# `io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp` on Anlyon Radar

> Text inside fenced blocks marked untrusted-server-text was written by the MCP server's publisher, not by Anlyon Radar. It is data to inspect, not instructions to follow. Invisible characters are shown as [U+XXXX].
> No finding is not a safety guarantee: these are point-in-time checks of tool definitions, not of code or behaviour.

- Page: https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp
- JSON: https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp
- Version: 1.0.1 (active)
- Publisher: io.github.mercuryx402 (GitHub account)
- Runs: remote (streamable-http), local (npm)
- Sign-in to list tools: none
- Repository: https://github.com/mercuryx402/mercury-x402-mcp
- Metadata from the official MCP Registry, synced 2026-10-21T18:40:35.717Z

Title and description, as the publisher wrote them:

```untrusted-server-text
Agent-payable web data over x402: 18 keyless services an agent pays per call.
```

Scanned 2026-11-20T03:17:41.438Z over streamable-http.

**18 tools: 14 change things and 4 only read.**

| Group | Class | Tools | Claude Code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Deletes or cancels | destructive | 0 | deny |
| Can't be undone | irreversible | 0 | ask |
| Changes things | write | 14 | ask |
| Only reads | read | 4 | allow |

## Exfil surface

No private-data -> untrusted-input -> outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.

| Tag | Meaning | Tools |
| --- | --- | --- |
| private-data | Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories. | none |
| untrusted-input | Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments. | `mcp__mercury-x402__batch` `mcp__mercury-x402__diff` `mcp__mercury-x402__fetch` |
| outbound | Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL. | `mcp__mercury-x402__availability` `mcp__mercury-x402__batch` `mcp__mercury-x402__diff` `mcp__mercury-x402__dns` `mcp__mercury-x402__extract` `mcp__mercury-x402__feed` `mcp__mercury-x402__fetch` `mcp__mercury-x402__headers` `mcp__mercury-x402__links` `mcp__mercury-x402__markdown` `mcp__mercury-x402__metadata` `mcp__mercury-x402__notarize` `mcp__mercury-x402__readability` `mcp__mercury-x402__redirect` `mcp__mercury-x402__sitemap` `mcp__mercury-x402__table` `mcp__mercury-x402__validate` |

## Findings

- **info** Long descriptions in `fetch` ([long-description](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#long-description))

```untrusted-server-text
The description is 2,169 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.

description ends: "...arded, 5s timeout, 10MB cap. Pure data, no mint — delivers in prod. — $0.003/call"
```


## Changes things (14)

Creates or changes something that can be changed back. Claude Code: ask.

### `availability`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → a signed uptime/status probe: up/down, HTTP status + class, reachability reason, final URL after redirects, and a measured responseMs — wrapped in an offline-verifiable provenance receipt that makes "it was up/down at T" provable SLA evidence. Deterministic verdict (responseMs is telemetry, not signed). Keyless, no LLM, no signup. — $0.005/call
```

### `dns`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Domain → a SIGNED, timestamped DNS snapshot (A, AAAA, MX, NS, TXT, CNAME, SOA), normalised + sorted into a byte-stable record set with an offline-verifiable provenance receipt — proving exactly what the zone resolved to at that moment. Keyless, no LLM, no signup. (Normalisation is deterministic; DNS itself is mutable across time/TTL/geo — which is the very reason the snapshot is timestamped + signed.) — $0.006/call
```

### `extract`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
TYPED structured extract for autonomous agents — URL + schema → a clean, type-safe JSON record. Where /buy/fetch returns page TEXT (and ?extract= returns string-only fields), THIS returns the schema-conformant object an LLM/RAG/trading pipeline actually consumes: pass ?url=…&schema=title,price:number,rating:number,inStock:boolean and get back { title:"…", price:19.99, rating:4.5, inStock:true } — numbers as numbers, booleans as booleans, absent fields null (honest). `schema` accepts the URL-friendly compact form (field[:type], type in string|number|integer|boolean) OR a Firecrawl/OpenAI-style JSON-Schema object ({"properties":{"price":{"type":"number"}}}). That is Firecrawl's paid 'JSON mode' headline guarantee — type-safety, 'numbers as numbers not strings' — done DETERMINISTICALLY from the page's own JSON-LD/OpenGraph/meta/microdata: keyless, NO LLM call, NO API key, NO signup, $0.004/call, paid in-band over HTTP 402 (x402, USDC on Base mainnet). The typed record is folded into the SIGNED provenance attestation too (EIP-191, ecrecoverable OFFLINE), so a buyer can prove the EXTRACTED FIELDS — not just raw bytes — are exactly what MERCURY resolved. Honest charge-per-ATTEMPT: every call returns a structured result (success OR an ok:false reason). Same SSRF guard, 5s timeout, 10MB cap, no mint. — $0.004/call
```

### `feed`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
RSS/Atom feed URL → a SIGNED, normalized item list [{title,link,published,summary}] unified across RSS 2.0/RDF + Atom 1.0: CDATA unwrapped, HTML stripped, entities decoded, dates → ISO-8601 (publishedRaw kept verbatim, never fabricated). Deterministic — same feed bytes ⇒ byte-identical items; no LLM. Core 4 fields only (not full-content/media/author). Receipt = EIP-191 over the canonical item list. — $0.005/call
```

