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UpgradeLens MCP server

io.github.mattpicone/upgradelensmattpiconestreamable-httpv0.4.8Scanned

npm/PyPI package dependency upgrade reviews: security, runtime compatibility, cited migration.

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the UpgradeLens MCP server can do

The UpgradeLens MCP server is published by the GitHub account mattpicone. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: review_dependency_upgrade, check_dependency_upgrade and plan_dependency_upgrade), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

4 tools bring in text other people can write (review_dependency_upgrade, check_dependency_upgrade, find_safe_upgrade_target and 1 more).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.4.8.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • check_dependency_upgradeUse when a coding agent needs a cited go/no-go risk decision without steps before changing an existing npm or PyPI dependency between two exact versions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when a coding agent needs a cited go/no-go risk decision without steps before changing an existing npm or PyPI dependency between two exact versions. Returns action_allowed, vulnerability delta, compatibility, EOL, and breaking-change evidence. Use plan_dependency_upgrade instead for ordered migration work. Do not use to choose a target, install a new package, search general docs, or analyze another ecosystem. Read-only and safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • plan_dependency_upgradeUse when a coding agent needs a migration checklist, refactor actions, ordered review actions, changelog links, or test steps for exact current and target npm/PyPI versions.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when a coding agent needs a migration checklist, refactor actions, ordered review actions, changelog links, or test steps for exact current and target npm/PyPI versions. Use check_dependency_upgrade instead for a go/no-go without steps. Do not use to choose a target, install a package, or provide a general tutorial. Read-only and safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • review_dependency_upgradeUse when an agent reviews a Dependabot, Renovate, npm, or PyPI version change before merge.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use when an agent reviews a Dependabot, Renovate, npm, or PyPI version change before merge. One cited result combines security delta, runtime compatibility, breaking changes, go/no-go risk, and ordered migration actions for exact current and target versions. Do not use for new installs, unknown versions, general documentation, or other ecosystems. Read-only and safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • find_safe_upgrade_targetUse only when an existing npm or PyPI dependency has an exact current version but no chosen target.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_safe_upgrade_target" says "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use only when an existing npm or PyPI dependency has an exact current version but no chosen target. Ranks candidates; candidates are not declared safe and require check_dependency_upgrade or plan_dependency_upgrade. Do not use when a target is stated, for a new install, or as authorization to edit files. Read-only and safe to retry.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://upgradelens.mattpicone.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including review_dependency_upgrade (write), check_dependency_upgrade (write), plan_dependency_upgrade (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.4.8. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http upgradelens https://upgradelens.mattpicone.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http upgradelens https://upgradelens.mattpicone.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__upgradelens__find_safe_upgrade_target"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__upgradelens__review_dependency_upgrade",
      "mcp__upgradelens__check_dependency_upgrade",
      "mcp__upgradelens__plan_dependency_upgrade"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as upgradelens. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__upgradelens__review_dependency_upgrade untrusted-input
  • mcp__upgradelens__check_dependency_upgrade untrusted-input
  • mcp__upgradelens__find_safe_upgrade_target untrusted-input
  • mcp__upgradelens__plan_dependency_upgrade untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mattpicone/upgradelens/verify?hash=4bd1568268a4d492b07a3dac0b3be1c3a62483e5296258fe1c0e06d2be8aec7f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 4bd1568268a4, from Nov 21, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mattpicone/upgradelens/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mattpicone/upgradelens
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mattpicone/upgradelens.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mattpicone/upgradelens)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:38 UTC.

UpgradeLens MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the UpgradeLens MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the UpgradeLens MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the UpgradeLens MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the UpgradeLens MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. review_dependency_upgrade, check_dependency_upgrade, plan_dependency_upgrade and find_safe_upgrade_target.

Does the UpgradeLens MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the UpgradeLens MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the UpgradeLens MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.