Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server
io.github.piiiico/proof-of-commitmentpiiiicostreamable-httpv1.36.0Scanned
Supply chain risk scoring for npm, PyPI, Cargo, and Go. 9 tools. Behavioral signals.
12 tools: 3 change things and 9 only read.
- Reads private data · 2
- Reads text others write · 1
- Can send data out · 0
- No findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server can do
The Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server is published by the GitHub account piiiico. It has 12 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: audit_dependencies, audit_github_repo and get_api_key), but cannot delete data. 9 tools only read.
2 tools read private data (lookup_github_repo and get_api_key); 1 tool brings in text other people can write (get_api_key).
None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.36.0.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
12 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
audit_dependenciesBatch-score multiple npm, PyPI, Cargo, or Go packages for supply chain risk.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Batch-score multiple npm, PyPI, Cargo, or Go packages for supply chain risk. Takes a list of package names and returns a risk table sorted by commitment score (lowest = highest risk first). Risk flags: - CRITICAL: single publisher + >10M weekly downloads (publish-access concentration risk) - HIGH: new package (<1yr) + high downloads (unproven, rapid adoption = supply chain risk) - WARN: no release in 12+ months (potential abandonware) - WARN: dormant publishers with current scope access — contributors who stopped publishing but retain npm tokens (Mastra-incident vector, June 2026) Perfect for auditing a full package.json, requirements.txt, Cargo.toml, or go.mod — paste your dependency list and get a prioritized risk report. For Go: pass full module paths (e.g., "github.com/gin-gonic/gin", "golang.org/x/net") and set ecosystem="golang". The "maintainers" column shows GitHub contributor count since Go has no centralized publisher concept. Examples: score all deps in a project, compare two similar packages, identify abandonware before it becomes a CVE.
audit_github_repoAudit the supply chain risk of a GitHub repository's dependencies.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Audit the supply chain risk of a GitHub repository's dependencies. Fetches the repo's package.json and/or requirements.txt from GitHub and runs behavioral commitment scoring on every dependency. This is the fastest way to audit a project — just provide the GitHub URL or owner/repo slug, and get a full risk table in seconds. Risk flags: - CRITICAL: single publisher/maintainer/owner + >10M weekly downloads (publish-access concentration risk) - HIGH: sole publisher/maintainer + >1M/wk downloads, OR new package (<1yr) with high adoption - WARN: no release in 12+ months (potential abandonware) Examples: - "vercel/next.js" — audit Next.js dependencies - "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchainjs" — audit LangChain JS - "facebook/react" — audit React's dependency tree - "anthropics/anthropic-sdk-python" — audit Anthropic Python SDK Use this when someone asks "is my project at risk?" or "audit this repo's dependencies".
get_api_keyCreate a free Commit API key instantly — no browser required.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_api_key" says "get": a word for reading.
- The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "commit": it reads repositories.
- untrusted-inputThe description's first sentence says "create" and "browser": it reads web pages, which anyone can write.
Description, as the server wrote it Create a free Commit API key instantly — no browser required. When you've hit the daily free query limit (or just want faster access), call this tool with your email to get an API key returned directly in the chat. The key lifts the rate limit to 200 audits/day and enables package monitoring (weekly alerts when your dependencies get riskier). After creating the key, configure your MCP client to pass it: Authorization: Bearer sk_commit_<your-key> Example: get_api_key({ email: "dev@company.com" }) One key per email. 3 keys per IP per day (anti-abuse).
Only reads 9Show 9 read-only tools
audit_dependency_treeMap the full dependency tree of an npm package and identify CRITICAL supply chain risks at every level.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "audit_dependency_tree" says "tree": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Map the full dependency tree of an npm package and identify CRITICAL supply chain risks at every level. Unlike auditing a flat list of packages, this tool traverses the dependency graph — showing not just your direct dependencies but also what your dependencies depend on. Hidden CRITICAL packages (sole publisher + >10M weekly downloads) often lurk 1-2 levels deep. Risk flags: - CRITICAL: single npm publisher + >10M weekly downloads — sole point of failure for a massive attack surface - HIGH: sole publisher + >1M/wk, OR new package (<1yr) with high adoption - WARN: no release in 12+ months (potential abandonware) depth=1 (default): root package + all direct dependencies depth=2: also traverses one more level for any CRITICAL/HIGH direct deps (reveals hidden exposure) Examples: - audit_dependency_tree("express") — see all of Express's deps and their risk scores - audit_dependency_tree("langchain", 2) — reveal transitive CRITICAL deps 2 levels deep - audit_dependency_tree("@anthropic-ai/sdk") — audit Anthropic SDK full tree Use this when someone asks: - "What am I really depending on?" - "Are my dependencies' dependencies safe?" - "Show me the full supply chain risk for package X"
lookup_businessSearch for a Norwegian business and get its commitment profile from public data (Brønnøysund Register Centre).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_business" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Search for a Norwegian business and get its commitment profile from public data (Brønnøysund Register Centre). Returns real commitment signals: longevity, financial health, employee count, and overall commitment score (0-100). Data source: Norwegian government registers — free, verified, unfakeable.
lookup_business_by_orgLook up a specific Norwegian business by organization number (9 digits) and get its commitment profile.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_business_by_org" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Look up a specific Norwegian business by organization number (9 digits) and get its commitment profile. Returns temporal, financial, and operational commitment signals from Brønnøysund Register Centre.
lookup_cargo_crateGet a behavioral commitment profile for any Rust crate on crates.io.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_cargo_crate" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a behavioral commitment profile for any Rust crate on crates.io. Returns real signals: crate age, download volume (estimated weekly from 90-day totals), version count, publish cadence, owner count (users with publish access), team owners, and linked GitHub activity. Supply chain risks apply to Cargo too — crate owners with publish access are the attack surface. A single owner on a high-download crate is the same risk pattern as npm. Useful for: vetting Rust dependencies before adding to Cargo.toml, identifying abandonware, supply chain risk assessment. Examples: "serde", "tokio", "reqwest", "clap", "rand"
lookup_github_repoGet a behavioral commitment profile for any public GitHub repository.Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_github_repo" says "lookup": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "lookup_github_repo" says "lookup" and "repo": it reads repositories.
