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secureflows-mcp server

io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcpmichal-leflerstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned

MCP server for secureFlows: token-free URL builders and integration-linting tools for AI agents.

18 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 do something that can't be undone, 9 change things and 6 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 1 irreversible, 9 write, 6 read.
  • Reads private data · 2
  • Reads text others write · 2
  • Can send data out · 7
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things and 1 does something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the secureflows-mcp server can do

The secureflows-mcp server is published by the GitHub account michal-lefler. It has 18 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: delete_sessions_delete_key and post_sessions_revoke), do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (secureflows_build_logout_url) and create or change data (9 tools: post_sessions, post_sessions_get_or_create, post_sessions_renew_session_token, post_sessions_set_key and 5 more). 6 tools only read.

2 tools read private data (get_sessions_identity and get_docs_search); 2 tools bring in text other people can write (get_sessions_identity and get_auth_logout); 7 tools can send data out of your system (post_sessions, post_sessions_get_or_create, post_sessions_renew_session_token and 4 more). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.2.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

18 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • delete_sessions_delete_keyRemoves `key` from the session payload and returns `true` if the key existed.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "delete_sessions_delete_key" says "delete": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Removes `key` from the session payload and returns `true` if the key existed. Source: DELETE /api/v1/sessions/delete/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessions_revokePermanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions_revoke" says "post": a word for a change.
    • The description's first verb is "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The description says "cannot be restored".

