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TrustBench MCP server

io.github.lithvall/trustbenchlithvallstreamable-httpv1.1.1Scanned

x402 provider rankings + Ed25519-signed payment receipts + signature verification (3 tools).

3 tools: 1 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the TrustBench MCP server can do

The TrustBench MCP server is published by the GitHub account lithvall. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (get_rankings, get_receipt and verify_receipt).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.1.1.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_receiptVerify the Ed25519 signature on a TrustBench receipt.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verify the Ed25519 signature on a TrustBench receipt. Two modes: (1) Lookup mode — pass receipt_id and the server fetches the receipt from trustbench.io and re-runs verification (handy when you only have an ID). (2) Offline mode — pass receipt_json (the full {receipt, signature} envelope an agent received from a third party) and the server verifies the Ed25519 signature against the published public key at trustbench.io/.well-known/trustbench-pubkey without trusting the database. Exactly one of receipt_id or receipt_json must be provided. Output: returns JSON with receipt_id, signature_valid (boolean), on_chain_verified (boolean, where present), signature_alg ("ed25519"), verify_url, pubkey_url. For non-server-mediated verification with no network round-trip, use the @trustbench/verify-receipt npm package.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify Receipt Signature
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • get_rankingsGet TrustBench liveness rankings for x402 providers by capability.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_rankings" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get TrustBench liveness rankings for x402 providers by capability. Returns a scored list of providers with latency and success-rate telemetry. Methodology note: scores are derived from HEAD-probe liveness checks (3 samples from one host), not a rigorous benchmark. See trustbench.io/methodology. Output: returns a JSON array. Each object has name (string, provider name), score (number 0-100, composite liveness score), latency_p50 (number, ms), success_rate (number 0.0-1.0, last 7 days), endpoint (string, URL), capabilities (array of strings).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Provider Rankings
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_receiptFetch a TrustBench routing receipt by ID.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_receipt" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a TrustBench routing receipt by ID. Receipts are immutable, Ed25519-signed records of a routing or payment event. Use to verify what was paid, to whom, for what capability, and what the on-chain settlement reference is. IDs start with rcpt_ (Phase 3) or rrcpt_ (Phase 4). Output: returns the signed receipt envelope as JSON. Phase 3 (rcpt_) returns a SignedReceipt with receipt (call metadata + settlement ref) and signature (Ed25519 over JCS-canonicalized receipt body). Phase 4 (rrcpt_) returns {receipt, signature} where receipt.paid contains routing details and signature covers the canonical envelope. To verify an envelope offline use the verify_receipt tool with the returned JSON, or @trustbench/verify-receipt npm.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Fetch Payment Receipt
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2024-11-05
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://trustbench.io/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_receipt (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http trustbench https://trustbench.io/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http trustbench https://trustbench.io/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__trustbench__get_rankings",
      "mcp__trustbench__get_receipt"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__trustbench__verify_receipt"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as trustbench. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__trustbench__get_rankings untrusted-input
  • mcp__trustbench__get_receipt untrusted-input
  • mcp__trustbench__verify_receipt untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.lithvall/trustbench/verify?hash=18b6ee8f3ba05968ee27c52271f44d0c7ea4a88cb5b38543bd54f3d73dbfb8d1" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 18b6ee8f3ba0, from Nov 20, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lithvall/trustbench/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.lithvall/trustbench
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.lithvall/trustbench.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lithvall/trustbench)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.

TrustBench MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the TrustBench MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the TrustBench MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the TrustBench MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the TrustBench MCP server have?

3 tools: 1 write, 2 read. verify_receipt, get_rankings and get_receipt.

Does the TrustBench MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the TrustBench MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the TrustBench MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.