container-loading MCP server
io.github.lxxmng/container-loadinglxxmngstreamable-httpv0.3.0Scanned
Plan optimal container & truck loads: 3D layouts, utilization, centre of gravity, crush checks.
6 tools: 5 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the container-loading MCP server can do
The container-loading MCP server is published by the GitHub account lxxmng. It has 6 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: suggest_containers, plan_load, export_plan, import_packing_list and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.3.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
export_dg_paperworkDraft the dangerous-goods paperwork for a load from its cargo lines: an IMDG 5.4.1 transport-document description per DG line (UN, proper shipping name, class, PG, marine pollutant…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Draft the dangerous-goods paperwork for a load from its cargo lines: an IMDG 5.4.1 transport-document description per DG line (UN, proper shipping name, class, PG, marine pollutant), the 5.3 placards + marks required, and the 5.4.2 container/vehicle packing-certificate statements. Input is a "loadingmcp.packing-list" document. This is a DRAFT from the curated DGL — it lists the fields a DG-competent person must still complete (flash point, net explosive mass, unverified PSN) and is never signed.
export_planExport a load as a machine-readable LOADING WORK ORDER: a numbered stuffing sequence (which SKU, where, in what order and orientation), the securing/bracing action list, a securing…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Export a load as a machine-readable LOADING WORK ORDER: a numbered stuffing sequence (which SKU, where, in what order and orientation), the securing/bracing action list, a securing shopping list per container (`securingBom`: straps, airbags, timber, bars, with quantities, specs and the work-order steps each goes to; recommendations to verify with the carrier), the key declarable figures (VGM, axle load, centre of gravity), and an optional per-retailer inbound-packaging check (Amazon FBA / Walmart). Feed it to a WES/TMS, a robotic palletiser, or a printable worker sheet. A real API key packs it with the production PackingSolver optimizer (the same plan plan_load returns for the same cargo); the public demo key uses the offline preview packer; `engine` in the result says which one ran. This is decision support to MEET published retailer/carrier specs — verify in your own portal; it is not a retailer certification.
import_packing_listERP/TMS on-ramp: take a versioned "loadingmcp.packing-list" document (a WMS/ERP export — cargo lines + equipmentCode) and return a load plan + a container manifest.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "import_packing_list" says "import": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it ERP/TMS on-ramp: take a versioned "loadingmcp.packing-list" document (a WMS/ERP export — cargo lines + equipmentCode) and return a load plan + a container manifest. Parsing is fail-explicit: an invalid document returns the exact per-line issues, never a silently-dropped row. Pairs with plan_load's output for a full round-trip.
plan_loadCompute a 3D load plan for cargo into a container or truck: containers used, utilization (volume & payload %), centre of gravity, crush-protection violations, and a securing checkl…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Compute a 3D load plan for cargo into a container or truck: containers used, utilization (volume & payload %), centre of gravity, crush-protection violations, and a securing checklist (round cargo that rolls, soft cargo that slumps). Cargo `type` drives realism — drums/pipes hex-nest, big bags/sacks load on top and are never crushed. Omit `equipmentCode` to auto right-size to the cheapest container that fits. A real API key runs the production PackingSolver optimizer; the public demo key uses the offline preview packer.
suggest_containersGiven total cargo volume (m³) and weight (kg), suggest how many of which container to use — a quick volume/weight estimate.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Given total cargo volume (m³) and weight (kg), suggest how many of which container to use — a quick volume/weight estimate. For an exact, dimension-aware plan with utilization, CoG and securing, use plan_load (which can also auto right-size).
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_equipmentList the standard container, truck, ULD and pallet types LoadingMCP can plan loads into, with internal dimensions (mm) and max payload (kg).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_equipment" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the standard container, truck, ULD and pallet types LoadingMCP can plan loads into, with internal dimensions (mm) and max payload (kg).
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.loadingmcp.com/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including suggest_containers (write), plan_load (write), export_plan (write), import_packing_list (write), export_dg_paperwork (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:export_planChanges thingsinputSchema
- Changed:plan_loadChanges thingsinputSchema
Tools2 changed.~2 changedView diff
- Changed:export_planChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:plan_loadChanges thingsinputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 0.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http container-loading https://mcp.loadingmcp.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http container-loading https://mcp.loadingmcp.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__container-loading__list_equipment"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__container-loading__suggest_containers",
"mcp__container-loading__plan_load",
"mcp__container-loading__export_plan",
"mcp__container-loading__import_packing_list",
"mcp__container-loading__export_dg_paperwork"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as container-loading. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.lxxmng/container-loading/verify?hash=321cc7ac362ffc364883c01472d3355703a3cf293d637aa831379ecd1139b468" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 321cc7ac362f, from Nov 20, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lxxmng/container-loading/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.lxxmng/container-loading)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.
container-loading MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the container-loading MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the container-loading MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the container-loading MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the container-loading MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 5 write, 1 read. suggest_containers, plan_load, export_plan, import_packing_list, export_dg_paperwork and list_equipment.
Does the container-loading MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the container-loading MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the container-loading MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.