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JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server

io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidecogasurfproject-jpgstreamable-httpv1.4.0Scanned

Read Bitcoin-anchored conduct history (NENRIN), admissions and daily check roots; cite records.

13 tools: 1 change things and 12 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 12 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 13
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server can do

The JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server is published by the GitHub account ogasurfproject-jpg. It has 13 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: jidec_replay), but cannot delete data. 12 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (jidec_how_to_verify); 13 tools bring in text other people can write (jidec_cite, jidec_replay, jidec_list_paths and 10 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (nenrin_resume and nenrin_trust_signal). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 17, 2026, version 1.4.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

13 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • jidec_replayRe-observe an anchored JIDEC verification path against the live system right now and report drift.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Re-observe an anchored JIDEC verification path against the live system right now and report drift. Returns MATCH (the live system still matches what was anchored) or DRIFT (it changed), node by node. Nodes that cannot be re-observed server-side are reported as deferred, never counted as drift.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Re-observe an anchored path and report drift
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 12Show 12 read-only tools
  • jidec_citeResolve and INDEPENDENTLY verify any JIDEC citation.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "resolve": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Resolve and INDEPENDENTLY verify any JIDEC citation. Accepts 'jidec:path:<sha>', 'jidec:entry:<n>', a bare 64-hex id, or a ledger URL. Fetches the record's exact bytes, recomputes SHA-256 locally, and confirms it equals the cited id. Returns integrity, Bitcoin anchoring status, the parsed record (verification path, claim, or v0 spec entry), and an explicit statement of what the proof does and does not cover. No trust in HORIZON SHIELD is required to accept the result.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cite and independently verify a JIDEC record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • jidec_how_to_verifyReturn the step-by-step recipe for verifying a JIDEC record WITHOUT trusting HORIZON SHIELD: which bytes to fetch, which hashes to recompute, which OpenTimestamps proof to check, w…Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "return" and "commit": it reads repositories.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the step-by-step recipe for verifying a JIDEC record WITHOUT trusting HORIZON SHIELD: which bytes to fetch, which hashes to recompute, which OpenTimestamps proof to check, which algorithm commit to check out, and what must match. Use this when you want to confirm the result yourself rather than repeat an assertion.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get the executable verification recipe
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • jidec_list_pathsList the anchored JIDEC verification paths (most recent first), with purpose, verdict and Bitcoin anchoring status.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "jidec_list_paths" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List the anchored JIDEC verification paths (most recent first), with purpose, verdict and Bitcoin anchoring status.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: List anchored verification paths
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_admissionReturn one admission record (a2a-admission-v0) as the ledger stores it, by its canonical SHA-256: the exact record bytes, pending or anchored, and the ledger entry once anchored.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one admission record (a2a-admission-v0) as the ledger stores it, by its canonical SHA-256: the exact record bytes, pending or anchored, and the ledger entry once anchored. A door writes one before it lets an agent's action run; version 0.4 carries the content check as fields only (a salted commitment to the content, the digest of the check, the rule set, decision, marks), no text. The anchored admissions of a relying party are also listed in admissions[] of its Résumé (nenrin_resume).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One admission record by its SHA-256
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_agreementReturn one agreement record as the ledger stores it, by its canonical SHA-256: the exact record bytes, pending or anchored, and the ledger entry once anchored.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one agreement record as the ledger stores it, by its canonical SHA-256: the exact record bytes, pending or anchored, and the ledger entry once anchored. The anchored agreements of an endpoint are listed in agreements[] of its Résumé (nenrin_resume).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One agreement record by its SHA-256
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_furui_dayReturn the day record (furui-check-day-v0) of the content check runner: the signed RFC 6962 root of one UTC day's check envelopes and their count.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the day record (furui-check-day-v0) of the content check runner: the signed RFC 6962 root of one UTC day's check envelopes and their count. Give its SHA-256, or a day (YYYY-MM-DD) to find it through the runner's day status. This server reads the record from the ledger and the key from the ledger's /.well-known/furui-check-keys.json, and recomputes: the bytes hash to the SHA-256, the shape is closed, the key is listed for the record's heights, the Ed25519 signature verifies, and whether the record is anchored. No content, scope or answer text is in it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: A content check runner's day record, checked
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_furui_leafReturn envelope i of a closed UTC day as the content check runner serves it (kept 7 days after the day), with its RFC 6962 audit path.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return envelope i of a closed UTC day as the content check runner serves it (kept 7 days after the day), with its RFC 6962 audit path. This server recomputes: the envelope has the closed shape (digests, numbers, booleans, fixed words; no text), the leaf hash is sha256(0x00 || canonical envelope), the audit path rebuilds the root of the day record the ledger stores, and the runner's Ed25519 signature verifies under the key the ledger lists. An admission of version 0.4 names the check of such an envelope by its digest.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One check envelope of a day (a leaf), checked against the day record
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_ledger_entryReturn ledger entry n as the ledger serves it: claim_sha256, the canonical record bytes, work description, OpenTimestamps status and Bitcoin block when anchored.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return ledger entry n as the ledger serves it: claim_sha256, the canonical record bytes, work description, OpenTimestamps status and Bitcoin block when anchored. Pair with jidec_how_to_verify to recompute it.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One ledger entry by number
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_ledger_headReturn the current head of the JIDEC/NENRIN ledger: entry count n, the head hash, and the end marker bound into the chain (jidec-head-v1) with the recipe to recompute it.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the current head of the JIDEC/NENRIN ledger: entry count n, the head hash, and the end marker bound into the chain (jidec-head-v1) with the recipe to recompute it. Compare it with a head you saw earlier to detect truncation or rewrite.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Current ledger head and its bound end marker
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_resumeReturn the NENRIN résumé of an agent or MCP endpoint: every recorded measurement that touches its origin (by the gate and by outside witnesses, signed or not), which are Bitcoin-an…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the NENRIN résumé of an agent or MCP endpoint: every recorded measurement that touches its origin (by the gate and by outside witnesses, signed or not), which are Bitcoin-anchored, discrepancies, rings, agreements[] (anchored agreements), admissions[] (the anchored admissions whose relying party is on the endpoint's host: record_sha256, ledger entry, decision, the closed part of a 0.4 content block, revoked; no text), and the records not counted with the reason. Includes resume_sha256 and a recompute recipe. A history, not a score. Absent means no record, not a negative finding.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Recorded conduct history of an endpoint (NENRIN résumé)
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_trust_signalReturn the compact NENRIN signal for an endpoint: counts of anchored measurements, witness diversity and freshness, in a shape a trust engine or orderer can read.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    • untrusted-inputThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint), and the tool reads it: it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
    • outboundThe input takes a URL (input.endpoint): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.