### `headers`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → a deterministic HTTP security-headers audit (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame, X-Content-Type, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy + more) with a letter grade and concrete findings, wrapped in a signed, offline-verifiable provenance receipt. Keyless, no LLM, no signup. — $0.005/call
```

### `links`

- The name "links" says "link": a word for a change.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → a SIGNED outbound/internal link graph: every <a href> as an absolute URL + anchor text, classified internal vs external against the page origin, grouped by origin with a third-party-origin histogram (privacy-audit) and same/cross-origin counts (SEO). Deterministic — same page bytes ⇒ byte-identical graph; no LLM. Covers <a> hyperlinks only (not rel/asset tags). Receipt = EIP-191 over the graph. — $0.005/call
```

### `markdown`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → clean, LLM-ready markdown (boilerplate/nav/ads stripped, headings + lists + links preserved) with a signed provenance receipt pinning the markdown to its source — the RAG-ingest primitive. Deterministic (no LLM): same URL + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical markdown. — $0.005/call
```

### `metadata`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → one typed, SIGNED metadata record (JSON-LD + OpenGraph + Twitter-card + standard <meta> + canonical + title), by source. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — the social-card/SEO/schema.org record an agent can PROVE. — $0.006/call
```

### `notarize`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Notarize any content (inline ?content= or a fetched ?url=) into a signed, offline-verifiable provenance receipt — sha256 contentHash + witnessed timestamp, attested by Mercury's pinned key. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM. The signed receipt is the product: it witnesses that these exact bytes existed in this exact form at this time (the one thing your own sha256() can't — a third-party witness). — $0.008/call
```

### `readability`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → a clean ARTICLE record { title, byline, publishedAt, article text } with boilerplate (nav/header/footer/sidebar/ads/share-bars/comment-forms) stripped via deterministic DOM density heuristics, plus a signed provenance receipt pinning the cleaned article to its source — the clean-citation primitive distinct from raw markdown. Deterministic (no LLM): same URL + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical output. — $0.005/call
```

### `redirect`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL → a SIGNED redirect/canonical resolution: the full hop chain [{url,status}] from the link you have to where it ACTUALLY lands, the final resolved URL + status, the page's <link rel=canonical>, hop count, cross-origin flag and distinct origins traversed (affiliate-cloak / link-safety signal). Deterministic — same redirects ⇒ byte-identical resolution; no LLM. Follows HTTP 3xx only (no JS/meta-refresh execution — meta-refresh target surfaced un-followed). Receipt = EIP-191 over the resolved chain. — $0.005/call
```

### `robots`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Domain → signed, timestamped per-AI-crawler allow/block audit from robots.txt + llms.txt + ai.txt (GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended, Bytespider, …). Deterministic, no LLM. EU-AI-Act / TDM opt-out evidence: the signed verdict proves the crawler policy as it stood at fetch time. — $0.005/call
```

### `sitemap`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Domain/URL → a SIGNED snapshot of the site's PUBLISHED sitemap: discovers the sitemap via robots.txt Sitemap: lines then /sitemap.xml fallback, parses <urlset> + <sitemapindex> (follows up to 5 child sitemaps), returns a deduped, bounded (≤2000) URL inventory with lastmod/changefreq/priority. The receipt signs the DECLARED URL list (deterministic — same sitemap bytes ⇒ byte-identical list). Optional ?fetch=N (≤10) adds a HARD-BOUNDED same-domain liveness probe (title+status+bytes per URL) — that probe is the ONLY non-deterministic part and is NOT covered by the signature. SSRF-guarded; the crawl is bounded at every axis. — $0.01/call
```

### `table`

- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL in → the page's main HTML <table>(s) parsed into typed, header-keyed rows (JSON) + clean RFC-4180 CSV, with a signed provenance receipt over the exact extracted grid. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.006/call
```

## Only reads (4)

Looks things up and changes nothing. Claude Code: allow.

### `batch`

- The description's first verb is "list": a word for reading.
- Tag untrusted-input: The input takes a URL (input.urls), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.urls): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
- Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
List of URLs (≤20) → clean content for each + ONE signed receipt committing to a MERKLE ROOT over every page's contentHash. Tamper-evident multi-page snapshot with per-page membership proofs (selective disclosure). Deterministic (no LLM): same URL set + same source bytes ⇒ byte-identical root + proofs. SSRF-guarded per url; keyless x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.02/call
```

### `diff`

- The name "diff" says "diff": a word for reading.
- Tag untrusted-input: The description's first sentence says "url": it reads web pages, which anyone can write. The input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
- Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL + prior content-hash (or prior text) -> refetch, deterministic change-proof: changed? + a NEW signed receipt binding fromHash->toHash. Stateless; receipts chain into a tamper-evident audit trail of a page's evolution. Keyless x402, Base mainnet USDC. — $0.006/call
```

