Probe V0 MCP server
io.github.lexbritten/probelexbrittenstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Experimental MCP server for current empirical verification of explicit public HTTPS endpoint claims.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 1
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Probe V0 MCP server can do
The Probe V0 MCP server is published by the GitHub account lexbritten. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_http_claim), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (verify_http_claim and probe.history); 1 tool can send data out of your system (verify_http_claim).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
verify_http_claimUse this to verify a current public HTTPS claim by direct observation rather than web search, documentation, browser inference, or shell/curl.Reads text others writeCan send data out2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...supports only public HTTPS URLs without credentials, query strings, fragments, IP literals,..."
- Info
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "Public HTTPS URL to observe. V0 forbids credentials, query strings, fragments, IP literals,..."
Description, as the server wrote it Use this to verify a current public HTTPS claim by direct observation rather than web search, documentation, browser inference, or shell/curl. Use for explicit assertions that a GET/HEAD currently returns an expected HTTP status, exact header value, JSON value at a JSON Pointer, or body substring. It evaluates assertions, persists bounded evidence, reuses sufficiently fresh matching evidence, and summarizes recent observations. follow_redirects defaults to false; when true, Probe manually follows at most 3 validated HTTPS redirects. Every fetch uses redirect: manual. V0 supports only public HTTPS URLs without credentials, query strings, fragments, IP literals, or non-443 ports. Redirect validation is hostname/policy based; the Worker cannot guarantee protection against DNS rebinding between validation and platform DNS resolution.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
probe.historyRetrieve up to 20 persisted observations for an existing Probe experiment ID without making a new HTTP request.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "retrieve": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "retrieve" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieve up to 20 persisted observations for an existing Probe experiment ID without making a new HTTP request. Use after verify_http_claim to inspect repeated results, PASS/FAIL/ERROR counts, agreement, or whether the observed verdict changed between the two latest decisive observations. This is historical evidence lookup, not a current live verification; use verify_http_claim when freshness or present endpoint behavior matters.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out1
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://probe-evidence.probe-lab.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_http_claim (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...supports only public HTTPS URLs without credentials, query strings, fragments, IP literals,..."
The input schema at properties.url.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.url.description: "Public HTTPS URL to observe. V0 forbids credentials, query strings, fragments, IP literals,..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http probe https://probe-evidence.probe-lab.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http probe https://probe-evidence.probe-lab.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__probe__probe_history"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__probe__verify_http_claim"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as probe. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__probe__verify_http_claim untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__probe__probe_history untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.lexbritten/probe/verify?hash=b29dae7fc985a36fb2b198147c6bb02ead3a9a476712eb4dea3cf6b6fcce6dd2" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b29dae7fc985, from Nov 20, 2026, 01:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lexbritten/probe/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lexbritten/probe)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.
Probe V0 MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Probe V0 MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Probe V0 MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Probe V0 MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Probe V0 MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. verify_http_claim and probe.history.
Does the Probe V0 MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Probe V0 MCP server send data to outside services?
- 1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): verify_http_claim.
Has the Probe V0 MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.