Skip to content

LogTriage MCP server

io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriagelogtriage-cyberstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Security log tools: Windows/Entra error codes, log explainer, IP blocklists, attack scans

5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 3
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the LogTriage MCP server can do

The LogTriage MCP server is published by the GitHub account logtriage-cyber. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: check_ip_blocklists), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

3 tools read private data (lookup_error_code, scan_log_for_attacks and search_reference); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (scan_log_for_attacks and search_reference).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 19, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • check_ip_blocklistsChecks IPv4 addresses against 12 free public blocklists (IPsum, FireHOL levels 1-3, Spamhaus DROP, blocklist.de, CINS Army, GreenSnow, DShield, ET compromised, Tor exits), the same…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks IPv4 addresses against 12 free public blocklists (IPsum, FireHOL levels 1-3, Spamhaus DROP, blocklist.de, CINS Army, GreenSnow, DShield, ET compromised, Tor exits), the same lists as logtriage.app's IP blocklist checker. Accepts a list of addresses or any text containing them (log lines, CSV); private and other special-purpose ranges are labelled, not looked up. Up to 500 addresses per call. Lists are refreshed twice a day. Being on a list is evidence, not proof. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • explain_log_recordIdentifies the format of one log record (access-log line, syslog/auth.log line, Windows event XML, CloudTrail, Entra ID, CrowdStrike, firewall, CEF/LEEF and more) and lists every f…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "explain_log_record" says "explain": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Identifies the format of one log record (access-log line, syslog/auth.log line, Windows event XML, CloudTrail, Entra ID, CrowdStrike, firewall, CEF/LEEF and more) and lists every field with what it means and where that meaning comes from (LogTriage's reference pages or the vendor's published definition). Decodes values: timestamps, address ranges, HTTP statuses, ports, logon types, NTSTATUS and AADSTS codes, encoded PowerShell. Runs LogTriage's attack checks on the record too. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • lookup_error_codeExplains Microsoft authentication error codes from Microsoft's official tables: Entra ID sign-in errors (AADSTS50126, or the bare 50126), Windows NTSTATUS codes as logged in events…Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "lookup_error_code" says "lookup": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "explain" and "table": it reads databases.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Explains Microsoft authentication error codes from Microsoft's official tables: Entra ID sign-in errors (AADSTS50126, or the bare 50126), Windows NTSTATUS codes as logged in events 4625/4776 (0xC000006A, C000006A, or decimal 3221225578 / -1073741718), Kerberos failure codes from events 4768/4769/4771 (0x18), Win32 error codes such as the data value of an LDAP bind failure (data 52e, data 775) or System error 1326, and official names (IdsLocked, STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT, KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED, ERROR_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT). Paste a whole error message or event to find every code in it, or give words to search names and descriptions. Returns the official name and description, where the code is logged, and LogTriage's investigation page when one exists. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • scan_log_for_attacksDetects the log format (50+ formats: web access logs, auth.log, Windows events, Sysmon, CloudTrail, Entra ID, Okta, Kubernetes audit, firewalls, EDR exports and more) and runs LogT…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "scan_log_for_attacks" says "log": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "password": it reads secrets.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Detects the log format (50+ formats: web access logs, auth.log, Windows events, Sysmon, CloudTrail, Entra ID, Okta, Kubernetes audit, firewalls, EDR exports and more) and runs LogTriage's deterministic attack checks: brute force and password spraying, logins after failures, web scanning and injection, privilege changes in cloud logs, suspicious command lines, port scans and others, with MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Up to 5 MB of text; no threat-intelligence lookups and no AI (use analyze_log_file for those). The log is processed in memory and not stored. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_referenceFinds LogTriage's reference pages for an investigation: Windows Security event IDs, Entra AADSTS, NTSTATUS and Kerberos codes, AWS CloudTrail events (ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole...), …Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_reference" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Finds LogTriage's reference pages for an investigation: Windows Security event IDs, Entra AADSTS, NTSTATUS and Kerberos codes, AWS CloudTrail events (ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole...), CrowdStrike Falcon events (ProcessRollup2...), sshd/PAM log messages, web scanner probes, scanner user agents, log format field references and the free tools. Each page explains what the entry means, the fields to read and queries (KQL, CQL, SPL, bash) to investigate it. Returns the best matches with links. Free; no API key needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data3
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 13, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.logtriage.app/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including check_ip_blocklists (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 13, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 1

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools2 removed, 1 changed.−2 removed~1 changedView diff
    • Removed:analyze_log_file
    • Removed:get_analysis
    • Changed:lookup_error_codeOnly readsdescription
  2. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 -> 1.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 2 to 1

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http logtriage https://api.logtriage.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http logtriage https://api.logtriage.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__logtriage__lookup_error_code",
      "mcp__logtriage__explain_log_record",
      "mcp__logtriage__scan_log_for_attacks",
      "mcp__logtriage__search_reference"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__logtriage__check_ip_blocklists"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as logtriage. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__logtriage__lookup_error_code private-data
  • mcp__logtriage__scan_log_for_attacks private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__logtriage__search_reference private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriage/verify?hash=d927b51bde0daf16293eeea586e9710adafccaf693e2f72b309b53b783fd735e" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash d927b51bde0d, from Nov 19, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriage/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriage
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriage.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.logtriage-cyber/logtriage)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 5, 2026, 05:17 UTC.

LogTriage MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the LogTriage MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the LogTriage MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the LogTriage MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the LogTriage MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. check_ip_blocklists, lookup_error_code, explain_log_record, scan_log_for_attacks and search_reference.

Does the LogTriage MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the LogTriage MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the LogTriage MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 19, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.