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions_revoke" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Permanently revokes the session referenced by the internal SESSION Bearer token. The session ends and everything stored in it is destroyed and cannot be restored. This is NOT sign-out: to sign a user out and keep their data, use POST /api/v1/auth/logout (or, in a browser, the redirect helper GET /api/v1/auth/logout). Call revoke only when the user or an admin deliberately wants the session and its data deleted, for example on account deletion. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
Can't be undone 1Claude Code: ask
  • secureflows_build_logout_urlBuilds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers tre…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description says "permanently destroys".
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Builds a correct redirect-logout URL and refuses to build one that violates the two documented logout anti-patterns: a redirect_uri pointing at /callback (SPA callback handlers treat the tokenless return as a failed login and loop), and a redirect_uri that itself embeds session_token (silently renews the old session instead of signing out). The result always instructs top-level navigation, never fetch/XHR — cross-site fetch() to this endpoint gets a 200 but browsers silently ignore its Clear-Site-Data header on cross-site responses, so the hosted-login cookie survives and the user silently re-authenticates on the next login redirect. This tool never builds a revoke request: revoke permanently destroys the user's data and must only run on an explicit "delete my account" action, never on ordinary sign-out.
Changes things 9Claude Code: ask
  • auth_session_callback**Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    **Browser redirect endpoint** used after hosted `/app/sessions/login`. No `Authorization` header. 1. Verifies **`firebaseToken`** (Firebase ID token). 2. Ensures **`client_redirect_uri`** is allowlisted for **`app_id`** (same rules as `validate-redirect`). 3. **Create vs renew:** If **`session_token`** is absent, **reuses the newest active session** for **`(workspace_name, Firebase UID, app_id)`** or **creates** one (`get-or-create`). Optional **`payload`** (URL-encoded JSON **object**, default `{}`) is stored **only on create** — ignored when reusing an existing session. If **`session_token`** is present (previous session JWT, may be expired), **renews** that session; **`payload`** must **not** be sent on the same request. Optional **`ttl_seconds`** applies to both paths (default **0** = unlimited; otherwise **60–604800**). When the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (audit display only). 4. Responds with **`302 Found`** to `client_redirect_uri` with query params **`sessionToken`** and, if provided, **`state`**. If **`client_redirect_uri`** is not allowed for **`app_id`**, responds **`400`** and does **not** redirect (open-redirect mitigation). Other failures return an HTTP error status with a JSON **`{"status", "error"}`** body and do **not** redirect. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/callback No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_auth_logoutLogs out the current session **without revoking** it.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_auth_logout" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_auth_logout" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Logs out the current session **without revoking** it. **Browser warning:** calling this endpoint via XHR/fetch from a different origin than `secure-flows.com` is not a reliable way to clear hosted-login cookies. For browser apps (especially localhost), prefer the redirect helper `GET /api/v1/auth/logout?session_token=...&redirect_uri=...`. Behavior: - **Invalidates** the current `sessionToken` by incrementing `tokenRevision` (no new token is issued). - Calls Firebase `revokeRefreshTokens(firebaseUid)` using the session’s stored Firebase UID. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"` to clear browser cookies (including Firebase session cookie). Session payload and session row are **not** deleted or modified (other than `tokenRevision`). Source: POST /api/v1/auth/logout Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessionsVerifies **Firebase** ID token, creates a session for **`workspaceName`**, stores serialized **`payload`** (defaults to `{}` when omitted), and returns **`sessionToken`** (JWT; sub…Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verifies **Firebase** ID token, creates a session for **`workspaceName`**, stores serialized **`payload`** (defaults to `{}` when omitted), and returns **`sessionToken`** (JWT; subject = internal session id). Default server-side TTL is **1 hour** (implementation detail). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists it on the workspace end-user row (for audit display). Prefer **`POST /sessions/get-or-create`** for hosted-login-style flows that should reuse an active session. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessions_get_or_createVerifies **Firebase** ID token.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions_get_or_create" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions_get_or_create" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verifies **Firebase** ID token. If an **active** session already exists for **`(workspaceName, Firebase UID, app_id)`**, returns a new **`sessionToken`** JWT for the **most recently created** matching row (touches activity; does not create a duplicate session). The request **`payload` is ignored on reuse** — it is applied only when a new session row is created. Prefer a dedicated `app_id` per integration surface, or revoke old sessions, if you need a fresh payload. Otherwise behaves like **`POST /sessions`** (new row + default **1 hour** TTL). If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort persists or backfills it on the workspace end-user row (including when reusing an existing session). Intended for integrators that mirror hosted login session reuse. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/get-or-create Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessions_renew_session_tokenVerifies **Firebase** ID token.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions_renew_session_token" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions_renew_session_token" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Verifies **Firebase** ID token. Parses **`sessionToken`** path segment as an internal SESSION JWT **without enforcing JWT expiry** (signature and `tokenType=SESSION` are still validated). Loads the session by id from the token subject; the Firebase UID must match the session owner. Increments **`tokenRevision`** on the server so **previous session JWTs** (same session id, older revision) are no longer accepted for `GET/POST/DELETE /sessions/...`. Returns a **new `sessionToken`** (with the new `tokenRevision` claim) and the current decrypted **payload**; extends server-side session expiry by **1 hour**. If the Firebase token includes **`email`**, the server best-effort backfills it on the session owner when the user row has no email yet (audit display only). Use the path form `POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken}` — **URL-encode** the JWT (e.g. `encodeURIComponent` in JS). Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/renew/{sessionToken} Requires `auth.firebaseToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessions_revoke_session_idSelf-service dashboard endpoint.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions_revoke_session_id" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions_revoke_session_id" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Self-service dashboard endpoint. Revokes a session owned by the caller in the current workspace. The session ends and its stored data is destroyed permanently; this is not sign-out. Requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/revoke/{sessionId} Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • post_sessions_set_keySets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "post_sessions_set_key" says "post": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe name "post_sessions_set_key" says "post": it sends or publishes something to other people.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Sets a key in the encrypted session payload and returns the updated decrypted payload. If the JSON body is `{ "value": <x> }`, the server unwraps it and stores `<x>` directly. Source: POST /api/v1/sessions/set/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • secureflows_build_login_urlBuilds a correct hosted-login redirect URL.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Builds a correct hosted-login redirect URL. Needs no secureFlows token — safe to call at app-scaffolding time, before any user session exists, which is the phase most secureFlows integration mistakes happen in. Always targets /app/sessions/login (session apps). Never builds the legacy /app/login console URL, which returns a firebaseToken your SecureFlowsCallback handler cannot consume and causes an infinite redirect loop. Use this instead of hand-building the URL with URLSearchParams — hand-built login URLs are the #1 source of the login-loop and stale-renewal bugs documented in SKILL.md.
  • secureflows_lint_integrationChecks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Checks source you already generated against the secureFlows integration rules. Needs no secureFlows token; safe at scaffolding time. Pass every auth/session-related file in one call — some checks are evaluated across the whole set. Two kinds of findings: • scope "file" — a forbidden construct is present (localStorage token, legacy /app/login, fetch-based logout, client-side JWT decode, empty catch, restore non-auth errors clearing session UI, Continue CTA gated on null session, ...), reported at an exact file:line. • scope "project" — REQUIRED handling is missing everywhere you passed in: detecting 401/410 but never clearing the token, never handling 403, or handling 403 without the BILLING_GRACE_LOCK carve-out. These are the defects that actually dominate real generated apps, and no "forbidden pattern" check can see them, because the bug is an absence. Heuristic text analysis, not a parser or a type checker. It can miss things it has no rule for, and a project check can be satisfied by the right keyword in the wrong place. It is a fast first pass — not a substitute for the Agent implementation checklist in SKILL.md, and specifically not for the checks that need a running app (auth-guard mount races, the fresh-reload check). Fix every "error" before calling an integration done; treat "needs_review" as a lead.
Only reads 6Show 6 read-only tools
  • get_auth_logoutBrowser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_auth_logout" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Browser-friendly logout endpoint for **cross-site** clients (e.g. apps running on `localhost`). Use this as a **top-level navigation** (not XHR/fetch) so `Clear-Site-Data` is applied in a **first-party** context on `secure-flows.com`, making cookie/session clearing reliable even when third-party cookies are blocked. **Critical client rules:** - Clear your in-app `sessionToken` state **before** navigating. - **Never** include `session_token` inside `redirect_uri` (that would silently renew and defeat logout). This endpoint (best-effort / idempotent for browser UX): - Invalidates the provided `session_token` by incrementing `tokenRevision` when the token still matches an **active** session (no new token is issued). - If the session is already expired/revoked or the revision was superseded by renew, still completes logout UX (does **not** return 401 solely for that reason). - Revokes Firebase refresh tokens for the session’s stored Firebase UID when known. - Sets `Clear-Site-Data: "cookies"`. - Redirects the browser to `redirect_uri`. Source: GET /api/v1/auth/logout No Authorization header is required. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • get_sessionsReturns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_sessions" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the decrypted session payload for the authenticated internal session token. Response shape is a **flat JSON object**. Empty payload returns `{}`. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • get_sessions_get_keyRetrieves the decrypted payload value for `key`.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_sessions_get_key" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Retrieves the decrypted payload value for `key`. **Important:** `404` means the key was never written (normal first-use case). Do not treat as an error. Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/get/{key} Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • get_sessions_identityReturns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_sessions_identity" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "email": it reads mail.
    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "return" and "email": it reads inbound email, which other people can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns the workspace end-user's **`userId`** and **email** for the authenticated session token. Does not return Firebase UID or session payload. `userId` is a stable, opaque identifier for this person across sessions and logins — it is **not** derived from Firebase. Use it as the correlation key when your own backend needs to link an external event (e.g. a billing provider webhook you receive and verify yourself) back to this user. Do not use the session token or session id for this — sessions expire and rotate, `userId` does not. Email is best-effort from hosted login (Firebase `email` claim persisted on the user row). When unknown, `email` is `null`. Browser SDK: **`secureflows-js`** **`fetchSessionIdentity(token)`** (≥ 0.1.15 for `userId`). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/identity Requires `auth.sessionToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.
  • get_sessions_myReturns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_sessions_my" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns a page of sessions for the current user within the current workspace. Self-service dashboard endpoint — requires workspace **`enableSelfService: true`**. Payload is included only for rows whose computed status is active. Sort keys match the admin workspace session list; `pageSize` is clamped to 1–200 (default 20). Source: GET /api/v1/sessions/my Requires `auth.userToken` and forwards it as a Bearer token. Prefer connection.workspaceName and connection.appId as stable config instead of generating identity fields dynamically.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

