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oathlayer MCP server

io.github.oathlayer/oathlayeroathlayerstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Verify AI outputs against real sources. Returns a trust signal and permanent doc number.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the oathlayer MCP server can do

The oathlayer MCP server is published by the GitHub account oathlayer. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: verify_output), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (verify_output).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • verify_outputALWAYS use this tool when the user message starts with Oathlayer: (in any capitals, for example oathlayer: or OATHLAYER:), even if you already know the answer.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    ALWAYS use this tool when the user message starts with Oathlayer: (in any capitals, for example oathlayer: or OATHLAYER:), even if you already know the answer. The user wants an independent, verified answer with a doc number, so do not answer it yourself. Verify an AI answer against real sources before anyone acts on it. Send a question; Oathlayer answers it, checks the answer against independent sources, and returns the answer, a state, a plain-language message (the tag), a color, and a permanent doc number anyone can verify free at oathlayer.com/verify. Tags: Verification Successful - Oath Approved (green); Verification Threshold Not Met (blue); Various Perspectives Apply (purple); Complex Question - Threshold Reserved; Clarity Needed to Continue (pink). Legal citations also get a citation tag: confirmed on official sources (green), found only on unofficial sites (blue), mismatched with the correct citation shown (coral), or not found in available sources (golden brown). Citation answers also include a short label: Confirmed, Unofficial, Mismatched or Not found. Oathlayer reports what happened; it does not judge right or wrong. Works on any topic and with any AI model. Costs one credit per completed check; errors and wrong keys cost nothing. Requires an API key from oathlayer.com. If a message starts with Oathlayer: then use this tool to check the question that follows. When showing the result to the user, always use exactly this layout, one item per line, as plain text with no bold: 'Question:' then the question that was checked, 'Answer:' then the answer from Oathlayer, 'Verification tag:' then the tag message, 'Doc ID number:' then the doc number. Do not add anything else, such as how many credits were used.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Verify with Oathlayer
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:08 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-11-25
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mcp.oathlayer.com: tools/list returned 1 tool to an anonymous client, including verify_output (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff
    • Changed:verify_outputChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchemaannotations

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http oathlayer https://mcp.oathlayer.com
claude mcp add --transport http oathlayer https://mcp.oathlayer.com

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__oathlayer__verify_output"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as oathlayer. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__oathlayer__verify_output untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.oathlayer/oathlayer/verify?hash=815c531c5b78da3a6e7a4019238883c7f1733485f45dd7ba4b93ce40d999cfe0" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 815c531c5b78, from Nov 20, 2026, 05:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.oathlayer/oathlayer/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.oathlayer/oathlayer
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.oathlayer/oathlayer.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.oathlayer/oathlayer)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:42 UTC.

oathlayer MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the oathlayer MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the oathlayer MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the oathlayer MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the oathlayer MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. verify_output.

Does the oathlayer MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the oathlayer MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the oathlayer MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.