AgentFlow MCP server
io.github.leonidahqadmin-cell/agentflowleonidahqadmin-cellstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Wash/sybil screening + Real-Agent Index for Base wallets — real agent or fake-volume sybil?
6 tools: 6 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
6 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AgentFlow MCP server can do
The AgentFlow MCP server is published by the GitHub account leonidahqadmin-cell. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (6 tools: screen_wallet, counterparty_risk, real_agent_index, agent_pulse and 2 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 6Claude Code: ask
agent_pulseThe speedometer: distinct genuine AI agents ACTIVE on Base in the live 24h / 72h window (rises AND falls), vs.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it The speedometer: distinct genuine AI agents ACTIVE on Base in the live 24h / 72h window (rises AND falls), vs. the cumulative count.
counterparty_riskCounterparty risk score (0-100; LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/UNKNOWN) for any Base wallet — wash + hub detection + automation score + known-entity labels.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Counterparty risk score (0-100; LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH/UNKNOWN) for any Base wallet — wash + hub detection + automation score + known-entity labels.
index_statsAgentFlow coverage stats: wallets tracked, agents labeled, hubs excluded, authorized x402 payers, transfers in the live window, last indexed block.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it AgentFlow coverage stats: wallets tracked, agents labeled, hubs excluded, authorized x402 payers, transfers in the live window, last indexed block.
real_agent_indexThe Real-Agent Index: what % of 'AI agent' USDC flow on Base is wash/self-dealing vs.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it The Real-Agent Index: what % of 'AI agent' USDC flow on Base is wash/self-dealing vs. genuine one-way payments. The honest benchmark.
screen_walletWash/sybil screen for any Base wallet — real autonomous agent or fake-volume sybil?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Wash/sybil screen for any Base wallet — real autonomous agent or fake-volume sybil? Returns a calibrated sybil_score (0-100), confidence, and the reasons. Use before an agent trusts or pays a counterparty.
x402_rail_tapeThe Base EIP-3009 Settlement Tape: daily verifiable FLOOR on gasless x402-style USDC settlement on Base — tx count, volume, wash-suspect share (count + value), median payment, shar…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it The Base EIP-3009 Settlement Tape: daily verifiable FLOOR on gasless x402-style USDC settlement on Base — tx count, volume, wash-suspect share (count + value), median payment, share of value >=$1, and chain coverage %. Methodology-versioned, receipts-backed. NOT total x402 volume — a lower bound with its blind spots disclosed.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 6
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 6 tools that change things (6 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agentflow.watch/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including screen_wallet (write), counterparty_risk (write), real_agent_index (write), agent_pulse (write), index_stats (write) and 1 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agentflow https://agentflow.watch/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agentflow https://agentflow.watch/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__agentflow__screen_wallet",
"mcp__agentflow__counterparty_risk",
"mcp__agentflow__real_agent_index",
"mcp__agentflow__agent_pulse",
"mcp__agentflow__index_stats",
"mcp__agentflow__x402_rail_tape"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentflow. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.leonidahqadmin-cell/agentflow/verify?hash=77884d96ca48eec7e2dde9269d0b7e1340641f1f92d00509eee988477f45e5f9" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 77884d96ca48, from Nov 21, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.leonidahqadmin-cell/agentflow/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.leonidahqadmin-cell/agentflow)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.
AgentFlow MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AgentFlow MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 6 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AgentFlow MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AgentFlow MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AgentFlow MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 6 write. screen_wallet, counterparty_risk, real_agent_index, agent_pulse, index_stats and x402_rail_tape.
Does the AgentFlow MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AgentFlow MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the AgentFlow MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.