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Social → Context MCP server

io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcpmcp-dirstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Turn a TikTok/Instagram/YouTube link into text for your AI: metadata, transcript and image OCR.

9 tools: 5 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 5 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 3
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

5 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Social → Context MCP server can do

The Social → Context MCP server is published by the GitHub account mcp-dir. It has 9 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: socialdl_extract, socialdl_metadata, report_bug, marketplace and 1 more), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

2 tools bring in text other people can write (socialdl_download and marketplace); 3 tools can send data out of your system (socialdl_extract, socialdl_metadata and socialdl_download).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 8, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

9 tools

Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
  • authenticateMCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    MCP.AI for IDE agents (Cursor, etc.): log in in the browser, copy the access token. Best: add it to this server's config as a header `Authorization: Bearer <token>` for a permanent, non-expiring connection. Or paste it here for a session-only login: call with { token: "<jwt>" } after the user pastes, or with no args to get the link.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Authenticate
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • marketplaceThe official mcp.ai marketplace — the in-platform catalog of every MCP/tool, AND the way to run them.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...ating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; i..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The official mcp.ai marketplace — the in-platform catalog of every MCP/tool, AND the way to run them. Covers capability requests like "find an MCP that does X", "consulta um CPF", "is there a tool for Y". Core flow: action=search discovers MCPs by intent → describe returns one MCP's full profile (every tool with its id + params, pricing, auth) so you pick the right tool_id → invoke RUNS that tool. KEY: invoke works even when the MCP is NOT installed — it runs the tool pontualmente (one-off), without adding the MCP to the toolkit and without bloating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; if it is paid and the wallet is empty, invoke returns a checkout/top-up link (the user opens it, then you retry). Use install only to make an MCP PERMANENT in the active toolkit (its tools then show up natively in future sessions); prefer invoke for a single/occasional use. list_tools lists what is callable right now. subscribe/cancel handle per-MCP billing; report_bug sends feedback; request_mcp asks us to build a NEW MCP when nothing fits. Search/describe flag installed_in_toolkit vs installed_in_workspace. Writes (install/uninstall/subscribe/cancel and the one-off install behind invoke) require workspace owner/admin. It also carries the mcp.ai PROMPT LIBRARY, which is about ready-made prompt TEXT rather than MCPs: search_prompts finds one, get_prompt returns its full text with {{variables}} filled, and publish_prompt saves a prompt and returns a shareable mcp.ai/p/<slug> link that opens without login.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Marketplace
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • report_bugReport a bug, missing feature, or send feedback.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report a bug, missing feature, or send feedback. Include the conversation array with recent messages for reproduction.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Report Bug
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • socialdl_extractDownload a social-media link (TikTok, Instagram reel/post/carousel, YouTube, or any direct .mp4) and return it as usable text context: metadata (author, caption, duration), the aud…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Download a social-media link (TikTok, Instagram reel/post/carousel, YouTube, or any direct .mp4) and return it as usable text context: metadata (author, caption, duration), the audio/video transcript, and a vision description (OCR + summary) of each image in a carousel/post. YouTube uses its existing captions when available. Use this to give Claude the content of a video or post the user pasted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: socialdl_extract
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • socialdl_metadataLightweight lookup: resolve a social-media link to its metadata (author, caption, duration, counts) and media URLs WITHOUT transcribing or running vision.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Lightweight lookup: resolve a social-media link to its metadata (author, caption, duration, counts) and media URLs WITHOUT transcribing or running vision. Cheaper than socialdl_extract — use when the caption/context alone is enough.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: socialdl_metadata
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • connectReturns connection status and URLs.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    Findings

    • Info

      The description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      description: "...nticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for th..."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns connection status and URLs. When all providers are connected, returns authenticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for the toolkit and per-install URLs.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Connection Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • show_versionShow the current MCP platform and adapter versions.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "show_version" says "show": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show the current MCP platform and adapter versions.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Show Version
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • socialdl_downloadResolve a TikTok / Instagram / YouTube link (or direct .mp4/image URL) to its DIRECT download URLs from the source CDN — every video quality, audio track and image, with quality la…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "resolve" and "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve a TikTok / Instagram / YouTube link (or direct .mp4/image URL) to its DIRECT download URLs from the source CDN — every video quality, audio track and image, with quality labels. Use when the user wants to DOWNLOAD/save the media instead of transcribing it. No transcription/vision.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: socialdl_download
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • toolkit_infoReturns the current toolkit state: installed MCPs, their connection status, the accounts connected to each one, and how many catalog tools each exposes.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the current toolkit state: installed MCPs, their connection status, the accounts connected to each one, and how many catalog tools each exposes.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Toolkit Info
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out3
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:39 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
5
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.mcp.ai/p_socialdl: tools/list returned 9 tools to an anonymous client, including socialdl_extract (write), socialdl_metadata (write), report_bug (write), marketplace (write), authenticate (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 info
  • The description mentions "credentials".

    Matched text

    description: "...nticated:true and empty pending[]. When credentials are missing, returns connect_url for th..."

    What this check looks for
  • The description mentions "credential".

    Matched text

    description: "...ating the tool list. If the MCP needs a credential/login, invoke returns a connect link; i..."

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http socialdl https://api.mcp.ai/p_socialdl
claude mcp add --transport http socialdl https://api.mcp.ai/p_socialdl

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__socialdl__show_version",
      "mcp__socialdl__connect",
      "mcp__socialdl__toolkit_info"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__socialdl__socialdl_extract",
      "mcp__socialdl__socialdl_metadata",
      "mcp__socialdl__socialdl_download",
      "mcp__socialdl__report_bug",
      "mcp__socialdl__marketplace",
      "mcp__socialdl__authenticate"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as socialdl. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 4 rules
  • mcp__socialdl__socialdl_extract outbound
  • mcp__socialdl__socialdl_metadata outbound
  • mcp__socialdl__socialdl_download untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__socialdl__marketplace untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcp/verify?hash=173e5a0eb98f5511218fe8b1b6e3b8857a2e03e5b050c0ed07d6d9a5def596d7" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 173e5a0eb98f, from Nov 8, 2026, 06:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcp-dir/socialdl-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:40 UTC.

Social → Context MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Social → Context MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 9 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Social → Context MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Social → Context MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Social → Context MCP server have?

9 tools: 5 write, 4 read. socialdl_extract, socialdl_metadata, report_bug, marketplace, authenticate, socialdl_download, show_version, connect and 1 more.

Does the Social → Context MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Social → Context MCP server send data to outside services?

3 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): socialdl_extract, socialdl_metadata and socialdl_download.

Has the Social → Context MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 8, 2026.