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "get" and "repository": it reads repositories.
- private-dataThe input names a repo (input.repo), and the tool reads: it reads repositories.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a behavioral commitment profile for any public GitHub repository. Returns real signals that prove genuine investment: how long the project has existed, recent commit frequency, contributor community size, release cadence, and social proof. These are behavioral commitments — harder to fake than README claims or marketing copy. Useful for: vetting open-source dependencies, evaluating AI tools/frameworks, assessing vendor reliability, due diligence on any GitHub project. Examples: "vercel/next.js", "facebook/react", "https://github.com/piiiico/proof-of-commitment"
lookup_go_moduleGet a behavioral commitment profile for any Go module on proxy.golang.org.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_go_module" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a behavioral commitment profile for any Go module on proxy.golang.org. Takes a full module path (e.g., "github.com/gin-gonic/gin", "golang.org/x/net", "k8s.io/client-go", "gopkg.in/yaml.v3") and returns real signals: module age, version count, publish cadence, GitHub contributors (the closest equivalent to "publishers" since Go has no centralized publisher concept — git push access is the publish equivalent), GitHub stars, OpenSSF Scorecard score. The Go ecosystem has no centralized download counter, so this profile is GitHub-primary — the linked source repository's activity, contributor count, and Scorecard carry more weight than for npm/PyPI/Cargo. Stars are used as the popularity proxy. Useful for: vetting Go dependencies before adding to go.mod, identifying abandonware, supply chain risk assessment. Examples: "github.com/gin-gonic/gin", "golang.org/x/crypto", "github.com/spf13/cobra", "k8s.io/api"
lookup_npm_packageGet a behavioral commitment profile for any npm package.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_npm_package" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a behavioral commitment profile for any npm package. Returns real signals that prove genuine investment: package age, download volume and trend (growing/stable/declining), release consistency, npm publisher count, GitHub contributor count, and linked GitHub activity. Also returns publisherLifecycle — cross-referencing current maintainers against per-version publish history to flag dormant publishers who still hold npm scope access. The Mastra incident (June 2026) exploited exactly this: a contributor dormant since 2024 with never-revoked scope access. Why behavioral signals matter: download counts, stars, and READMEs can be gamed. Download *trend* consistency and publisher depth over years are harder to fake. Supply chain attacks often target packages with low publisher depth (few people with npm publish access). Useful for: vetting dependencies before installation, due diligence on open-source packages, identifying abandonware, checking if a package is actively maintained. Examples: "langchain", "@anthropic-ai/sdk", "express", "litellm"
lookup_pypi_packageGet a behavioral commitment profile for any PyPI (Python) package.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "lookup_pypi_package" says "lookup": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Get a behavioral commitment profile for any PyPI (Python) package. Returns real signals: package age, download volume and trend, release consistency, publisher/owner count, and linked GitHub activity. Supply chain attacks target Python packages — LiteLLM (97M downloads/mo) was compromised via stolen PyPI token in March 2026. Behavioral signals reveal what star counts hide. Useful for: vetting Python dependencies, identifying abandonware, supply chain risk due diligence. Examples: "langchain", "litellm", "openai", "anthropic", "requests", "fastapi", "pydantic"
query_commitmentQuery verified behavioral commitment data for a domain.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "query_commitment" says "query": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Query verified behavioral commitment data for a domain. Returns aggregated signals: unique verified visitors, repeat visit rate, and average time spent. These prove real human engagement — harder to fake than reviews or content.
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data2
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write1
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:09 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 12 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_dependencies (write), audit_github_repo (write), get_api_key (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.36.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http proof-of-commitment https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http proof-of-commitment https://poc-backend.amdal-dev.workers.dev/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__query_commitment",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_business",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_business_by_org",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_github_repo",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_npm_package",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_pypi_package",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_cargo_crate",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_go_module",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__audit_dependency_tree"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__audit_dependencies",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__audit_github_repo",
"mcp__proof-of-commitment__get_api_key"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as proof-of-commitment. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 2 rules
- mcp__proof-of-commitment__lookup_github_repo private-data
- mcp__proof-of-commitment__get_api_key private-data, untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.piiiico/proof-of-commitment/verify?hash=b02397f42a0ce5f8b8cfc949c9b7fa9493581ae93dfdc34a26cea85f361f6e1a" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash b02397f42a0c, from Nov 21, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.piiiico/proof-of-commitment/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.piiiico/proof-of-commitment)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:43 UTC.
Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 12 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server have?
- 12 tools: 3 write, 9 read. audit_dependencies, audit_github_repo, get_api_key, query_commitment, lookup_business, lookup_business_by_org, lookup_github_repo, lookup_npm_package and 4 more.
Does the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Commit — Supply Chain Risk Scoring MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 21, 2026.