GEN MCP server
io.github.poweredbyGEN/gen-mcp-serverpoweredbyGENstreamable-httpv0.2.2Scanned
GEN is the creative AI video engineer. Free editor/social publishing; AI credits via card/x402.
19 tools: 14 can delete or cancel things and 5 change things.
- Reads private data · 0
- Reads text others write · 10
- Can send data out · 2
- 6 findings
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
14 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the GEN MCP server can do
The GEN MCP server is published by the GitHub account poweredbyGEN. It has 19 tools. It can delete or cancel things (14 tools: gen_agent_action, gen_analyze, gen_ask, gen_asset_action and 10 more) and create or change data (5 tools: gen_discover, gen_feedback, gen_generate_report_ideas, gen_sign_in_link and 1 more). None of its tools only reads.
10 tools bring in text other people can write (gen_agent_action, gen_analyze, gen_ask and 7 more); 2 tools can send data out of your system (gen_publish_action and gen_sign_in_link).
The fixed checks matched 6 findings (long-description, annotation-conflict and credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed 2 times since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.2.2.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
19 tools
Deletes or cancels 14Claude Code: deny
gen_agent_actionOnly agent profile/settings/appearance.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only agent profile/settings/appearance. Read current actions with gen_discover domain=agent view=actions.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Create, update, or remove assistants and their profiles
gen_analyzeOnly collect sources/analyze videos/trends/research.Reads text others write2 findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,861 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ind media assets on web page; next: use assets. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get."
- Warn
The server marks "gen_analyze" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "analyze", a word for reading.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "gen_analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Only collect sources/analyze videos/trends/research. start directly; write a short chat acknowledgement. analytics(agent_id,view):Query workspace metrics; next: inspect rows. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. analyze_account(agent_id,username):Analyze supplied social account; next: read job. analyze_socials(agent_id):Analyse own connected socials; next: read job. apify_scrape(actor_id,agent_id,idempotency_key,input):Run external data collector; next: read job. aura_user_stats(agent_id,emails,environment):Read user campaign metrics; next: inspect rows. chart(agent_id):Create chart from data; next: open artifact. clip_moments(agent_id,sources):Content run step; use gen_content_action find_clips. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. collect(agent_id,targets):Collect typed targets and scope; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. collect_enrichment_status(agent_id,job_id):Read collect enrichment job; next: use analysis. comment_mining(agent_id,target):Find comment patterns; next: read analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. comments(agent_id):Read stored video comments; next: read returned job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. comments_online(agent_id,video_ids):Collect live video comments; next: read job. creators(agent_id,query):Creators for a topic; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. hooks(agent_id,query):Hooks for a topic; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. import_urls(agent_id,platform,videos_urls):Import source URLs for analysis; next: read returned job. layer_analysis(agent_id,cell_id,vidsheet_id):Analyze owned layer media; next: read vidsheet.layer_analysis. monitor_status(agent_id):Read comment monitoring state; never commenter text. report(agent_id,window):Topic report; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. research_scrape(agent_id,input,source):Collect sources for research; next: read job. research_web(agent_id):Web, news, Reddit, X search for query; save=true keeps it; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. search_posts(agent_id,keyword):Search social posts for query; next: read job. sounds(agent_id,view):Find music matching criteria; next: use sound refs. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. transcribe(agent_id):Transcribe public social video; next: gen_discover job. transcribe_status(agent_id,video_ids):Read accepted transcription; next: use text. trends(agent_id,query):Trends for a topic; next: gen_discover analyze.job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. upload_by_ids(agent_id,video_ids):Import provider media IDs; next: read resources. video_analysis(agent_id,video_url):Analyze source video; next: read analysis. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. web_asset_scrape(agent_id,url):Find media assets on web page; next: use assets. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Analyze social trends, comments, hooks, and creators
