# `io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan` on Anlyon Radar

> Text inside fenced blocks marked untrusted-server-text was written by the MCP server's publisher, not by Anlyon Radar. It is data to inspect, not instructions to follow. Invisible characters are shown as [U+XXXX].
> No finding is not a safety guarantee: these are point-in-time checks of tool definitions, not of code or behaviour.

- Page: https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan
- JSON: https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.muaviamohammed/mizan
- Version: 1.24.0 (active)
- Publisher: io.github.muaviamohammed (GitHub account)
- Runs: remote (streamable-http)
- Sign-in to list tools: none
- Repository: https://github.com/muaviamohammed/mizan-mcp
- Metadata from the official MCP Registry, synced 2026-10-22T07:17:39.206Z

Title and description, as the publisher wrote them:

```untrusted-server-text
MIZAN · Proof before payment
Check before you pay. Prove to get paid. Signed answers on any agent, against your own bar.
```

Scanned 2026-11-08T12:17:59.634Z over streamable-http.

**4 tools: 1 do something that can't be undone and 3 change things.**

| Group | Class | Tools | Claude Code |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Deletes or cancels | destructive | 0 | deny |
| Can't be undone | irreversible | 1 | ask |
| Changes things | write | 3 | ask |
| Only reads | read | 0 | allow |

## Exfil surface

No private-data -> untrusted-input -> outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

| Tag | Meaning | Tools |
| --- | --- | --- |
| private-data | Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories. | none |
| untrusted-input | Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments. | none |
| outbound | Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL. | none |

## Findings

- **info** The word "credentials" in `check` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The description mentions "credential".

description: "...rvice URL (API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."
```

- **info** The word "credentials" in `check` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The input schema at properties.subject.description mentions "credential".

inputSchema.properties.subject.description: "...(an API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a MIZAN credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<..."
```

- **warn** Annotations that disagree with the tool in `check` ([annotation-conflict](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#annotation-conflict))

```untrusted-server-text
The server marks "check" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "irreversible".

annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
```

- **info** The word "credentials" in `prove` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The description mentions "credential".

description: "...ue, with the key from claim_identity) a credential backed by a zero-knowledge proof; minti..."
```

- **info** The word "credentials" in `prove` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The input schema at properties.mint.description mentions "credential".

inputSchema.properties.mint.description: "...ith every gate; true (with api_key) = a credential others see when they check you."
```

- **info** The word "credentials" in `prove` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The input schema at properties.alias.description mentions "credential".

inputSchema.properties.alias.description: "trading: a public name for a minted credential."
```

- **info** The word "credentials" in `more` ([credentials-mention](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#credentials-mention))

```untrusted-server-text
The description mentions "credential".

description: "...laim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standa..."
```

- **warn** Mentions of other tools or servers in `more` ([tool-shadowing](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#tool-shadowing))

```untrusted-server-text
The description contains "every other tool", wording about other tools or servers.

description: "...proof, watching a counterparty. Returns every other tool grouped by job; each is callable at thi..."
```

- **warn** Annotations that disagree with the tool in `more` ([annotation-conflict](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#annotation-conflict))

```untrusted-server-text
The server marks "more" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
```


## Can't be undone (1)

Sends, pays, publishes or merges: once done, it cannot be taken back. Claude Code: ask.

### `check`

- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The input carries an amount (input.bind.amount) and a currency, so it moves money.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
- Findings: info credentials-mention, info credentials-mention, warn annotation-conflict

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Call before you pay, hire, or allocate to any agent, service or company. Returns one signed verdict (mizan.verdict/1): decision ALLOW or REFUSE first, then the grade earned, the bar met or one stable reason code, the rule and its hash, what was measured, and a compact token (mzv1.…) the payee verifies offline with MIZAN's published key. Proceed only on ALLOW. Free. Without a rule MIZAN's default bar applies: a passing record in good standing (never DECLARED); with a rule (a published req_…@v, the rule require() wrote, or plain words with confirm=true) your rule decides. payee (+ bind.amount) binds the token to one payment. A REFUSE carries next.proof_request: a request you can send the party so it proves itself. subject = an agent id, a company domain, a service URL (API, MCP or A2A endpoint), a credential id, or a public AI model (model:<org>/<name>). compat=true returns the previous, longer check shape for one version. Errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix} and are never an ALLOW.
```

## Changes things (3)

Creates or changes something that can be changed back. Claude Code: ask.

