lexvibe MCP server
io.github.marcosnovo/lexvibemarcosnovostreamable-httpv1.0.4Scanned
One-step legal compliance for vibe-coded apps: privacy, terms, cookie banner and EU AI Act check.
10 tools: 7 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 3
- 3 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
7 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the lexvibe MCP server can do
The lexvibe MCP server is published by the GitHub account marcosnovo. It has 10 tools. It can create or change data (7 tools: check_website, check_store, generate_policies, check_ai_act and 3 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (lookup_framework and list_frameworks); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (check_website and check_store); 3 tools can send data out of your system (check_website, check_store and claim_app). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.4.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
10 tools
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
applicable_frameworksGiven the markets a product serves, return every framework that applies, the documents it must publish, the strictest cookie-consent regime across those markets, and whether a univ…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Given the markets a product serves, return every framework that applies, the documents it must publish, the strictest cookie-consent regime across those markets, and whether a universal opt-out signal (Global Privacy Control) has to be honoured. This is the read-only version of what generate_policies uses internally, so the answer matches the documents LexVibe would actually produce. Use it to answer 'I sell to the EU and Texas — what do I need?'. Read-only, instant.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
check_ai_actClassify a product's risk level under the EU AI Act — minimal, limited, high or prohibited — and return the applicable obligations, each with its compliance deadline (limited-risk …No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Classify a product's risk level under the EU AI Act — minimal, limited, high or prohibited — and return the applicable obligations, each with its compliance deadline (limited-risk transparency duties apply from Aug 2, 2026; Annex III high risk from Dec 2, 2027). The boolean parameters fall into three groups, all optional and defaulting to the safest 'not applicable' value: (1) transparency triggers — usesAI, interactsWithPeople, generatesContent, automatedDecisions; (2) the eight prohibited practices of art. 5 — socialScoring, realtimeBiometricPublic + realtimeBiometricLawEnforcement, emotionRecognitionWorkEducation, biometricCategorisationSensitive, untargetedFaceScraping, manipulativeOrExploitative, individualPredictivePolicing; (3) high-risk triggers — embeddedInRegulatedProduct, annexIII domains. Answer the boolean questions about what the system does; leave unknowns at their defaults, which never over-report risk. Read-only and instant.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
check_storeFree legal-compliance check of a mobile app from its PUBLIC App Store (apps.apple.com) or Google Play (play.google.com) listing URL — no repo or developer-account access needed.Reads text others writeCan send data out1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "check_store" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Free legal-compliance check of a mobile app from its PUBLIC App Store (apps.apple.com) or Google Play (play.google.com) listing URL — no repo or developer-account access needed. Follows the privacy-policy link the developer declared on the listing, analyzes that page, and returns detected data processing, compliance recommendations, whether the EU AI Act applies, and suggestedAnswers for generate_policies. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
check_websiteFree legal-compliance check of a public website (no signup).Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Free legal-compliance check of a public website (no signup). Fetches the URL server-side and detects data processing relevant to compliance — analytics, marketing pixels, payments, generative AI, email collection, third-party sharing — then returns the legal documents and cookie-consent setup the site needs, whether the EU AI Act applies, and suggestedAnswers you can pass straight to generate_policies. Result contract: `fetched` is true only when the page HTML was actually read; when false, `fetchError` says why ("unreachable": the URL could not be resolved or connected; "blocked": the server answered with an error status) and the detected signals are NOT meaningful — report the check as inconclusive, not as clean. Run it again after adding any SDK, analytics, payment, auth or AI integration: when an appId is passed (or read from the installed LexVibe snippet) the result ALWAYS includes a `drift` key — status "in_sync", "outdated" (listing processing the hosted legal documents don't cover yet) or "unavailable" with a bounded `reason` (no-database, app-not-found, no-baseline, domain-mismatch, page-not-fetched) when the comparison could not be made; treat "unavailable" as unknown, never as in sync. Read-only.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
claim_appCreate a REAL LexVibe app in the user's account (replaces any YOUR_APP_ID placeholder).Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a REAL LexVibe app in the user's account (replaces any YOUR_APP_ID placeholder). Returns a claim link: show it to the user so they can sign in and confirm — the link stays valid for 7 days, so the user can open it later. On confirmation LexVibe creates the app, scans the URL (if given), generates and hosts the legal documents. After the user confirms, call get_claim_status with the returned code to retrieve the real app id and install snippet. Provide at least `url` or `appName`.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
generate_policiesGenerate the legal documents (privacy policy, terms of service and, if applicable, an AI disclosure) localized and tailored to the target markets (GDPR, UK GDPR, CCPA…).1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_policies" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_policies" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_policies" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate the legal documents (privacy policy, terms of service and, if applicable, an AI disclosure) localized and tailored to the target markets (GDPR, UK GDPR, CCPA…). Returns Markdown drafts. Pass check_website's or check_store's suggestedAnswers as `answers` so the documents disclose the right processing. Anonymous remote generation is template-based and capped at 3 locales; AI-tailored, hosted and auto-updated documents require a LexVibe account (https://golexvibe.com).