gen_askOnly chat run_id: workflow; omit: one user wait, several ask which, zero hub; message = the person's whole message, copied exactly, every word (including a leading 'no'/'ok' and an…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only chat run_id: workflow; omit: one user wait, several ask which, zero hub; message = the person's whole message, copied exactly, every word (including a leading 'no'/'ok' and any request at the end); never summarize, shorten or split it. ask(client_message_id,question):Start a durable/scheduled goal: question + client_message_id. Follow next_steps. New content: gen_content_action. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. cancel_pending(conversation_id,pending_id):Cancel pending_id; read platform.conversation. chat(client_message_id,message):Exact message to run_id's workflow; omitted: one user wait, several ask which, zero hub. Requires client_message_id. steer(conversation_id):Steer active conversation; follow next_steps. stop(run_id):Stop run_id; read task.run_status.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Ask GEN anything, or chat about a build goal
gen_asset_actionOnly owned media/files: manage/analyze.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Only owned media/files: manage/analyze. analyze(kind):Analyze owned media, not content intake; next: read returned job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. complete_asset_upload(signed_id):Register the finished direct upload as an owned asset; next: read asset.detail. create_direct_upload(byte_size,checksum,content_type,filename):Prepare an owned file upload; next: PUT bytes, then complete_asset_upload. delete_asset(resource_id):Delete the named owned asset; next: read asset.list. import_asset_from_url(url):Import a URL into owned assets; next: use returned resource ID. run_computer(command):Execute supplied code in the compute sandbox; next: read returned outputs.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Analyze, upload, import, and delete assets
gen_billing_actionOnly subscriptions/funding/billing settings.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only subscriptions/funding/billing settings. buy_credits(credit_plan_id,organization_id):Buy a credit pack when balance is low; next: open returned checkout. create_x402_credit_purchase(workspace_id):Prepare an x402 credit purchase; next: settle its payment. list_owned_invoices(organization_id):Read owned-workspace invoices; invoice URL next. list_owned_subscriptions():Read owned-workspace subscriptions; billing plans next. open_checkout(credit_plan_id,organization_id):Open plan checkout for a workspace; next: follow the returned URL. prepare_funding_recovery():Present owned-workspace funding choices; next: choose a plan or top up. settle_x402_credit_purchase(checkout_session_id,payment_signature,workspace_id):Settle the prepared x402 purchase; next: read credit balance.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Read billing and manage credit purchases
gen_charactersOnly standalone characters from owned image/video; video/series: gen_content_action.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only standalone characters from owned image/video; video/series: gen_content_action. copy_to_mine(agent_id,character_id):Copy shared character to mine; next: get copy. create(agent_id,content_resource_id):Standalone character/clone_voice from owned image/video; content intake: content-ideas-and-videos. create_talking_character(agent_id,character_id,clips,look_id):Standalone talking clips from look/voice; next: read generation; content intake: content-ideas-and-videos. delete_character(agent_id,character_id):Delete character; next: confirm preview after user approval. delete_look(agent_id,character_id,look_id):Delete look; next: confirm preview after user approval. delete_talking_character(agent_id,character_id,talking_character_id):Delete talking clip; next: confirm preview after user approval. edit_talking_character(agent_id,character_id,clips,talking_character_id):Revise saved talking clips; next: read generation. get(agent_id,character_id):Read character; next: choose look/voice. get_talking_character(agent_id,character_id,talking_character_id):Read talking character; next: build with its media. list(agent_id):Read pool; next: get a character. rename(agent_id,character_id,name):Rename character/look/clip; next: get character. set_primary_voice(agent_id,character_id,voice):Save selected voice; next: get character. set_profile(agent_id,character_id,profile):Save appearance fields; next: get character. share_character(agent_id,character_id,organization_id):Grant workspace access; next: inspect grant. unshare_character(agent_id,character_id,organization_id):Revoke workspace access; next: inspect grant. upload_look(agent_id,character_id,content_resource_id):Add owned image; next: get character. upload_talking_character(agent_id,character_id,content_resource_id):Standalone owned video/clone_voice; content intake: content-ideas-and-videos. validate_cast(agent_id,build_inputs):Validate saved cast before build; next: repair missing media.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Manage characters, looks, and talking characters
gen_content_actionOnly plan videos from a topic/goal/product/story/multi-scene script; specified media/file edits: other tools.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,232 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...date_content_resource(filename,resource_id):Update source; read content.resource."
