NAIF Gravity MCP server
io.github.naief9961-tech/naif-fixgraphnaief9961-techstreamable-httpv1.7.2Scanned
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5 tools: 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 2
- Can send data out · 0
- 2 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
5 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the NAIF Gravity MCP server can do
The NAIF Gravity MCP server is published by the GitHub account naief9961-tech. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (5 tools: diagnose_issue, quote_repair, prepare_repair, request_delegated_purchase and 1 more), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.
2 tools bring in text other people can write (diagnose_issue and verify_repair).
The fixed checks matched 2 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.7.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
diagnose_issueStart here.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "start": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.problem.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.problem.description: "...le error/status. Never include secrets, credentials, private keys or PII."
Description, as the server wrote it Start here. Diagnose one sanitized MCP, API, webhook, agent or integration failure for free. Returns bounded evidence plus a suggested repair service, then use quote_repair only if a priced repair is wanted. It never creates a quote, checkout, payment or repair job. It may record bounded operational attribution/telemetry, so readOnlyHint is false; it does not modify the caller system or commercial state.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
prepare_repairUse ONLY for the normal repair flow after quote_repair has already returned a quoteId and the caller explicitly chooses that existing quote.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use ONLY for the normal repair flow after quote_repair has already returned a quoteId and the caller explicitly chooses that existing quote. This tool does not create a quote: with confirm=true it records acceptance of that quote and creates checkout instructions on exactly one rail offered by it. Do NOT use this tool for owner/platform-preauthorized autonomous purchasing where the agent is allowed to choose one of the four capped micro-services and create its own quote; use request_delegated_purchase for that separate flow. APPLE_PAY returns a human handoff URL for buyer authorization; BASE_USDC and TRON_USDT return payer transfer instructions. It never sends funds, charges the caller, verifies payment or directly starts repair execution. After the buyer completes the required payment action, use verify_repair with the returned checkoutId and the same rail.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
quote_repairUse only after diagnose_issue when the caller wants a priced bounded repair.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Use only after diagnose_issue when the caller wants a priced bounded repair. Creates a new non-binding quote for the selected or automatically matched public service. Repeating the call may create a different quoteId, so it is intentionally non-idempotent. It does not accept the quote, create checkout, send payment or start execution. If the quote is accepted by the caller, pass its quoteId and one offered payment rail to prepare_repair.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
request_delegated_purchaseUse ONLY for an owner/platform-preauthorized autonomous purchase of one of four supported micro-services under an explicit spending cap.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_delegated_purchase" says "request": a word for a change.
Findings
- Info
The input schema at properties.description.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.description.description: "...d micro-service; never include secrets, credentials or private keys."
Description, as the server wrote it Use ONLY for an owner/platform-preauthorized autonomous purchase of one of four supported micro-services under an explicit spending cap. Unlike prepare_repair, this tool does not consume an existing quoteId: it creates its own quote, accepts it, and creates checkout within the delegation. Repeating the call may create a new quote/checkout, so it is intentionally non-idempotent. Do NOT use it when quote_repair already produced a quoteId or for general repair services outside the four listed micro-services; use prepare_repair for an existing repair quote. Supports wallet rails and APPLE_PAY_AUTO. APPLE_PAY_AUTO requires one human Apple Pay approval first; when Tap returns an ACTIVE saved-card payment agreement, later purchases may be charged only within the stored cap. If provider support or authorization is missing, the flow fails closed.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
verify_repairUse after the buyer completes the payment action for a checkout created by prepare_repair.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Use after the buyer completes the payment action for a checkout created by prepare_repair. APPLE_PAY verifies the existing Tap charge by checkoutId; BASE_USDC and TRON_USDT require the payer-provided txHash. A confirmed payment returns verified=true, while an already-confirmed Apple Pay checkout may return alreadyVerified=true; an unconfirmed or rejected payment returns error and/or reason without fabricating success. Verification may also return the job attached by the existing payment-completion workflow. This tool never creates or sends a transaction and never charges the buyer.
Annotations the server declares
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write2
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 5
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 5 tools that change things (5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://naifgravity.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including diagnose_issue (write), quote_repair (write), prepare_repair (write), request_delegated_purchase (write), verify_repair (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Infodiagnose_issue
The input schema at properties.problem.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.problem.description: "...le error/status. Never include secrets, credentials, private keys or PII."
The input schema at properties.description.description mentions "credentials".
What this check looks forMatched text
inputSchema.properties.description.description: "...d micro-service; never include secrets, credentials or private keys."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.7.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http naif-fixgraph https://naifgravity.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http naif-fixgraph https://naifgravity.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__naif-fixgraph__diagnose_issue",
"mcp__naif-fixgraph__quote_repair",
"mcp__naif-fixgraph__prepare_repair",
"mcp__naif-fixgraph__request_delegated_purchase",
"mcp__naif-fixgraph__verify_repair"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as naif-fixgraph. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__naif-fixgraph__diagnose_issue untrusted-input
- mcp__naif-fixgraph__verify_repair untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.naief9961-tech/naif-fixgraph/verify?hash=5f531167a669176bbbe6eed82864a504a6f291d3b93f4ed4c9fb783175f35ed9" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 5f531167a669, from Nov 11, 2026, 06:17 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.naief9961-tech/naif-fixgraph/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.naief9961-tech/naif-fixgraph)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 18:24 UTC.
NAIF Gravity MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the NAIF Gravity MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 5 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the NAIF Gravity MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the NAIF Gravity MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the NAIF Gravity MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 5 write. diagnose_issue, quote_repair, prepare_repair, request_delegated_purchase and verify_repair.
Does the NAIF Gravity MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the NAIF Gravity MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the NAIF Gravity MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 11, 2026.