    Claude Code: ask, because it is tagged outbound.

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return the compact NENRIN signal for an endpoint: counts of anchored measurements, witness diversity and freshness, in a shape a trust engine or orderer can read. No score, no allow or deny.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Compact conduct signal of an endpoint
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • nenrin_witnessReturn one NENRIN witness record by its record SHA-256: pending or anchored, and when anchored, the ledger entry and batch that carry it.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Return one NENRIN witness record by its record SHA-256: pending or anchored, and when anchored, the ledger entry and batch that carry it. Use it to check a walk someone says they submitted.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: One witness record by its SHA-256
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

26 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write13
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
deny to break every path
{
  "permissions": {
    "deny": [
      "mcp__jidec__jidec_how_to_verify"
    ]
  }
}

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:26 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-11-25
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://jidec.horizonshield.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 13 tools to an anonymous client, including jidec_replay (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools4 added, 1 changed.+4 added~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.4.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http jidec https://jidec.horizonshield.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http jidec https://jidec.horizonshield.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__jidec__jidec_cite",
      "mcp__jidec__jidec_list_paths",
      "mcp__jidec__jidec_how_to_verify",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_witness",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_ledger_head",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_ledger_entry",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_admission",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_agreement",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_furui_day",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_furui_leaf"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__jidec__jidec_replay",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_resume",
      "mcp__jidec__nenrin_trust_signal"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as jidec. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 13 rules
  • mcp__jidec__jidec_cite untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__jidec_replay untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__jidec_list_paths untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__jidec_how_to_verify private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_resume untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_trust_signal untrusted-input, outbound
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_witness untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_ledger_head untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_ledger_entry untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_admission untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_agreement untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_furui_day untrusted-input
  • mcp__jidec__nenrin_furui_leaf untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidec/verify?hash=7aecc30967060aee6d9c79a1674168420422dea5211ac59c36dcd0ca9fbce06f" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 7aecc3096706, from Nov 17, 2026, 01:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidec/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidec
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidec.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ogasurfproject-jpg/jidec)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Nov 3, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 13 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server have?

13 tools: 1 write, 12 read. jidec_replay, jidec_cite, jidec_list_paths, jidec_how_to_verify, nenrin_resume, nenrin_trust_signal, nenrin_witness, nenrin_ledger_head and 5 more.

Does the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): nenrin_resume and nenrin_trust_signal.

Has the JIDEC: Bitcoin-anchored public verification ledger (NENRIN) MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 3, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.