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Remover Fundo MCP server

io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcpmcp-dirstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Removes the background from an image by URL, cutting out the foreground person or object with AI and

7 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 3 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 3 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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What the Remover Fundo MCP server can do

The Remover Fundo MCP server is published by the GitHub account mcp-dir. It has 7 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: removebg_remove) and create or change data (3 tools: report_bug, marketplace and authenticate). 3 tools only read.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (marketplace).

The fixed checks matched 3 findings (annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

7 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • removebg_removeRemove o fundo de uma imagem apontada por URL: recorta o objeto/pessoa em primeiro plano e devolve um link de download do resultado (PNG com fundo transparente por padrão), que tam…1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "removebg_remove" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "removebg_remove" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "removebg_remove" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove o fundo de uma imagem apontada por URL: recorta o objeto/pessoa em primeiro plano e devolve um link de download do resultado (PNG com fundo transparente por padrão), que também fica na aba Arquivos do mcp.ai. Opcionalmente troca o fundo por uma cor sólida (`background`) ou redimensiona (`max_width`). Leva poucos segundos. Um arquivo por chamada.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: removebg_remove
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • authenticateMCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    MCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token. Best: add it to this server's config as a header `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for a permanent, non-expiring connection. Or paste it here for a session-only login: call with { token: "<jwt>" } after the user pastes, or with no args to get the link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Authenticate
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • marketplaceThe official mcp.ai marketplace — the in-platform catalog of every MCP/tool, AND the way to run them.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; i..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The official mcp.ai marketplace — the in-platform catalog of every MCP/tool, AND the way to run them. Covers capability requests like "find an MCP that does X", "consulta um CPF", "is there a tool for Y". Core flow: action=search discovers MCPs by intent → describe returns one MCP's full profile (every tool with its id + params, pricing, auth) so you pick the right tool_id → invoke RUNS that tool. KEY: invoke works even when the MCP is NOT installed — it runs the tool pontualmente (one-off), without adding the MCP to the toolkit and without bloating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; if it is paid and the wallet is empty, invoke returns a checkout/top-up link (the user opens it, then you retry). Use install only to make an MCP PERMANENT in the active toolkit (its tools then show up natively in future sessions); prefer invoke for a single/occasional use. list_tools lists what is callable right now. subscribe/cancel handle per-MCP billing; report_bug sends feedback; request_mcp asks us to build a NEW MCP when nothing fits. Search/describe flag installed_in_toolkit vs installed_in_workspace. Writes (install/uninstall/subscribe/cancel and the one-off install behind invoke) require workspace owner/admin. It also carries the mcp.ai PROMPT LIBRARY, which is about ready-made prompt TEXT rather than MCPs: search_prompts finds one, get_prompt returns its full text with {{variables}} filled, and publish_prompt saves a prompt and returns a shareable mcp.ai/p/<slug> link that opens without login.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Marketplace
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • report_bugReport a bug, missing feature, or send feedback.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a bug, missing feature, or send feedback. Include the conversation array with recent messages for reproduction.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Report Bug
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • connectReturns connection status and URLs.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...nticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for th..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns connection status and URLs. When all providers are connected, returns authenticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for the toolkit and per-install URLs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Connection Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • show_versionShow the current MCP platform and adapter versions.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "show_version" says "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show the current MCP platform and adapter versions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Show Version
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • toolkit_infoReturns the current toolkit state: installed MCPs, their connection status, the accounts connected to each one, and how many catalog tools each exposes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the current toolkit state: installed MCPs, their connection status, the accounts connected to each one, and how many catalog tools each exposes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Toolkit Info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:42 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 destructive, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.mcp.ai/p_removebg: tools/list returned 7 tools to an anonymous client, including removebg_remove (destructive), report_bug (write), marketplace (write), authenticate (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn2 info
  • The server marks "removebg_remove" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "removebg_remove" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...nticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for th..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; i..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http removebg https://api.mcp.ai/p_removebg
claude mcp add --transport http removebg https://api.mcp.ai/p_removebg

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__removebg__show_version",
      "mcp__removebg__connect",
      "mcp__removebg__toolkit_info"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__removebg__report_bug",
      "mcp__removebg__marketplace",
      "mcp__removebg__authenticate"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__removebg__removebg_remove"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as removebg. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__removebg__marketplace untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcp/verify?hash=f14de1a55d29f6e0563d2220799e020548143569d59b335868e7c8a539265337" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash f14de1a55d29, from Nov 8, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/removebg-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:39 UTC.

Remover Fundo MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Remover Fundo MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 7 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 3 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Remover Fundo MCP server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: removebg_remove.

Can the Remover Fundo MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Remover Fundo MCP server have?

7 tools: 1 destructive, 3 write, 3 read. removebg_remove, report_bug, marketplace, authenticate, show_version, connect and toolkit_info.

Does the Remover Fundo MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Remover Fundo MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Remover Fundo MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.