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Verifile MCP server

io.github.neubuot/verifileneubuotstreamable-httpv1.6.0Scanned

Proof of existence for files and texts: anchor a SHA-256 on the Doichain and verify it later

4 tools: 3 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 3 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Verifile MCP server can do

The Verifile MCP server is published by the GitHub account neubuot. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: hash_text, check_proof and anchor_proof), but cannot delete data. 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (check_proof, anchor_proof and get_anchoring_quota).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.6.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
  • anchor_proofAnchor a SHA-256 hash on the Doichain as a tamper-evident timestamp (proof of existence, name poe/<sha256>).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Anchor a SHA-256 hash on the Doichain as a tamper-evident timestamp (proof of existence, name poe/<sha256>). Free for users, limited per IP address and day (see get_anchoring_quota). Confirms with the next block, usually within 10 minutes, then check_proof returns block height and time. If the hash is already anchored or pending, the existing proof is returned instead of creating a second one. If an earlier proof of the hash has expired, it stays valid and is returned with expired true. Nothing is registered unless reanchor_expired is true. Only the hash and the optional note and file name become public, never the document itself. The operator of this server pays for the name and holds it. The proof shows that a document with this hash existed no later than the block time, not who submitted it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: false
  • check_proofCheck whether a SHA-256 hash is anchored on the Doichain (name poe/<sha256>) and since when.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check whether a SHA-256 hash is anchored on the Doichain (name poe/<sha256>) and since when. Returns status (confirmed, pending, expired, unknown) and at the top level block height, block time, transaction and links of the first anchoring, which is the proof time. If the name was updated later or registered again after it expired (possibly by someone else), that registration is reported separately in latest_registration with its own holder and record, which are not part of the original proof. A confirmed or expired proof shows that a document with exactly this hash existed no later than the block time, not who submitted it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true
  • hash_textCompute the SHA-256 digest of a short text (UTF-8) on the server, for example to anchor a statement or a message with anchor_proof.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Compute the SHA-256 digest of a short text (UTF-8) on the server, for example to anchor a statement or a message with anchor_proof. The text is sent to the server but not stored or logged. For files and for confidential texts compute the hash locally instead (sha256sum file, or Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256).

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
    • readOnlyHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_anchoring_quotaHow many proofs can still be anchored today (UTC day) within the free public quota for the caller's IP address.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_anchoring_quota" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How many proofs can still be anchored today (UTC day) within the free public quota for the caller's IP address. Hosted chat apps connect from their own servers, so their users share one quota. Callers that send their own API key in the X-API-Key header have no quota.

    Annotations the server declares

    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
    • readOnlyHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 18, 2026, 16:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 18, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://verifile.it/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including hash_text (write), check_proof (write), anchor_proof (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.6.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http verifile https://verifile.it/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http verifile https://verifile.it/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__verifile__get_anchoring_quota"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__verifile__hash_text",
      "mcp__verifile__check_proof",
      "mcp__verifile__anchor_proof"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as verifile. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__verifile__check_proof untrusted-input
  • mcp__verifile__anchor_proof untrusted-input
  • mcp__verifile__get_anchoring_quota untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.neubuot/verifile/verify?hash=e84c6c4d6f69b772eff1524d9d7fcee8b6c3a9a2734adad2bed86aaacdf181f6" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash e84c6c4d6f69, from Nov 18, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.neubuot/verifile/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.neubuot/verifile
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.neubuot/verifile.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.neubuot/verifile)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Verifile MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Verifile MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Verifile MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Verifile MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Verifile MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 write, 1 read. hash_text, check_proof, anchor_proof and get_anchoring_quota.

Does the Verifile MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Verifile MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Verifile MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.