MCPExplorer MCP server
io.github.mcpexplorer/mcpexplorermcpexplorerstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned
Search, vet & assemble MCP servers from your agent: verified tools, risk labels, and trust scores.
14 tools: 3 change things and 11 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the MCPExplorer MCP server can do
The MCPExplorer MCP server is published by the GitHub account mcpexplorer. It has 14 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: generate_runtime_config, plan_toolset and report_broken_server), but cannot delete data. 11 tools only read.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
14 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
generate_runtime_configGenerate the install + client config for an MCP server in a given runtime (claude-desktop, cursor, vscode, windsurf, cline, continue, goose, openai-agents, langgraph, crewai).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_runtime_config" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Generate the install + client config for an MCP server in a given runtime (claude-desktop, cursor, vscode, windsurf, cline, continue, goose, openai-agents, langgraph, crewai).
plan_toolsetTurn a plain-language goal into a recommended, governed toolset: the best-fit curated loadout (matched transparently by goal terms) plus an assembled set of the most relevant index…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn a plain-language goal into a recommended, governed toolset: the best-fit curated loadout (matched transparently by goal terms) plus an assembled set of the most relevant indexed servers, each with LIVE trust and tool-risk, and an aggregate governance posture for the kit. The decision layer over search/capability/trust/loadouts.
report_broken_serverReport that an MCP server's install, docs, or endpoint is broken.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Report that an MCP server's install, docs, or endpoint is broken. Creates a submission for editorial review.
Only reads 11Show 11 read-only tools
check_trustReturn the explainable trust score, label, scoring reasons, and verification history for an MCP server.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the explainable trust score, label, scoring reasons, and verification history for an MCP server.
compare_serversCompare two MCP servers side by side: trust, transport, tools, install, and links.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "compare_servers" says "compare": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Compare two MCP servers side by side: trust, transport, tools, install, and links.
get_alternativesFind verified MCP servers with the same capabilities as a given server, ranked by trust.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_alternatives" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find verified MCP servers with the same capabilities as a given server, ranked by trust.
get_capabilityList the best MCP servers that provide a capability (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_capability" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the best MCP servers that provide a capability (e.g. 'send-email', 'web-search'), ranked by trust.
get_ecosystem_statsLive snapshot of the indexed MCP ecosystem: totals (servers, tools, handshake-verified), provenance and transport breakdowns, and the current top-trust / most-adopted / newest / bi…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_ecosystem_stats" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Live snapshot of the indexed MCP ecosystem: totals (servers, tools, handshake-verified), provenance and transport breakdowns, and the current top-trust / most-adopted / newest / biggest-trust-riser servers.
get_loadoutFetch one curated loadout: its servers (each with role + LIVE trust/transport/tool-risk from the index), an aggregated governance posture for the whole kit, and the plays (see→deci…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_loadout" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch one curated loadout: its servers (each with role + LIVE trust/transport/tool-risk from the index), an aggregated governance posture for the whole kit, and the plays (see→decide→act sequences) it's designed to run.
get_serverFetch the full record for one MCP server by slug: install methods, tools, trust, verification, and provenance.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_server" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch the full record for one MCP server by slug: install methods, tools, trust, verification, and provenance.
list_capabilitiesList the capability slugs an agent can filter or look up by (e.g.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_capabilities" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the capability slugs an agent can filter or look up by (e.g. 'send-email', 'query-database'), most-populated first. Use these with get_capability or search_servers' capability filter — the taxonomy isn't guessable.
list_loadoutsList curated loadouts — deliberately-assembled kits of MCP servers + governance + plays for a specific job (GTM, coding, research, support, infra).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_loadouts" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List curated loadouts — deliberately-assembled kits of MCP servers + governance + plays for a specific job (GTM, coding, research, support, infra). The agent-facing version of the /loadouts product. Use get_loadout for the full kit with live trust.
list_runtimesList the runtimes generate_runtime_config supports (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, agent frameworks, …), with each one's config path.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_runtimes" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it List the runtimes generate_runtime_config supports (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, agent frameworks, …), with each one's config path. Enumerate these instead of guessing runtime slugs.
search_serversSearch the MCPExplorer index of MCP servers by free text and filters.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_servers" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search the MCPExplorer index of MCP servers by free text and filters. Omit `query` to browse the whole index ranked by trust score. Every filter either applies or is echoed back in `ignored_filters` with a reason — filters never silently do nothing.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcpexplorer.com/mcp: tools/list returned 14 tools to an anonymous client, including generate_runtime_config (write), plan_toolset (write), report_broken_server (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http mcpexplorer https://mcpexplorer.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http mcpexplorer https://mcpexplorer.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__mcpexplorer__search_servers",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__get_server",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__get_capability",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__compare_servers",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__check_trust",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__get_alternatives",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__list_loadouts",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__get_loadout",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__list_capabilities",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__get_ecosystem_stats",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__list_runtimes"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__mcpexplorer__generate_runtime_config",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__plan_toolset",
"mcp__mcpexplorer__report_broken_server"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mcpexplorer. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mcpexplorer/mcpexplorer/verify?hash=e233bf4326f4ed8116d50b862266814e2366d8e7e9e25c6fef294422d1624fc3" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e233bf4326f4, from Nov 20, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcpexplorer/mcpexplorer/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mcpexplorer/mcpexplorer)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:40 UTC.
MCPExplorer MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the MCPExplorer MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 14 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the MCPExplorer MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the MCPExplorer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the MCPExplorer MCP server have?
- 14 tools: 3 write, 11 read. generate_runtime_config, plan_toolset, report_broken_server, search_servers, get_server, get_capability, compare_servers, check_trust and 6 more.
Does the MCPExplorer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the MCPExplorer MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the MCPExplorer MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.