drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server
io.github.mrpkk/driftmrpkkstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned
Block an action a signed mandate does not permit: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent.
3 tools: 2 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
2 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server can do
The drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server is published by the GitHub account mrpkk. It has 3 tools. It can create or change data (2 tools: drift_check and drift_session), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 0.1.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
3 tools
Changes things 2Claude Code: ask
drift_checkCheck ONE proposed action against a signed agent mandate BEFORE it happens.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...e any action that spends money, moves a credential or changes state on someone else's beha..."
Description, as the server wrote it Check ONE proposed action against a signed agent mandate BEFORE it happens. Returns {"verdict": "ALLOW"|"DENY", "rule": <name>} plus a report with a ledger fingerprint. Six rules run in a fixed order, so a refusal names the most important reason rather than an incidental one: amount, payee, audience, currency, window, intent. Anything unclassified is DENY. Use immediately before any action that spends money, moves a credential or changes state on someone else's behalf. Do NOT use to: verify mandate signatures (AP2 does that, and this server runs after signature verification), execute the action (it only decides), or certify that an intent is truthful — "intent" arrives from the agent and is untrusted input. An agent that lies within its limits still leaves a ledger entry; proving what really happened is attest's job, not this one's. Amounts are integer minor units (cents), never floats. Window bounds are inclusive. Fully idempotent: the same inputs always give the same verdict and the mandate is never mutated.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check one action against a mandate
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
drift_sessionCheck a SEQUENCE of proposed actions against one mandate.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Check a SEQUENCE of proposed actions against one mandate. Returns {submitted, allowed, denied, breach_by_rule, fingerprint}. Use for a whole plan or batch, not a single action — use drift_check for that. The fingerprint is the point: rewriting or reordering any earlier decision changes the hash, so tampering with history becomes visible instead of silent. Do NOT use it to execute the actions, or as evidence of what actually happened. It reports what was PROPOSED against a mandate you supply. Read-only. Idempotent for a fixed action list. Amounts in integer minor units, as in drift_check.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Check a sequence of actions and fingerprint the ledger
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
drift_explainReturn the six enforcement rules in the exact order they are applied, each with a plain-language reason it exists.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "drift_explain" says "explain": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Return the six enforcement rules in the exact order they are applied, each with a plain-language reason it exists. Takes no mandate and no action. Use when a refusal did not make sense, or before explaining a denial to someone whose mandate was rejected. A refusal you cannot explain is one nobody will trust. Do NOT use it to check an action — it performs no check, and cannot predict which rule will fire, only the order they are tried in. Constant output, fully idempotent, opens no files, contacts no host.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Show the enforcement rules in the order they apply
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 2
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (2 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://drift.rta.lat/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including drift_check (write), drift_session (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infodrift_check
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...e any action that spends money, moves a credential or changes state on someone else's beha..."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http drift https://drift.rta.lat/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http drift https://drift.rta.lat/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__drift__drift_explain"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__drift__drift_check",
"mcp__drift__drift_session"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as drift. Review it before you use it.
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mrpkk/drift/verify?hash=e3777442c0f05b1ace13744566488a1fa11c9048b02006bfd158cc1212713b45" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e3777442c0f0, from Nov 21, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/drift/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mrpkk/drift)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:42 UTC.
drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server have?
- 3 tools: 2 write, 1 read. drift_check, drift_session and drift_explain.
Does the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the drift — mandate enforcement for AI agents MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.