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NukeBG MCP server

io.github.nukebg/nukebgnukebgstreamable-httpv1.1.0Scanned

Remove image backgrounds, remove objects and upscale images. Transparent PNG or Amazon-ready white.

4 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 1 change things and 1 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 1 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 3
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 2 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the NukeBG MCP server can do

The NukeBG MCP server is published by the GitHub account nukebg. It has 4 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: remove_background and erase_objects) and create or change data (1 tool: upscale_image). 1 tool only reads.

3 tools bring in text other people can write (remove_background, erase_objects and upscale_image).

The fixed checks matched 2 findings (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 18, 2026, version 1.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • erase_objectsRemove objects from a photo by describing them, for example "the cables on the desk" or "the person on the left".Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "erase_objects" says "erase": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "erase_objects" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "erase_objects" says "erase": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove objects from a photo by describing them, for example "the cables on the desk" or "the person on the left". The rest of the image is kept pixel for pixel. Costs 25 credits (enhance 40, paid credits).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Remove objects
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • remove_backgroundRemove the background from an image and return a transparent PNG/WebP, or place the subject on white, a colour, a gradient or a built-in scene, optionally at a marketplace size (Am…Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.
    • The server marks it not destructive (destructiveHint: false), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Remove the background from an image and return a transparent PNG/WebP, or place the subject on white, a colour, a gradient or a built-in scene, optionally at a marketplace size (Amazon, Shopify, Etsy, eBay, Instagram). Costs 1 credit (hd 2, ultra 4); free credits export up to 2 MP.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Remove background
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • upscale_imageUpscale an image 2× (source up to 16 MP, 2 credits) or 4× (source up to 4 MP, 4 credits) with Real-ESRGAN.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Upscale an image 2× (source up to 16 MP, 2 credits) or 4× (source up to 4 MP, 4 credits) with Real-ESRGAN. Needs paid credits.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Upscale image
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 1Show 1 read-only tool
  • get_creditsShow the NukeBG credit balance (free, subscription and paid) and plan for this API key.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_credits" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Show the NukeBG credit balance (free, subscription and paid) and plan for this API key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Credit balance
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write3
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 17, 2026, 15:20 UTC, unchanged since Nov 17, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
3
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (2 destructive, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.nukebg.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including remove_background (destructive), erase_objects (destructive), upscale_image (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

2 warn
  • The server marks "remove_background" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "remove_background" says "remove": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for
  • The server marks "erase_objects" not destructive (destructiveHint: false), and its own name, description or input give the class "destructive".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "erase_objects" says "erase": a word for removing or ending something.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http nukebg https://api.nukebg.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http nukebg https://api.nukebg.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__nukebg__get_credits"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__nukebg__upscale_image"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__nukebg__remove_background",
      "mcp__nukebg__erase_objects"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as nukebg. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 3 rules
  • mcp__nukebg__remove_background untrusted-input
  • mcp__nukebg__erase_objects untrusted-input
  • mcp__nukebg__upscale_image untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.nukebg/nukebg/verify?hash=00fcadf0f98d26e3e5b819bb6d21583c8988c37e6160feab8f02d726b6a36fa4" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 00fcadf0f98d, from Nov 18, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.nukebg/nukebg/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.nukebg/nukebg
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.nukebg/nukebg.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.nukebg/nukebg)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 18, 2026, 10:18 UTC.

NukeBG MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the NukeBG MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 2 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the NukeBG MCP server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: remove_background and erase_objects.

Can the NukeBG MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the NukeBG MCP server have?

4 tools: 2 destructive, 1 write, 1 read. remove_background, erase_objects, upscale_image and get_credits.

Does the NukeBG MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the NukeBG MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the NukeBG MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 18, 2026.