify_counterpartyTHE pre-transaction question in one free call: should my agent deal with this counterparty right now?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it THE pre-transaction question in one free call: should my agent deal with this counterparty right now? Returns proceed / caution / reject with reasoning. Liveness-aware: an agent with no public activity signal in 30+ days never gets a clean proceed, even if well-ranked. Use before paying, delegating to, or integrating any agent. Deeper analysis (full risk decomposition, history, signed attestation) is x402/Pro priced — pointers included in the response.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 13Show 13 read-only tools
compare_agentsCompare 2-5 AI agents side-by-side across all their categories.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "compare_agents" says "compare": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare 2-5 AI agents side-by-side across all their categories. Returns full per-agent scoring data + comparison context. Use for "X vs Y" queries. AgentCrush does not declare a universal winner — comparison shows evidence differences.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
find_agentsCounterparty discovery: "which agents can do X and are safe to pay?" Returns the top 3 ranked candidates with liveness (30-day Ghost Index rule), trust tier, verified payment rails…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "find_agents" says "find": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Counterparty discovery: "which agents can do X and are safe to pay?" Returns the top 3 ranked candidates with liveness (30-day Ghost Index rule), trust tier, verified payment rails (x402/MCP/ERC-8004), scores, and endpoints, plus the total match count. The full ranked list (up to 50) is at https://agentcrush.xyz/api/agents/find/full — $0.05 via x402 on Base, or free with an AgentCrush Pro key.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_agent_changesPairwise delta scan over an agent's recent snapshots.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent_changes" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Pairwise delta scan over an agent's recent snapshots. Reports material changes in score, rank, github_stars, follower_count, identity_type, etc. Mirror of GET /api/agent/{handle}/changes.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_agent_detailsGet full details for a specific AI agent including all category scores it qualifies for (model_family, tokenized, service, developer).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent_details" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get full details for a specific AI agent including all category scores it qualifies for (model_family, tokenized, service, developer). Returns identity, raw signals, sub-scores, evidence-ready status. Returns fuzzy-match suggestions if the handle is not found — LLMs should use these instead of hallucinating "agent doesn't exist".
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_agent_historyGet rank and score history for an AI agent over the past 1–90 days.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent_history" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get rank and score history for an AI agent over the past 1–90 days. Daily snapshots, deduplicated per calendar day. Returns trend summary (rising/falling/flat). Useful for showing how an agent's standing has evolved.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_agent_trustSingle-call composite trust score (0-100) + classification (verified / provisional / unverified / low_trust) for delegation decisions.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_agent_trust" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Single-call composite trust score (0-100) + classification (verified / provisional / unverified / low_trust) for delegation decisions. Combines confidence_tier, evidence tier, ERC-8004 verified identity, and risk flags. Mirror of GET /api/agent/{handle}/trust.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_category_rankingGet the full ranking for one of the 5 categories.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_category_ranking" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the full ranking for one of the 5 categories. Returns agents ordered by composite score with all sub-scores visible. Defaults to evidence-ranked only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_ecosystem_summaryOne-call ecosystem-level summary: counts (total, evidence-ranked, archived), category mix (model_family/tokenized/service/developer/mcp_server), category leaders, snapshot volume l…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_ecosystem_summary" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it One-call ecosystem-level summary: counts (total, evidence-ranked, archived), category mix (model_family/tokenized/service/developer/mcp_server), category leaders, snapshot volume last 30 days. Mirror of GET /api/trends/summary.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_methodologyGet the scoring methodology for one category — weights, signal sources, formulas, evidence-ready rule, and known limitations.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_methodology" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get the scoring methodology for one category — weights, signal sources, formulas, evidence-ready rule, and known limitations. **Methodology travels with data**: call this when explaining HOW a ranking works so the LLM can give a methodology-accurate answer instead of guessing.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_protocol_adoptionHow many indexed agents touch each major protocol/surface (ERC-8004 verified, Virtuals tokens, Agentverse, x402/Bazaar, HuggingFace, GitHub).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_protocol_adoption" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it How many indexed agents touch each major protocol/surface (ERC-8004 verified, Virtuals tokens, Agentverse, x402/Bazaar, HuggingFace, GitHub). Useful for ecosystem-state questions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
get_top_moversReturns the top weekly rank movers (up + down) computed from agents.weekly_delta.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_top_movers" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the top weekly rank movers (up + down) computed from agents.weekly_delta. Useful for surfacing notable changes since last week. Default limit 10 per direction.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
list_categoriesList the 5 AgentCrush agent categories with tracked + evidence-ranked counts and current methodology versions.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_categories" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it List the 5 AgentCrush agent categories with tracked + evidence-ranked counts and current methodology versions. Use this for market-level discovery — what kinds of agents does AgentCrush track and how many of each?
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
search_agentsSearch AI agents by name or keyword across AgentCrush's evidence-ranked index.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_agents" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search AI agents by name or keyword across AgentCrush's evidence-ranked index. Returns matching agents with category, tier, and rank info. Use the `filters` object for structured constraints; future versions will add filter keys without breaking the API.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write13
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.agentcrush.xyz/api/mcp/v1: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_counterparty (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentcrush-app https://www.agentcrush.xyz/api/mcp/v1claude mcp add --transport http agentcrush-app https://www.agentcrush.xyz/api/mcp/v1Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agentcrush-app__search_agents",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_details",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_history",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__compare_agents",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__list_categories",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_category_ranking",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_methodology",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_trust",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_top_movers",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_protocol_adoption",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_changes",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__get_ecosystem_summary",
"mcp__agentcrush-app__find_agents"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentcrush-app__verify_counterparty"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentcrush-app. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 13 rules
- mcp__agentcrush-app__search_agents untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_details untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_history untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__compare_agents untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__list_categories untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_category_ranking untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_trust untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__verify_counterparty untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_top_movers untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_protocol_adoption untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_agent_changes untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__get_ecosystem_summary untrusted-input
- mcp__agentcrush-app__find_agents untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.kristof-sudo/agentcrush-app/verify?hash=de120bec42e259fa00d5326f08bf258f6e5b8a0815301800d7f26b3ab099ce41" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash de120bec42e2, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.kristof-sudo/agentcrush-app/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.kristof-sudo/agentcrush-app)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:37 UTC.
AgentCrush MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentCrush MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentCrush MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentCrush MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentCrush MCP server have?
- 14 tools: 1 write, 13 read. verify_counterparty, search_agents, get_agent_details, get_agent_history, compare_agents, list_categories, get_category_ranking, get_methodology and 6 more.
Does the AgentCrush MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentCrush MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentCrush MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.