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Offense MCP server

io.github.offense-research/offenseoffense-researchstreamable-httpv0.7.0Scanned

Security tools for coding agents: dependency advisory audits and evidence for remediation.

1 tool: 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 1
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata. Remote posture

Anlyon alternative

1 of these tools change something. Run those as governed actions.

Declare what an action changes, and Anlyon puts it under a shared limit, binds every approval to the exact request, and grades the outcome. It works on any HTTPS API you can describe as an action.

Anlyon Radar does not run, proxy or govern this MCP server. A tool your own code calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it.

Import an OpenAPI spec →

What the Offense MCP server can do

The Offense MCP server is published by the GitHub account offense-research. It has 1 tool. It can create or change data (1 tool: offense.audit_dependencies), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

1 tool brings in text other people can write (offense.audit_dependencies).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Last scanned Oct 31, 2026, version 0.7.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

1 tool

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • offense.audit_dependenciesUse Purple to audit sanitized npm/pnpm dependency metadata for known advisory matches and checked upgrade paths.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Info

      The input schema at properties.files.description mentions "credentials".

      Matched text

      inputSchema.properties.files.description: "...t read local paths. Do not send source, credentials or registry URLs."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Use Purple to audit sanitized npm/pnpm dependency metadata for known advisory matches and checked upgrade paths. Resume deferred targets with remediation.planning.next while retaining the full scan and coordinating plans across pages. Does not read source, run tests, edit files, confirm exploitability or use a model key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write1
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Sign-in required, no OAuth metadata

Looked at Nov 15, 2026, 13:21 UTC, unchanged since Nov 15, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
404
tools/list served without credentials
no
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
0
Protocol version
not observed
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed

The probe stopped: initialize answered HTTP 404.

Posture changes

  1. Nov 15, 2026
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. PostureRemote posture changed. HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 -> 404; tools/list served without credentials: yes -> no; Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 -> 0 (and 1 more).View diff
    • HTTP status of an anonymous initialize: 200 to 404
    • tools/list served without credentials: yes to no
    • Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 1 to 0
    • Protocol version: 2025-06-18 to none

Install

Pinned to version 0.7.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http offense https://offense.sh/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http offense https://offense.sh/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__offense__offense_audit_dependencies"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as offense. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__offense__offense_audit_dependencies untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.offense-research/offense/verify?hash=04dc928f1cadb062792077fe74285f1b2634a2896b49a28b53ef77a69b1ec163" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 04dc928f1cad, from Oct 31, 2026, 00:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.offense-research/offense/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.offense-research/offense
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.offense-research/offense.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.offense-research/offense)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 31, 2026, 01:17 UTC.

Offense MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Offense MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 1 tool, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Offense MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Offense MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Offense MCP server have?

1 tool: 1 write. offense.audit_dependencies.

Does the Offense MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint did not answer the last anonymous look.

Does the Offense MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Offense MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Oct 31, 2026.