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Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server

io.github.liad142/yedapoliad142streamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Search and read AI summaries of ~3,500 podcast and YouTube episodes.

2 tools: 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
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A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server can do

The Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server is published by the GitHub account liad142. It has 2 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (search_episodes and get_episode).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

2 tools

Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_episodeGet one episode's full Yedapo summary as markdown: teaser, should-you-listen verdict, key takeaways with timestamps, a short verbatim source snippet with a timestamp when a transcr…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_episode" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get one episode's full Yedapo summary as markdown: teaser, should-you-listen verdict, key takeaways with timestamps, a short verbatim source snippet with a timestamp when a transcript is available, chapter breakdown, and the page URL to cite. Newest summary added: 2026-11-10.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get a Yedapo episode summary
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
  • search_episodesSearch Yedapo's 5,000+ AI summaries of podcast and YouTube episodes.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_episodes" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Yedapo's 5,000+ AI summaries of podcast and YouTube episodes. Matches words in the episode title, the show name, the summary's topic tags and its short teaser text (not full transcripts). Returns up to 10 matches, newest first within each match type, each with show, date, teaser, the episode id for get_episode, and a page URL to cite. Newest summary added: 2026-11-10.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Yedapo episodes
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http yedapo https://www.yedapo.com/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http yedapo https://www.yedapo.com/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__yedapo__search_episodes",
      "mcp__yedapo__get_episode"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as yedapo. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__yedapo__search_episodes untrusted-input
  • mcp__yedapo__get_episode untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.liad142/yedapo/verify?hash=7761bae9f81173797d7cb54a926bbb9d46987e5936b8ff12cd9aa9925150b839" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7761bae9f811, from Nov 10, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.liad142/yedapo/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.liad142/yedapo
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.liad142/yedapo.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.liad142/yedapo)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 00:17 UTC.

Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server have?

2 tools: 2 read. search_episodes and get_episode.

Does the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Yedapo podcast summaries MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 10, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.