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Synaplan MCP server

io.github.metadist/synaplanmetadiststreamable-httpv5.8.9Scanned

Self-hosted AI workspace: semantic RAG document search, long-term memory, and AI chat via MCP.

10 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone, 2 change things and 7 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 1 irreversible, 2 write, 7 read.
  • Reads private data · 4
  • Reads text others write · 4
  • Can send data out · 1
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

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3 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

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What the Synaplan MCP server can do

The Synaplan MCP server is published by the GitHub account metadist. It has 10 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (synaplan_chat) and create or change data (2 tools: memory_add and file_ingest), but cannot delete data. 7 tools only read.

4 tools read private data (rag_search, rag_similar, list_chats and 1 more); 4 tools bring in text other people can write (synaplan_chat, rag_similar, list_chats and 1 more); 1 tool can send data out of your system (synaplan_chat). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 5.8.9.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

10 tools

Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • synaplan_chatSend a message through Synaplan's full AI pipeline — intent classification, web search, RAG over the user's documents, long-term memories, and inference — and return the synthesize…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "send": a word for sending, and what is sent cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • outboundThe description's first verb is "send": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.chat_id): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Send a message through Synaplan's full AI pipeline — intent classification, web search, RAG over the user's documents, long-term memories, and inference — and return the synthesized answer. This is richer than a raw model call: it uses the authenticated account's knowledge base and memories.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
  • file_ingestAdd a text document to the authenticated user's knowledge base.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Add a text document to the authenticated user's knowledge base. The content is chunked, embedded, and stored so it becomes retrievable via rag_search.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • memory_addStore a new long-term memory for the authenticated user — a durable fact or preference that Synaplan will recall in future conversations.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "memory_add" says "add": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Store a new long-term memory for the authenticated user — a durable fact or preference that Synaplan will recall in future conversations.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 7Show 7 read-only tools
  • get_messagesReturn the messages of one of the user's chats, in chronological order.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_messages" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "get_messages" says "get" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the messages of one of the user's chats, in chronological order.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_assistantsList assistants the authenticated user may use from a connected app.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_assistants" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List assistants the authenticated user may use from a connected app. Each row includes slug, name, description, version and origin.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_chatsList the authenticated user's conversations (most recently updated first).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_chats" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "list_chats" says "list" and "chat": it reads messages.
    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "conversation": it reads messages.
    • untrusted-inputThe name "list_chats" says "list" and "chat": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "list" and "conversation": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the authenticated user's conversations (most recently updated first).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • list_promptsList the user's available Synaplan task prompts (internal `tools:*` prompts excluded).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_prompts" says "list": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the user's available Synaplan task prompts (internal `tools:*` prompts excluded).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • rag_similarFind document chunks similar to a given source message/document id (the `message_id` returned by rag_search).Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "find": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "find" and "document": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "find" and "message": it reads messages, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find document chunks similar to a given source message/document id (the `message_id` returned by rag_search).

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

16 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 outbound tool breaks every one.

Reads private data4
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write4
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out1
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__synaplan__synaplan_chat"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://web.synaplan.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://web.synaplan.com/mcp: tools/list returned 10 tools to an anonymous client, including synaplan_chat (irreversible), memory_add (write), file_ingest (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Oct 29, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://web.synaplan.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 -> 200; tools/list served without credentials: no -> yes; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 -> 3 (and 3 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 401 to 200
    • tools/list served without credentials: no to yes
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 0 to 3
    • Protocol version: none to 2025-06-18
    • WWW-Authenticate on 401: yes to not observed
    • resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate: https://web.synaplan.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp to none

Install

Pinned to version 5.8.9. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http synaplan https://web.synaplan.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'
claude mcp add --transport http synaplan https://web.synaplan.com/mcp --header 'X-API-Key: <your-x-api-key>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__synaplan__rag_search",
      "mcp__synaplan__memory_search",
      "mcp__synaplan__rag_similar",
      "mcp__synaplan__list_chats",
      "mcp__synaplan__get_messages",
      "mcp__synaplan__list_prompts",
      "mcp__synaplan__list_assistants"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__synaplan__synaplan_chat",
      "mcp__synaplan__memory_add",
      "mcp__synaplan__file_ingest"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as synaplan. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__synaplan__synaplan_chat untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__synaplan__rag_search private-data
  • mcp__synaplan__rag_similar private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__synaplan__list_chats private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__synaplan__get_messages private-data, untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.metadist/synaplan/verify?hash=1407ed8801cae611563992ae32fa7dd4e039187ff2ff04b81588700f2f452bb3" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1407ed8801ca, from Nov 20, 2026, 07:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.metadist/synaplan/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.metadist/synaplan
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.metadist/synaplan.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.metadist/synaplan)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 07:17 UTC.

Synaplan MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Synaplan MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 10 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Synaplan MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Synaplan MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: synaplan_chat.

What tools does the Synaplan MCP server have?

10 tools: 1 irreversible, 2 write, 7 read. synaplan_chat, memory_add, file_ingest, rag_search, memory_search, rag_similar, list_chats, get_messages and 2 more.

Does the Synaplan MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Synaplan MCP server send data to outside services?

1 tool can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): synaplan_chat.

Has the Synaplan MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.