Dependency check MCP server
io.github.ladanyin/dependency-checkladanyinstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Check a package version for known vulnerabilities and Packagist release facts.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Dependency check MCP server can do
The Dependency check MCP server is published by the GitHub account ladanyin. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_dependency), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_package and check_dependency).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_dependencyLook up known vulnerabilities for one package version from OSV.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up known vulnerabilities for one package version from OSV. Returns advisory id, summary, CVE aliases, severity string, and fixed versions when the advisory lists them. Ecosystems: packagist, npm, pypi, go, crates.io, maven, rubygems, nuget. Omit ecosystem and a vendor/package name uses Packagist, otherwise npm. An empty list means OSV returned none, and that successful lookup is charged. This is not a full audit. The first 5 successful calls each UTC day from one network address are free and need no key. not_found and fetch_failed are not charged and do not use a free call. After the 5, send X-API-Key. A key call costs 0.04 credit on success. Key: https://firm.bestsmartgoods.com/signup
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
check_packageRead the current Packagist facts for one PHP package: latest stable version, required PHP, license, and whether it is abandoned.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "read": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Read the current Packagist facts for one PHP package: latest stable version, required PHP, license, and whether it is abandoned. Use it before composer require. Send vendor/package. Set version to ask about one release; version_found is false when that release is absent, and the latest stable is still returned. This does not list vulnerabilities. The first 5 successful calls each UTC day from one network address are free and need no key. not_found and fetch_failed are not charged and do not use a free call. After the 5, send X-API-Key. A key call costs 0.04 credit on success. Key: https://firm.bestsmartgoods.com/signup
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- idempotentHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 19, 2026, 17:23 UTC, unchanged since Nov 5, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://deps.bestsmartgoods.com/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including check_dependency (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http dependency-check https://deps.bestsmartgoods.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'claude mcp add --transport http dependency-check https://deps.bestsmartgoods.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'Run in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__dependency-check__check_package"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__dependency-check__check_dependency"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as dependency-check. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__dependency-check__check_package untrusted-input
- mcp__dependency-check__check_dependency untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ladanyin/dependency-check/verify?hash=12e5f80e9714e30246ee5905b325a8603ecd2a1280010684ffd7acdf8c674c85" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 12e5f80e9714, from Nov 18, 2026, 18:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ladanyin/dependency-check/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ladanyin/dependency-check)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 00:17 UTC.
Dependency check MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Dependency check MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Dependency check MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Dependency check MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Dependency check MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. check_dependency and check_package.
Does the Dependency check MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Dependency check MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Dependency check MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.