Agent Account Index MCP server
io.github.mycelium-being/agent-account-indexmycelium-beingstreamable-httpv2026-10-12Scanned
Can an AI agent hold an account at a service? Verdict, owner of record, quoted terms clause.
2 tools: 1 change things and 1 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 0
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
1 tool here changes things. Govern it.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Agent Account Index MCP server can do
The Agent Account Index MCP server is published by the GitHub account mycelium-being. It has 2 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: can_an_agent_hold_an_account), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.
1 tool reads private data (list_named_non_human_routes).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 2026-10-12.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
2 tools
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
can_an_agent_hold_an_accountCheck whether a non-human actor may hold an account at a service.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Check whether a non-human actor may hold an account at a service. Call this BEFORE creating an account anywhere. Returns the verdict, who answers for the account's acts, the verbatim clause from the service's own terms, and what the signup door demanded on load (captcha, phone field, SSO only). The stored captcha value disagreed with a browser re-read on 16 of the 54 doors whose value speaks, and not in one direction: 10 understated it, 5 named a widget the page lacked, 1 changed type. Read those against their own denominators: the 34 doors storing none_seen were wrong 10 times and the 20 storing a vendor name 6 times, about the same rate either way, so a disagreement does not say which reading to lean on. Where signup_door.captcha_rendered is not null it is that re-read ([] means re-read and nothing found); a captcha added on submit is invisible to both reads. These six integers are typed here and live in captcha_recheck_counts at the top of /index.json, which is the copy to trust. A row may also carry answered_by_a_named_human_2026_10_06: what a named person at the vendor answered when asked, held by the index with no page anyone can open. It sits beside the verdict and never changes it; the return counts the rows that carry one as rows_with_an_answered_reply. Null means nobody there was asked, which is not a finding.
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
list_named_non_human_routesList every service that documents an identity a non-human actor may hold.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "list_named_non_human_routes" says "list": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "list" and "document": it reads documents.
Description, as the server wrote it List every service that documents an identity a non-human actor may hold. In 11 of the 12 a human or a legal entity remains owner of record and answers for the account's acts: there an agent acts as a delegate, not as the principal. 1 names no party at all (Wellknown): the holder is whoever proves control of a web origin and no identity is verified. Each row carries agent_as_principal.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write0
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 1
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://agent-account-index.vercel.app/mcp: tools/list returned 2 tools to an anonymous client, including can_an_agent_hold_an_account (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 2026-10-12. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http agent-account-index https://agent-account-index.vercel.app/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http agent-account-index https://agent-account-index.vercel.app/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__agent-account-index__list_named_non_human_routes"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__agent-account-index__can_an_agent_hold_an_account"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agent-account-index. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 1 rule
- mcp__agent-account-index__list_named_non_human_routes private-data
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mycelium-being/agent-account-index/verify?hash=8859df1b9d29f1f3d6ed452e6b2b3589c64e2a834d22dbf966e3e6598505ca8c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 8859df1b9d29, from Nov 21, 2026, 01:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mycelium-being/agent-account-index/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mycelium-being/agent-account-index)Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:42 UTC.
Agent Account Index MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Agent Account Index MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 2 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Agent Account Index MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Agent Account Index MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Agent Account Index MCP server have?
- 2 tools: 1 write, 1 read. can_an_agent_hold_an_account and list_named_non_human_routes.
Does the Agent Account Index MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Agent Account Index MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Agent Account Index MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.