28 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 2 untrusted-input tools breaks every one.

Reads private data2
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write2
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out7
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__secureflows__get_auth_logout",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_sessions_identity"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
12
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 12 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 9 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp: tools/list returned 18 tools to an anonymous client, including delete_sessions_delete_key (destructive), post_sessions_revoke (destructive), secureflows_build_logout_url (irreversible), post_sessions (write), post_sessions_get_or_create (write) and 7 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http secureflows https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http secureflows https://www.secure-flows.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__secureflows__get_sessions",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_sessions_identity",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_sessions_get_key",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_auth_logout",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_sessions_my",
      "mcp__secureflows__get_docs_search"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_get_or_create",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_renew_session_token",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_set_key",
      "mcp__secureflows__auth_session_callback",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_auth_logout",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_revoke_session_id",
      "mcp__secureflows__secureflows_build_login_url",
      "mcp__secureflows__secureflows_build_logout_url",
      "mcp__secureflows__secureflows_lint_integration"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__secureflows__delete_sessions_delete_key",
      "mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_revoke"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as secureflows. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 10 rules
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__get_sessions_identity private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_get_or_create outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_renew_session_token outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_set_key outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_revoke outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__get_auth_logout untrusted-input
  • mcp__secureflows__post_auth_logout outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__post_sessions_revoke_session_id outbound
  • mcp__secureflows__get_docs_search private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcp/verify?hash=2fe709e6bdc240bbef9af7eefd03f1e972c7341ee871c36423de963cc09e990f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 2fe709e6bdc2, from Nov 20, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcp/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.michal-lefler/secureflows-mcp
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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:40 UTC.

secureflows-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the secureflows-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 18 tools, 12 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the secureflows-mcp server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: delete_sessions_delete_key and post_sessions_revoke.

Can the secureflows-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 1 tool can send, pay, publish or merge: secureflows_build_logout_url.

What tools does the secureflows-mcp server have?

18 tools: 2 destructive, 1 irreversible, 9 write, 6 read. delete_sessions_delete_key, post_sessions_revoke, secureflows_build_logout_url, post_sessions, post_sessions_get_or_create, post_sessions_renew_session_token, post_sessions_set_key, auth_session_callback and 10 more.

Does the secureflows-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the secureflows-mcp server send data to outside services?

7 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): post_sessions, post_sessions_get_or_create, post_sessions_renew_session_token, post_sessions_set_key, post_sessions_revoke, post_auth_logout and 1 more.

Has the secureflows-mcp server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.