Description, as the server wrote it Only plan videos from a topic/goal/product/story/multi-scene script; specified media/file edits: other tools. Flow: generate_ideas>brief(confirm/change)>characters(approve/change)>ideas(expand_idea idea_id)>storyboard(create_video_from_idea draft)>Draft>Full. start directly; write a short chat acknowledgement. approve_characters(run_id):Approve cast; next: ideas. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. back_to_ideas(run_id):Back to ideas; pick idea_id. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. confirm_brief(run_id):Confirm brief; next: characters. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. create_content_resource(signed_id):Save a source/asset; read content.resource. create_video_from_idea():Build a saved idea (idea_id, idea_ids or idea_title) into a Draft or Full video (default paid full); read content.video_job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. delete_content_resource(resource_id):Delete source; read content.list. expand_idea():Storyboard a saved idea named by idea_id into a fuller plan; read its job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. find_clips(brief):Clip ideas from a video; next: create_video_from_idea. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. generate_ideas():New brief/uploads: brief>cast>ideas>Draft>Full. Never for an idea already saved (idea_id): create_video_from_idea or expand_idea. Waiting replies: gen_ask chat run_id. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. recreate_video():Recreate a source video's structure as saved ideas, also when the person asks for it as another length or format; next: create_video_from_idea. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. reimagine_video(direction):Adapt a source video to a new concept or direction the person gives as ideas; next: create_video_from_idea. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. remove_content_preference(preference):Delete saved rule by text; first read agent.settings to find it. save_idea(brief,title,video_type_id):Save an authored idea's script and structure; next: create_video_from_idea. set_content_preference(preference):Save long_term (all future content) or session (conversation) rules, including 'never'; read agent.settings. set_idea_status(idea_id,status):Set idea status; read content.idea. update_content_resource(filename,resource_id):Update source; read content.resource.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Manage content resources and content ideas
gen_generateOnly specified media in one generation; planned videos: gen_content_action.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_generate" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only specified media in one generation; planned videos: gen_content_action. start directly; create_image(prompt):Render images from the person's prompt; next: read returned generation. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. create_song():Compose one requested song, jingle or sound; next: read returned generation. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. create_song_mix(tracks):Mix supplied songs into one output; next: read the returned generation. create_video(prompt):Render one clip from text or the person's image, with the named model; next: read returned generation. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. swap_character(prompt,reference_images,video):Swap a person in their video for their image's character; next: read generation. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. transcribe():Transcribe the person's own audio/video file; next: read returned job. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Create images, videos, songs, and transcripts
gen_platform_actionOnly workspace members/preferences/API access.2 findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Findings
- Info
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...create_api_key():Create a workspace API credential; next: give the person the returned dow..."
- Info
The description is 2,165 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...,request_id):Verify the requested email code as text; next: read the link result."
Description, as the server wrote it Only workspace members/preferences/API access. create_api_key():Create a workspace API credential; next: give the person the returned download_url. create_organization(name):Create a workspace with the supplied name; next: read platform.organization. create_proof_of_genesis_backup(asset_url):Save an asset's proof-of-genesis backup; next: read platform.backups. delete_organization(organization_id):Delete the named workspace; next: confirm only after user approval. invite_member(organization_id,username_or_email):Invite the named person to a workspace role; next: read platform.members. leave_workspace(organization_id):Leave the named workspace; next: read platform.organizations. remove_member(organization_id,user_id):Remove the named workspace member; next: read platform.members. remove_proof_of_genesis_backup(backup_id):Delete the named backup; next: read platform.backups. request_email_link_code(email):Start email linking for the supplied address; next: verify_email_link_code. resend_email_link_code(request_id):Resend a requested email code; next: verify_email_link_code. revoke_all_api_keys():Revoke every caller API key; next: sign in again. revoke_api_key(token_id):Revoke the named API key; next: read platform.api_keys. set_member_role(organization_id,role,username_or_email):Change the named workspace member's role; next: read platform.members. start_seat_checkout(organization_id,return_url):Open checkout to add workspace seats; next: follow returned URL. transfer_workspace_ownership(organization_id,username_or_email):Transfer workspace ownership to its named member; next: confirm. update_api_key(name,token_id):Rename the named API credential; next: read platform.api_keys. update_organization(name,organization_id):Rename the named workspace; next: read platform.organization. update_session_preferences(conversation_id,preferences):Save conversation preferences; next: read platform.preferences. upgrade_workspace(credit_plan_id,organization_id,return_url):Open the workspace plan upgrade; next: follow returned checkout URL. verify_email_link_code(code,request_id):Verify the requested email code as text; next: read the link result.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Manage workspaces, API keys, preferences, and backups
gen_publish_actionOnly connect accounts/publish/schedule.Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_publish_action" says "publish": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe name "gen_publish_action" says "publish": it sends or publishes something to other people.