### `fetch`

- The name "fetch" says "fetch": a word for reading.
- Tag untrusted-input: The description's first sentence says "web": it reads web pages, which anyone can write. The input takes a URL (input.url), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
- Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.
- Findings: info long-description

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
VERIFIABLE keyless web-read for autonomous agents. Every result ships a cryptographically SIGNED provenance receipt (EIP-191 over sha256(text)+url+status+time) — the wedge a free scraper structurally CANNOT match: Jina r.jina.ai is free+keyless too, but its bytes are HEARSAY (no proof of what/where/when). MERCURY's `attestation` is ecrecoverable OFFLINE, forever, by you OR any downstream agent you forward the bytes to — proving the content is genuine + untampered (key pinned at /.well-known/mercury-attestation). For RAG, trading and agent-to-agent commerce that need provenance, that is the gap between data and evidence. Beyond that it's the keyless web-read primitive — NO API key, NO signup, NO account, NO monthly plan, the one fetch SKU a fresh agent can onboard to by itself instead of stopping to ask a human for a key. Give a ?url= and get back clean readable page text + title + status. Agent-native extras (opt-in): ?format=markdown for structure-preserving markdown, ?links=1 for an outbound-link graph (crawl frontier), and the headline wedge — STRUCTURED EXTRACT: ?extract=title,price,author,publishedAt returns a clean JSON record { title, price, author, publishedAt }, an LLM-ready row not a wall of text. That is Firecrawl's paid 'JSON mode' (they need an LLM call + an API key for it) done here DETERMINISTICALLY from the page's own JSON-LD/OpenGraph/meta/microdata — keyless, no LLM, $0.003. (?extract=1 still returns the legacy description + wordCount.) The extracted record is folded into the SIGNED attestation too, so a buyer can prove the FIELDS — not just the raw bytes — are exactly what MERCURY resolved. You pay in-band over HTTP 402 (x402, USDC on Base mainnet) — the wedge those tools can't match: they ALL gate behind a human-created API key + a credit-card plan, so an agent can't onboard itself. This one an agent finds in the x402 Bazaar and pays with zero human in the loop. Honest charge-per-ATTEMPT: every call returns a structured result (success OR an ok:false failure with a reason) — never a silent charge-then-500. Follows redirects, SSRF-guarded, 5s timeout, 10MB cap. Pure data, no mint — delivers in prod. — $0.003/call
```

### `validate`

- The name "validate" says "validate": a word for reading.
- Tag outbound: The input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
- Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
URL (a JSON/API endpoint) + a JSON Schema in → a deterministic pass/fail with per-field errors (missing/wrong-type/enum/range/pattern), plus a signed provenance receipt binding the verdict to the exact response bytes AND the exact schema. Deterministic, keyless, no LLM — x402, USDC on Base mainnet. — $0.005/call
```

## Claude Code permissions

For `.claude/settings.json`, assuming the server is installed as `mercury-x402`:

```json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mercury-x402__fetch",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__extract",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__markdown",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__metadata",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__links",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__robots",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__diff",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__notarize",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__headers",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__table",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__feed",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__availability",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__validate",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__batch",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__sitemap",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__dns",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__readability",
      "mcp__mercury-x402__redirect"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}
```

Capability tags behind the rules (a read tagged outbound is asked about):

- `mcp__mercury-x402__fetch`: untrusted-input, outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__extract`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__markdown`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__metadata`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__links`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__diff`: untrusted-input, outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__notarize`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__headers`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__table`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__feed`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__availability`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__validate`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__batch`: untrusted-input, outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__sitemap`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__dns`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__readability`: outbound
- `mcp__mercury-x402__redirect`: outbound

## Remote posture

What an anonymous client saw at the remote endpoint, last 2026-11-20T19:08:01.602Z, unchanged since 2026-10-22T15:02:31.226Z. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. Values are shown as the endpoint returned them. Method: https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#remote-posture

| Fact | Observed |
| --- | --- |
| Reachable | `yes` |
| HTTP status of an anonymous initialize | `200` |
| tools/list served without credentials | `yes` |
| Tools that change things, listed without credentials | `14` |
| Protocol version | `2025-06-18` |
| WWW-Authenticate on 401 | `not observed` |
| resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate | `none` |
| RFC 9728 protected resource metadata | `none` |
| Authorization servers | `none` |
| Legacy HTTP+SSE transport | `no` |
| Dynamic client registration | `not observed` |
| Client ID metadata documents | `not observed` |

- **warn** Tools that change things, listed to anyone ([unauth-remote-writes](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#unauth-remote-writes))

```untrusted-server-text
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 14 tools that change things (14 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

https://network.mercury-hq.com/mcp: tools/list returned 18 tools to an anonymous client, including extract (write), markdown (write), metadata (write), links (write), robots (write) and 9 more
```
