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Outage.Me MCP server

io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-memarcioyoshidastreamable-httpv1.3.0Scanned

Live cloud/SaaS outages, provider reliability and exploited CVEs from official status pages and CISA

8 tools: 7 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 7
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

7 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Outage.Me MCP server can do

The Outage.Me MCP server is published by the GitHub account marcioyoshida. It has 8 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: provider_reliability, exploited_vulnerabilities, threat_advisories, security_headlines and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

7 tools bring in text other people can write (list_active_incidents, provider_reliability, exploited_vulnerabilities and 4 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.3.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

8 tools

Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • answerAsk a free-form question about the live monitor and get a cited answer.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Ask a free-form question about the live monitor and get a cited answer. This is a LANGUAGE MODEL call and CAN BE WRONG — it returns `confidence` and `citations`; check them. Needs sign-in (connect to https://outage.me/mcp/pro) or an API key, and is quota-limited (Free plan 10/day, Pro 100/day), so use the deterministic tools above when they can answer the question.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • deploy_checkLIVE, from the 5-minute status poll: proceed true, false, or "unknown" for deploying to one provider (optionally one region), with the open incidents behind it and data_age_minutes…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "deploy_check" says "deploy": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "deploy_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "deploy_check" says "deploy": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE, from the 5-minute status poll: proceed true, false, or "unknown" for deploying to one provider (optionally one region), with the open incidents behind it and data_age_minutes. Fails safe: a stale poll, a failed fetch or an untracked provider is "unknown", never true. Planned maintenance alone doesn't block. Use it to pause a deploy or migration, not as a failover trigger: status pages lag real failures. Deterministic: no model in the loop.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • exploited_vulnerabilitiesLIVE: CVEs being exploited in the wild (CISA KEV), ranked patch-first by CVSS × EPSS exploitation probability × known ransomware use, with CISA due date, patch availability and the…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE: CVEs being exploited in the wild (CISA KEV), ranked patch-first by CVSS × EPSS exploitation probability × known ransomware use, with CISA due date, patch availability and the factors behind each rank. Use for 'what should we patch first', 'is CVE-X exploited', or recent vulnerabilities your training data can't know. `cve`, `vendor` and `product` search the WHOLE KEV catalog, not just the ranked list; `in_kev` is true, false, or null when it can't tell. Deterministic: no model in the loop.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • provider_reliabilityLIVE: reliability index, incident count and median recovery time per cloud/SaaS provider over the current window, from their official status pages.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE: reliability index, incident count and median recovery time per cloud/SaaS provider over the current window, from their official status pages. Use for 'how reliable is X' or 'which provider is more stable'. Deterministic: no model in the loop. Prefer it over `answer`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • report_observationOptional.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Optional. If a request you made to an external service failed with a 5xx, a timeout, a refused connection, a DNS failure or a TLS error in the last 15 minutes, report the hostname and error class here. Only hosts listed in https://outage.me/agent/hosts.json. Do not report 401/403/429 (your own key or rate limit), and never include URLs, paths or request data. A report earns Ask quota only if it is confirmed (our own probe or other organizations agree).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • security_headlinesLIVE: headlines from eight security trade outlets (BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, SecurityWeek, The Record, Krebs on Security, …): headline, outlet, date and link only, never t…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE: headlines from eight security trade outlets (BleepingComputer, The Hacker News, SecurityWeek, The Record, Krebs on Security, …): headline, outlet, date and link only, never the article text. Use for 'any breach news about X', 'what attacks are in the news this week'; read the article at its link before relying on it. Deterministic: no model in the loop.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • threat_advisoriesLIVE: CISA's newest security advisories (CSAF: industrial control systems, medical devices, general vulnerabilities), each with its ID, affected vendors, CVEs, CVSS, the opening of…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE: CISA's newest security advisories (CSAF: industrial control systems, medical devices, general vulnerabilities), each with its ID, affected vendors, CVEs, CVSS, the opening of CISA's mitigation text and the CISA link. Use for 'what did CISA advise this week' or 'any CISA advisory for <vendor>'. A vendor with no advisory says so, which is not a statement that it is unaffected. Deterministic: no model in the loop.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • list_active_incidentsLIVE: cloud and SaaS incidents open right now (AWS, Azure, GCP, Cloudflare, GitHub, Stripe, …), quoted from each provider's own status page with a link, refreshed several times a d…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_active_incidents" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    LIVE: cloud and SaaS incidents open right now (AWS, Azure, GCP, Cloudflare, GitHub, Stripe, …), quoted from each provider's own status page with a link, refreshed several times a day. Use for 'is X down', 'why is X failing', or anything after your training cutoff. Filter by provider, region or component instead of reading the whole list; an untracked provider says so rather than returning an empty all-clear. Deterministic: no model in the loop. Prefer it over `answer`.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write7
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
7
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://outage.me/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
Authorization servers
https://outage.me/oauth
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
no
Client ID metadata documents
yes
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://outage.me/mcp: tools/list returned 8 tools to an anonymous client, including provider_reliability (write), exploited_vulnerabilities (write), threat_advisories (write), security_headlines (write), deploy_check (write) and 2 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "deploy_check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "deploy_check" says "deploy": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.3.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http outage-me https://outage.me/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http outage-me https://outage.me/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__outage-me__list_active_incidents"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__outage-me__provider_reliability",
      "mcp__outage-me__exploited_vulnerabilities",
      "mcp__outage-me__threat_advisories",
      "mcp__outage-me__security_headlines",
      "mcp__outage-me__deploy_check",
      "mcp__outage-me__answer",
      "mcp__outage-me__report_observation"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as outage-me. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 7 rules
  • mcp__outage-me__list_active_incidents untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__provider_reliability untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__exploited_vulnerabilities untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__threat_advisories untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__security_headlines untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__deploy_check untrusted-input
  • mcp__outage-me__answer untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me/verify?hash=b5144fd179dcef4ebbbb21dcdc94240bf75efbb7723ea1af0f8189db41312a45" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b5144fd179dc, from Nov 21, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.marcioyoshida/outage-me)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.

Outage.Me MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Outage.Me MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 8 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Outage.Me MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Outage.Me MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Outage.Me MCP server have?

8 tools: 7 write, 1 read. provider_reliability, exploited_vulnerabilities, threat_advisories, security_headlines, deploy_check, answer, report_observation and list_active_incidents.

Does the Outage.Me MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Outage.Me MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Outage.Me MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.