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
get_claim_statusCheck whether the user has confirmed a claim created with claim_app.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_claim_status" says "get": a word for reading.
- The input takes a statement or command to run (input.code), which can change anything it can reach.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "get_claim_status" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_claim_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether the user has confirmed a claim created with claim_app. While the user hasn't confirmed yet it returns {status: 'pending'} — wait a few seconds and call again (the link stays valid for 7 days). Once claimed it returns the REAL app id, the install snippet and the hosted privacy-policy URL: replace any placeholder (YOUR_APP_ID) snippet with the real one.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_install_snippetReturn what to install for a LexVibe app id.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_install_snippet" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return what to install for a LexVibe app id. For web: the one-line <script> snippet (cookie banner with real script blocking + hosted policy links) to paste before </head>, plus a JSX variant for React/Next.js layouts. For iOS/Android: the hosted privacy-policy URL and the exact App Store Connect / Google Play Console fields to paste it into. No app id yet? Call claim_app to create one in the user's account.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
list_frameworksList every privacy and AI framework LexVibe generates documents against — 55 laws across 46 jurisdictions, including GDPR, ePrivacy, the EU AI Act, UK GDPR and PECR, Swiss nFADP, 1…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_frameworks" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it List every privacy and AI framework LexVibe generates documents against — 55 laws across 46 jurisdictions, including GDPR, ePrivacy, the EU AI Act, UK GDPR and PECR, Swiss nFADP, 17 US state privacy laws modelled individually (CCPA/CPRA among them), PIPEDA and Quebec Law 25, LGPD and other LatAm regimes, APPI, PIPA, PDPA, Australia's Privacy Act, India's DPDP, China's PIPL, Saudi and UAE PDPL, POPIA and more. Each entry carries its id, jurisdiction, effective date and official-text URL. Optionally filter by market pack or by jurisdiction. Read-only, instant.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
lookup_frameworkLook up a privacy or AI law by id and get structured, primary-sourced facts: full name, jurisdiction, effective date, applicability threshold, the documents it requires, the rights…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_framework" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up a privacy or AI law by id and get structured, primary-sourced facts: full name, jurisdiction, effective date, applicability threshold, the documents it requires, the rights it grants, its cookie-consent regime, whether it requires honouring Global Privacy Control, key articles, and a link to the OFFICIAL text (plus the supervisory authority). Use it to answer 'what does the TDPSA require?' or 'when does the EU AI Act apply?' with citations instead of guesses. Call list_frameworks first if you don't know the id. Read-only, instant, no signup.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
12 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 untrusted-input tools breaks every one.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out3
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__lexvibe__check_store",
"mcp__lexvibe__check_website"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 7
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 7 tools that change things (7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://golexvibe.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including check_website (write), check_store (write), generate_policies (write), check_ai_act (write), claim_app (write) and 2 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warncheck_store
The server marks "check_store" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "check_store" says "store": a word for a change.
The server marks "generate_policies" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "generate_policies" says "generate": a word for a change.
- Warnget_claim_status
The server marks "get_claim_status" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_claim_status" says "get": a word for reading.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http lexvibe https://golexvibe.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http lexvibe https://golexvibe.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__lexvibe__get_install_snippet",
"mcp__lexvibe__lookup_framework",
"mcp__lexvibe__list_frameworks"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__lexvibe__check_website",
"mcp__lexvibe__check_store",
"mcp__lexvibe__generate_policies",
"mcp__lexvibe__check_ai_act",
"mcp__lexvibe__claim_app",
"mcp__lexvibe__get_claim_status",
"mcp__lexvibe__applicable_frameworks"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as lexvibe. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 5 rules
- mcp__lexvibe__check_website untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__lexvibe__check_store untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__lexvibe__claim_app outbound
- mcp__lexvibe__lookup_framework private-data
- mcp__lexvibe__list_frameworks private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.marcosnovo/lexvibe/verify?hash=b09b4fcc92ef54af4ac46b6b84061e32d3a195a9bf78eed373a6eacead571215" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b09b4fcc92ef, from Nov 20, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.marcosnovo/lexvibe/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.marcosnovo/lexvibe)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.
lexvibe MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the lexvibe MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 7 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the lexvibe MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the lexvibe MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the lexvibe MCP server have?
- 10 tools: 7 write, 3 read. check_website, check_store, generate_policies, check_ai_act, claim_app, get_claim_status, applicable_frameworks, get_install_snippet and 2 more.
Does the lexvibe MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the lexvibe MCP server send data to outside services?
- 3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): check_website, check_store and claim_app.
Has the lexvibe MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.