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AgentGraph MCP server

io.github.naithan20/agentgraphnaithan20streamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

Search 42,000+ MCP servers and agents by capability over one stateless MCP endpoint.

11 tools: 11 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 0 write, 11 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

Decide which of this server's tools your agent can use.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the AgentGraph MCP server can do

The AgentGraph MCP server is published by the GitHub account naithan20. It has 11 tools. Every one of them only reads: going by their definitions, none of them creates, changes, sends or deletes anything.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_agent_invocation).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 10, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Only reads 11Show 11 read-only tools
  • find_toolsList and filter indexed tools without a ranked task query — useful for browsing by capability, provider, or protocol.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "find_tools" says "find": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List and filter indexed tools without a ranked task query — useful for browsing by capability, provider, or protocol.
  • get_agentGet the full public profile of a single owner-submitted agent by id, including its reported interaction summary.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the full public profile of a single owner-submitted agent by id, including its reported interaction summary.
  • get_agent_invocationGet the machine-readable invocation contract for an owner-submitted agent: whether it's directly callable, which protocol (MCP, A2A, HTTP_JSON), the endpoint, auth requirements, in…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_invocation" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "get" and "http": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the machine-readable invocation contract for an owner-submitted agent: whether it's directly callable, which protocol (MCP, A2A, HTTP_JSON), the endpoint, auth requirements, input/output schemas where declared, and pricing (result.pricing — { mode: "FREE" } or { mode: "FIXED", amount, amountAtomic, currency, paymentProtocol, network, platformFeeBps, paymentRecipient }). An Agent may expose more than one contract for different capabilities (e.g. one for image comparison, a separate one for free-text idea evaluation) — pass `capability` to get the one that actually serves it; without it, this returns the Agent's primary/default contract plus a `multipleContracts`/`invocationsUrl` pointer if there's more than one. Use get_agent_invocations to list every contract at once. For a FIXED/X402 contract, use get_payment_requirement to obtain a standards-compliant x402 v2 payment requirement before invoking. Owner-submitted and unverified unless verificationStatus says otherwise — AgentGraph does not call this endpoint itself; the caller invokes the provider directly and reports the outcome via the interactions API.
  • get_agent_invocationsList every invocation contract an owner-submitted agent has declared — the unambiguous, capability-scoped view for an Agent that exposes more than one separately-callable surface.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_agent_invocations" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List every invocation contract an owner-submitted agent has declared — the unambiguous, capability-scoped view for an Agent that exposes more than one separately-callable surface. Each entry lists exactly which capabilities it serves. AgentGraph does not call any of these itself.
  • get_capabilityGet a single capability record by id, including which tool or agent exposes it.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_capability" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get a single capability record by id, including which tool or agent exposes it.
  • get_demandV0.4 demand intelligence: deterministic aggregates over real search telemetry — top intent concepts, top matched capabilities (rank<=10), and how many recent searches had zero curr…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_demand" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    V0.4 demand intelligence: deterministic aggregates over real search telemetry — top intent concepts, top matched capabilities (rank<=10), and how many recent searches had zero currently-callable Agent in their top 10. No LLM/clustering — every result reports its sample size and window. Mirrors GET /api/demand.
  • get_opportunitiesV0.4 opportunity feed: capabilities with real recent demand (>=minSampleSize top-10 matches) sorted by weakest current callable-Agent supply first.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_opportunities" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    V0.4 opportunity feed: capabilities with real recent demand (>=minSampleSize top-10 matches) sorted by weakest current callable-Agent supply first. Every entry is a real, sample-sized aggregate — see excludedForSampleSize for how many low-sample capabilities were dropped rather than shown with a misleading count. Mirrors GET /api/opportunities.
  • get_payment_requirementV0.6 — for a FIXED/X402 invocation contract, returns a real, standards-compliant x402 v2 PaymentRequired object (x402Version, resource, accepts[]) built fresh from that contract's …No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_payment_requirement" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    V0.6 — for a FIXED/X402 invocation contract, returns a real, standards-compliant x402 v2 PaymentRequired object (x402Version, resource, accepts[]) built fresh from that contract's current price/network/recipient. For a FREE contract, returns { pricing: { mode: "FREE" } } and nothing else — there is no payment requirement to construct. AgentGraph is not the resource being paid for: `resource.url` in the response is the agent's own invocation endpoint, and payment settles directly to the agent's own configured wallet — AgentGraph never custodies funds. After paying, present the resulting payment authorization to POST /api/agents/{id}/invocations/{label}/payment for verification/settlement, then invoke the agent's endpoint directly, exactly as for a free contract.
  • get_toolGet the full public profile of a single indexed tool by id.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_tool" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Get the full public profile of a single indexed tool by id.
  • search_agentsList and filter owner-submitted agents without a ranked task query — useful for browsing by capability, protocol, owner, or verification status.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_agents" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List and filter owner-submitted agents without a ranked task query — useful for browsing by capability, protocol, owner, or verification status. Use search_capabilities for a ranked task-driven search across both tools and agents.
  • search_capabilitiesSearch AgentGraph's index of real MCP servers and owner-submitted agents for ones that can perform a described task.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_capabilities" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search AgentGraph's index of real MCP servers and owner-submitted agents for ones that can perform a described task. Returns ranked, evidence-based results with transparent per-component scores. Every result includes machine-readable pricing (result.invocation.pricing — { mode: "FREE" } or { mode: "FIXED", amount, amountAtomic, currency, paymentProtocol, network, platformFeeBps }); paid results currently use the x402 protocol over USDC. Price is never a ranking input — it only becomes a filter when you set maxPrice/currency/paymentProtocol/freeOnly/paidOnly below, all optional.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 11, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
2026-07-28
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http agentgraph https://agentgraph-new.vercel.app/api/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http agentgraph https://agentgraph-new.vercel.app/api/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__agentgraph__search_capabilities",
      "mcp__agentgraph__find_tools",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_tool",
      "mcp__agentgraph__search_agents",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_agent",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_agent_invocation",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_agent_invocations",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_payment_requirement",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_demand",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_opportunities",
      "mcp__agentgraph__get_capability"
    ],
    "ask": [],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as agentgraph. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__agentgraph__get_agent_invocation untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.naithan20/agentgraph/verify?hash=1055d64eaac2ccafb3e018983312bc07ad039bbc8e8e651c350e9215228c3910" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1055d64eaac2, from Nov 10, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.naithan20/agentgraph/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.naithan20/agentgraph
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.naithan20/agentgraph.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.naithan20/agentgraph)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 10, 2026, 22:18 UTC.

AgentGraph MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the AgentGraph MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, all of which only read, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Read-only tools can still pass private data to a model.

Can the AgentGraph MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the AgentGraph MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the AgentGraph MCP server have?

11 tools: 11 read. search_capabilities, find_tools, get_tool, search_agents, get_agent, get_agent_invocation, get_agent_invocations, get_payment_requirement and 3 more.

Does the AgentGraph MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the AgentGraph MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the AgentGraph MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 10, 2026.