tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server
io.github.menantonio83-hue/tnt-house-risk-data-apimenantonio83-huestreamable-httpv1.4.1Scanned
RiskDataApi — Solana token risk scoring for AI agents. Safety score, insider clusters, honeypot.
6 tools: 2 do something that can't be undone, 1 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server can do
The tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server is published by the GitHub account menantonio83-hue. It has 6 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (create_topup_invoice and check_payment) and create or change data (1 tool: check_token_risk_batch), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (get_free_api_key); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_free_api_key).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 9, 2026, version 1.4.1.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
6 tools
Can't be undone 2Claude Code: ask
check_paymentChecks on-chain whether an invoice from create_topup_invoice has been paid and, if so, credits your key.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "check_payment" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Checks on-chain whether an invoice from create_topup_invoice has been paid and, if so, credits your key. Safe to call repeatedly (idempotent), at most once every 5 seconds per payment_id (after 30 checks per hour per key, once a minute); if throttled it returns error_code verify_rate_limited with retry_after seconds. Returns verified true/false with a reason.
create_topup_invoiceCreates a Solana payment invoice for your API key: kind "topup" adds call credit ($5-$500, usd_amount, default $5); kind "subscription" buys 30 days.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "create_topup_invoice" says "create": a word for a change.
- The name "create_topup_invoice" also says "topup": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
Description, as the server wrote it Creates a Solana payment invoice for your API key: kind "topup" adds call credit ($5-$500, usd_amount, default $5); kind "subscription" buys 30 days. Returns payment_id, the exact pay_amount and wallet_address. Send exactly pay_amount, then call check_payment. Max 3 pending invoices per key.
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
check_token_risk_batchSame as check_token_risk but for up to 25 mints in one call — N mints charged as N calls, same per-call economics as check_token_risk, no bulk discount.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Same as check_token_risk but for up to 25 mints in one call — N mints charged as N calls, same per-call economics as check_token_risk, no bulk discount. All-or-nothing: if the batch can't be fully covered by remaining quota/credit, the whole batch is rejected rather than partially processed. Needs an API key (Authorization header or api_key argument) or x402 — no anonymous batch calls.
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
check_token_riskReturns a 0-100 safety score, on-chain insider wallet clusters (wallets sharing a first funder), mint/freeze authority status, holder concentration, and live price/liquidity/volume…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns a 0-100 safety score, on-chain insider wallet clusters (wallets sharing a first funder), mint/freeze authority status, holder concentration, and live price/liquidity/volume for a single Solana token mint. Use before recommending or executing a trade on any Solana token. 5 free anonymous calls/day, no signup. Then call get_free_api_key (15/day) or pay per call via x402; pass a key via the Authorization header or the api_key argument. Quota refusals return error_code + options[] with the exact next step.
get_free_api_keyIssues a free RiskDataApi key for an email address (15 checks/day instead of 5 anonymous calls/day).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_free_api_key" says "get": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "email": it reads mail.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "issue": it reads issues, which other people can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Issues a free RiskDataApi key for an email address (15 checks/day instead of 5 anonymous calls/day). No email verification. One active key per email; the key is returned once and also emailed. Use it when you hit the anonymous daily limit.
get_token_risk_historyReturns hourly historical data points (safety_score, insider_cluster_count, holder_count, price, liquidity, volume) for a mint over the last N days (max 90).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_token_risk_history" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Returns hourly historical data points (safety_score, insider_cluster_count, holder_count, price, liquidity, volume) for a mint over the last N days (max 90). Free and unmetered — no quota, works with or without an API key — pure read from stored history, no live upstream call.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (2 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://www.tnt-audit.com/api/mcp: tools/list returned 6 tools to an anonymous client, including create_topup_invoice (irreversible), check_payment (irreversible), check_token_risk_batch (write)
Posture changes
- Oct 29, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 3
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 3.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 3
Tools3 added, 2 changed.+3 added~2 changedView diff
- Added:check_paymentCan't be undone
- Added:create_topup_invoiceCan't be undone
- Added:get_free_api_keyOnly reads
- Changed:check_token_riskOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:check_token_risk_batchChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.4.1. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http tnt-house-risk-data-api https://www.tnt-audit.com/api/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http tnt-house-risk-data-api https://www.tnt-audit.com/api/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__check_token_risk",
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__get_free_api_key",
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__get_token_risk_history"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__check_token_risk_batch",
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__create_topup_invoice",
"mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__check_payment"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as tnt-house-risk-data-api. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__tnt-house-risk-data-api__get_free_api_key private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.menantonio83-hue/tnt-house-risk-data-api/verify?hash=a5ff4abf81b3a378fdf746efce1d07e4ed25ee57f8ed19492ddd6787b02fe71c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash a5ff4abf81b3, from Nov 9, 2026, 21:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.menantonio83-hue/tnt-house-risk-data-api/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.menantonio83-hue/tnt-house-risk-data-api)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 28, 2026, 07:17 UTC.
tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 6 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- Yes. 2 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: create_topup_invoice and check_payment.
What tools does the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server have?
- 6 tools: 2 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read. create_topup_invoice, check_payment, check_token_risk_batch, check_token_risk, get_free_api_key and get_token_risk_history.
Does the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the tnt-house-risk-data-api MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Oct 28, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.