attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server
io.github.mrpkk/attestmrpkkstreamable-httpv0.2.0Scanned
Verify an AI agent artifact: schema, emptiness, provenance and mandate authority, Ed25519-signed.
2 tools: 2 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
Anlyon alternative
2 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.
Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.
Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.
Import an OpenAPI spec →What the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server can do
The attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server is published by the GitHub account mrpkk. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: verify_artifact and verify_artifact_batch), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.2.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
verify_artifactVerify an artifact produced by an AI agent before accepting or paying for it.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify an artifact produced by an AI agent before accepting or paying for it. Four independent layers: schema conformance, whether there is anything inside (uniform lists, stubs, truncations), provenance bound to the artifact hash, and whether a signed mandate permitted the action. Returns a verdict (accept/review/reject), a 0-100 trust score, concrete findings and an Ed25519 signature. Rule-based, no LLM: the same artifact always yields the same result. Use before accepting work from another agent and before payment.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify an AI agent artifact
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
verify_artifact_batchVerify several artifacts at once — a scan report, a list of findings, a set of tool descriptions.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Verify several artifacts at once — a scan report, a list of findings, a set of tool descriptions. One call, one verdict per artifact, plus a summary of how many were accepted, need review, or were rejected. Use when an agent produced a batch (twenty findings from a security scan, for example) and each of them has to be checked before the work is paid for.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Verify a batch of AI agent artifacts
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://attest.rta.lat/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://attest.rta.lat/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including verify_artifact (write), verify_artifact_batch (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 removed.−1 removedView diff
- Removed:bridge_check
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http attest https://attest.rta.lat/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http attest https://attest.rta.lat/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__attest__verify_artifact",
"mcp__attest__verify_artifact_batch"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as attest. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mrpkk/attest/verify?hash=69435d64275614af70377825e044b24deaf1c6f14cdbf2b5714e28e71701aaa5" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 69435d642756, from Nov 21, 2026, 02:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/attest/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/attest)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 21, 2026, 02:17 UTC.
attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 2 write. verify_artifact and verify_artifact_batch.
Does the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the attest — verification for AI agent artifacts MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 4, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.