jev-guide MCP server
io.github.mdimamhosen/jev-guidemdimamhosenstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Set up the JEV model router for Claude Code, Codex and Cursor, and install MCP servers.
4 tools: 4 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 2
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
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Import an OpenAPI spec →What the jev-guide MCP server can do
The jev-guide MCP server is published by the GitHub account mdimamhosen. It has 4 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_client_setup and get_mcp_install_commands); 2 tools can send data out of your system (get_client_setup and get_mcp_install_commands).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
4 tools
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
get_client_setupReturns the exact configuration that points Claude Code, Codex or Cursor at a JEV gateway.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_client_setup" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the exact configuration that points Claude Code, Codex or Cursor at a JEV gateway. Use when a user asks how to connect a coding agent to JEV.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
get_mcp_install_commandsReturns the commands that install a remote MCP server into Claude Code, Codex and Cursor, plus a one-click Cursor install link.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_mcp_install_commands" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns the commands that install a remote MCP server into Claude Code, Codex and Cursor, plus a one-click Cursor install link. Use when a user wants to add an MCP server URL to their agents.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
list_model_aliasesLists the JEV model names (jev-auto, jev-fast, …) and what each one does.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_model_aliases" says "list": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Lists the JEV model names (jev-auto, jev-fast, …) and what each one does. Use when choosing which model name to configure.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
route_promptShows which task class and model tier JEV's jev-auto router would pick for a coding prompt.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "show": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Shows which task class and model tier JEV's jev-auto router would pick for a coding prompt. Use to explain or predict routing decisions.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:07 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 0
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://jev-guide.jevrouter.workers.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http jev-guide https://jev-guide.jevrouter.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http jev-guide https://jev-guide.jevrouter.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__jev-guide__route_prompt",
"mcp__jev-guide__list_model_aliases"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__jev-guide__get_client_setup",
"mcp__jev-guide__get_mcp_install_commands"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as jev-guide. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__jev-guide__get_client_setup untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__jev-guide__get_mcp_install_commands untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mdimamhosen/jev-guide/verify?hash=5e3b6e3ed43e07400ae6e366c822a5e789683ee6bd23d3397d2b243487125349" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5e3b6e3ed43e, from Nov 20, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mdimamhosen/jev-guide/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mdimamhosen/jev-guide)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:40 UTC.
jev-guide MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the jev-guide MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.
Can the jev-guide MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the jev-guide MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the jev-guide MCP server have?
- 4 tools: 4 read. route_prompt, get_client_setup, get_mcp_install_commands and list_model_aliases.
Does the jev-guide MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the jev-guide MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): get_client_setup and get_mcp_install_commands.
Has the jev-guide MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.