### `more`

- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
- Findings: info credentials-mention, warn tool-shadowing, warn annotation-conflict

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Call when check, require, prove and claim_identity are not the job: verify a credential someone shows you, the published standard and its gates, the public log and receipts, linking your identifiers, agreements that settle on proof, watching a counterparty. Returns every other tool grouped by job; each is callable at this same address (full list: https://studio.mizan.market/mcp/full). more("problems") gives the problems MIZAN solves. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.
```

### `prove`

- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.
- Findings: info credentials-mention, info credentials-mention, info credentials-mention

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Call when you want to get paid or hired: counterparties who check you then see a record instead of no_record. Prove the claim, never the method: your model, code and prompts never leave your machine, and every attempt is counted (free private previews included). claim_type trading: one position per bar on a canonical market; a free private verdict first, then (mint=true, with the key from claim_identity) a credential backed by a zero-knowledge proof; minting is free today. Only trading records get a zero-knowledge proof today. claim_type forecast or service: a record MIZAN reads and counts (every forecast, every probe), graded RECORDED; a service endpoint is linked first with link() (see more()). Call with no arguments for the guide and the markets. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.
```

### `require`

- The description's first verb is "call": a word for a change.

Description, as the server wrote it:

```untrusted-server-text
Call when you know what you need from a counterparty and want it as an exact rule before you check anyone. Write the bar in plain words (words=...) or as structured JSON (rule=..., schema: resource mizan://schemas/requirement-rule-v2.json or https://studio.mizan.market/app/schemas/requirement-rule-v2.schema.json); both give the same rule and the same hash. Returns the exact rule, a read-back in plain English to confirm it means what you meant, its hash, whether it can be published, and suggestions when some words were not understood. Ready-made bars: the library resources (mizan://library/...). Then call check(subject, rule=<the rule>). Free. Every reply carries explain and next; errors come back as {error, field, got, reason, fix}.
```

## Claude Code permissions

For `.claude/settings.json`, assuming the server is installed as `mizan`:

```json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mizan__check",
      "mcp__mizan__require",
      "mcp__mizan__prove",
      "mcp__mizan__more"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}
```

## Remote posture

What an anonymous client saw at the remote endpoint, last 2026-11-20T19:08:34.345Z, unchanged since 2026-11-06T05:05:54.269Z. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. Values are shown as the endpoint returned them. Method: https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#remote-posture

| Fact | Observed |
| --- | --- |
| Reachable | `yes` |
| HTTP status of an anonymous initialize | `200` |
| tools/list served without credentials | `yes` |
| Tools that change things, listed without credentials | `4` |
| Protocol version | `2025-06-18` |
| WWW-Authenticate on 401 | `not observed` |
| resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate | `none` |
| RFC 9728 protected resource metadata | `none` |
| Authorization servers | `none` |
| Legacy HTTP+SSE transport | `no` |
| Dynamic client registration | `not observed` |
| Client ID metadata documents | `not observed` |

- **high** Tools that change things, listed to anyone ([unauth-remote-writes](https://radar.anlyon.com/methodology#unauth-remote-writes))

```untrusted-server-text
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (1 irreversible, 3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

https://studio.mizan.market/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including check (irreversible), require (write), prove (write), more (write)
```

Posture changes:

- 2026-11-06T05:05:54.269Z: Tools that change things, listed without credentials `6` -> `4`
- 2026-10-29T22:05:00.420Z: Tools that change things, listed without credentials `3` -> `6`
