Skip to content

mzizi-mcp server

io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcpmzizi-devstreamable-httpv0.26.0Scanned

Mzizi design system MCP: search and execute over components, tokens, crates, skills and docs. Free.

3 tools: 1 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 1 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here can delete or cancel things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the mzizi-mcp server can do

The mzizi-mcp server is published by the GitHub account mzizi-dev. It has 3 tools. It can delete or cancel things (1 tool: mzizi_execute) and create or change data (1 tool: mzizi_feedback). 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (mzizi_search, mzizi_execute and mzizi_feedback).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 7 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.26.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

3 tools

Deletes or cancels 1Claude Code: deny
  • mzizi_executeRun one operation by name with its arguments.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mzizi_execute" says "execute": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Run one operation by name with its arguments. mzizi_search lists operations with their arguments, the permission each needs and whether you may run it. Operations: get_component, list_components, get_tokens, get_architecture, get_doctrine, get_skills, check_accessibility, list_crates, fundi, describe, docs_search_mzizi, docs_query_docs_filesystem_mzizi, docs_submit_feedback. Reads need no account; the fundi operation needs sign-in, and a refusal names the permission it needs and how to sign in. The result is the operation's own answer. The earlier tool names (mzizi_get_component and the rest) are accepted as operation names.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: true
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • mzizi_feedbackYour issue desk (was mzizi_report_issue): report a problem with a component or the registry.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Your issue desk (was mzizi_report_issue): report a problem with a component or the registry. It goes to your own desk, which reproduces it via fundi, drafts an issue body with what the reproduction returned and logs it to fundi; fundi files the GitHub issue and tracks it, so action 'get' shows where yours got to. 'list' shows your reports, 'retry' re-attempts one that drafted but could not be logged. Needs sign-in: the desk belongs to your Mzizi console user; without it, the answer carries the report as a pre-filled GitHub issue for mzizi-dev/mzizi-registry, so it is never lost, and over HTTP the server answers with an OAuth challenge so your client can offer sign-in. With target 'docs', it instead reports a problem with a documentation page on docs.mzizi.dev (give `path` and `message`); that needs no account.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Nov 20, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
2
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
https://mcp.mzizi.dev/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp
Authorization servers
https://mcp.mzizi.dev
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
yes
Client ID metadata documents
no
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 2 tools that change things (1 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 3 tools to an anonymous client, including mzizi_execute (destructive), mzizi_feedback (write)

    What this check looks for

Posture changes

  1. Nov 20, 2026
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 2

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 -> 2.View diff
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 5 to 2
  2. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
  3. Tools2 added, 13 removed, 1 changed.+2 added−13 removed~1 changedView diff
    • Added:mzizi_executeDeletes or cancels
    • Added:mzizi_feedbackChanges things
    • Removed:docs_query_docs_filesystem_mzizi
    • Removed:docs_search_mzizi
    • Removed:docs_submit_feedback
    • Removed:mzizi_check_accessibility
    • Removed:mzizi_fundi
    • Removed:mzizi_get_architecture
    • Removed:mzizi_get_component
    • Removed:mzizi_get_doctrine
    • Removed:mzizi_get_skills
    • Removed:mzizi_get_tokens
    • Removed:mzizi_list_components
    • Removed:mzizi_mcp_describe
    • Removed:mzizi_report_issue
    • Changed:mzizi_searchOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
  4. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
    • Changed:docs_query_docs_filesystem_mziziChanges thingsdescription
    • Changed:mzizi_check_accessibilityChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:mzizi_get_tokensOnly readsdescription
  5. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:mzizi_get_componentOnly readsdescription
  6. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:mzizi_get_skillsOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
  7. Tools3 changed.~3 changedView diff
    • Changed:mzizi_check_accessibilityChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:mzizi_get_doctrineOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
    • Changed:mzizi_get_tokensOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
  8. Tools14 changed.~14 changedView diff
    • Changed:docs_query_docs_filesystem_mziziChanges thingstitleinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:docs_search_mziziOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:docs_submit_feedbackChanges thingsinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_check_accessibilityChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_fundiDeletes or cancelsinputSchema
    • Changed:mzizi_get_architectureOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_get_componentOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_get_doctrineOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_get_skillsOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_get_tokensOnly readsinputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_list_componentsOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_mcp_describeOnly readsannotations
    • Changed:mzizi_report_issueChanges thingsinputSchema
    • Changed:mzizi_searchOnly readsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations

Install

Pinned to version 0.26.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mzizi https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http mzizi https://mcp.mzizi.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__mzizi__mzizi_search"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mzizi__mzizi_feedback"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__mzizi__mzizi_execute"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mzizi. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__mzizi__mzizi_search untrusted-input
  • mcp__mzizi__mzizi_execute untrusted-input
  • mcp__mzizi__mzizi_feedback untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp/verify?hash=1e48969718fa3b42b9d54cbd4ff78dd52c30dbcbee780f18bd8c35c3fa3991b5" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1e48969718fa, from Nov 20, 2026, 03:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.mzizi-dev/mzizi-mcp)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 20, 2026, 03:17 UTC.

mzizi-mcp server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the mzizi-mcp server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 3 tools, 2 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the mzizi-mcp server delete data?

Yes. 1 tool can delete, cancel or revoke something: mzizi_execute.

Can the mzizi-mcp server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the mzizi-mcp server have?

3 tools: 1 destructive, 1 write, 1 read. mzizi_execute, mzizi_feedback and mzizi_search.

Does the mzizi-mcp server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the mzizi-mcp server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the mzizi-mcp server changed its tools?

Yes, 7 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 17, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.