Agora MCP server
io.github.mo-grantsmith/agoramo-grantsmithstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Find governed AI capabilities and verify signed receipts. Read-only, no account.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the Agora MCP server can do
The Agora MCP server is published by the GitHub account mo-grantsmith. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: execute_capability and verify_receipt), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
execute_capabilityStart a declared capability through Agora's own governed summon path, and return the RECEIPT ID of the act.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "execute_capability" says "execute": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Start a declared capability through Agora's own governed summon path, and return the RECEIPT ID of the act. Requires an OAuth 2.1 access token carrying the agora:execute scope and minted for this resource; the token establishes who is calling, and the tenant's member-role table decides what they may do. Every refusal names its cause and is itself receipted. Dry by default: pass commit=true to write.
verify_receiptCheck whether a receipt id names a real, signed act in the commons tenant, and report its signature verdict, action, outcome, actor class, timestamps, chain position, and — when th…1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ccount is needed: the receipt id is the credential. Private tenants answer 'not_public'; c..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a receipt id names a real, signed act in the commons tenant, and report its signature verdict, action, outcome, actor class, timestamps, chain position, and — when the act was denied — the cause that was actually stamped. No account is needed: the receipt id is the credential. Private tenants answer 'not_public'; capability URLs, key material and human subjects are never rendered.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
search_capabilitiesFind capabilities declared in Agora's habitat, by capability word, alias or name.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_capabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Find capabilities declared in Agora's habitat, by capability word, alias or name. Every entry reports its HONEST live status: scheduled (running on a clock), staffed, dormant (declared, never summoned or since stopped), or toolpack-wakeable (no clock by design, woken by a floor mention). Dormant entries are INCLUDED — a directory that hid what was not running would answer a question nobody asked.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2026-07-28
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://agora-console-production.up.railway.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agora-console-production.up.railway.app/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including execute_capability (write), verify_receipt (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infoverify_receipt
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...ccount is needed: the receipt id is the credential. Private tenants answer 'not_public'; c..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agora https://agora-console-production.up.railway.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agora https://agora-console-production.up.railway.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agora__search_capabilities"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agora__execute_capability",
"mcp__agora__verify_receipt"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agora. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mo-grantsmith/agora/verify?hash=123d88a004cc16014b13d368eacc2c38e7b370bb098e720922d9507b6f7ce9b0" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 123d88a004cc, from Nov 20, 2026, 04:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mo-grantsmith/agora/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mo-grantsmith/agora)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:41 UTC.
Agora MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agora MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agora MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agora MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agora MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. execute_capability, verify_receipt and search_capabilities.
Does the Agora MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agora MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agora MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.