Description, as the server wrote it Only connect accounts/publish/schedule. Read current actions with gen_discover domain=publish view=actions.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Schedule, publish, or remove posts
gen_task_actionOnly schedule/wait/read accepted tasks.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Only schedule/wait/read accepted tasks. create_monitoring_job(platform,search_type,value):Schedule source monitoring; next: read task.list. create_recurring_job(job_type,prompt,schedule):Save scheduled prompt and delivery; next: read task.list. decide_agent_run(approved,run_id):Approve or reject pending run; next: read task.run_status. delete_recurring_job():Delete named recurring job; next: read task.list. duplicate_recurring_job(job_id,vidsheet_url):Copy named recurring job; next: read task.list. ensure_default_recurring_job():Ensure default recurring job exists; next: read task.list. get(task_id):Read accepted MCP task by task_id; next: use result or wait. pause_recurring_job():Pause named recurring job; next: read task.list. render_email(assistant_content,payload):Render content as email; next: inspect document. resume_recurring_job():Resume paused recurring job; next: read task.list. revoke_grant(grant_id):Revoke scheduled-work grant; next: read task.list. run_recurring_job_now(job_id):Run named recurring job once; next: read task.run_status. update_monitoring_job(job_id,platform,search_type,value):Update saved monitoring settings; next: read task.list. update_recurring_job():Update schedule or delivery; next: read task.list. wait(task_id):Wait up to 60s for task_id; next: get result or wait.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Manage recurring jobs and monitoring tasks
gen_vidsheet_actionOnly edit/generate Vidsheet rows.Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Info
The description is 2,016 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...g. update_layer():Save fields on an existing layer_id; next: read vidsheet.layer."
Description, as the server wrote it Only edit/generate Vidsheet rows. add_column():Add a workspace column with required name and kind; fill rows only through set_cell; next: read vidsheet.columns. add_layer():Add a timeline layer to the target row; next: read vidsheet.layers. apply_storyboard():Apply an authored storyboard to an owned row; next: read the saved sheet. clone_template():Create a workspace from a template_slug; next: read vidsheet.sheet. close_gap(target):Close the gap immediately before the target layer, shifting that layer and its later track siblings together; refuses when no gap exists. continue_generation(generation_id,idempotency_key):Resume the accepted generation_id; next: read vidsheet.generation. create(target,values):Add a Vidsheet, column, row, layer or variable. create_engine():Create the workspace engine for template_slug and idea_id; next: read vidsheet.engine. create_sheet():Create an editable workspace without a saved idea; next: read vidsheet.sheet. Saved ideas use create_video_from_idea. delete(target):Delete the target via confirmation token. duplicate(target):Copy a Vidsheet, column, row or layer. duplicate_sheet():Copy an existing vidsheet_id; next: read the new vidsheet.sheet. export(target):Export targeted Vidsheet rows as CSV. generate(card,target):Run a creation card on the target. import_asset(vidsheet_id):Add owned media to an existing workspace; next: read vidsheet.rows. redo(target):Redo an edit on the targeted Vidsheet. refund_unused_output():Request credit recovery for unused generation output; next: read receipt. reorder(ids,target):Set order using every sibling target id. set_cell():Save authored cell values or a creation card with required row, column and value; next: read vidsheet.cell. stop_generation(generation_id):Stop the accepted generation_id; next: read vidsheet.generation. undo(target):Undo an edit on the targeted Vidsheet. update(target,values):Save target fields without generating. update_layer():Save fields on an existing layer_id; next: read vidsheet.layer.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Vidsheet action
gen_voice_actionOnly create/preview/manage voices/scripts.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only create/preview/manage voices/scripts. clone_voice(name):Clone from owned speech; next: read returned job. delete_voice(voice_id):Delete your saved voice; next: read voice.mine. design_voice(generation_id,name):Design voice from description; next: preview saved voice. generate_voice_description(gender):Describe a voice for the supplied content; next: design_voice. generate_voice_samples(text):Selectable speech samples; next: read voice.sample_status. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get. generate_voice_script():Narration from brief; next: preview_voice. preview_voice(text,voice_id):Preview text with voice ID; next: read voice.preview_status. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Clone, design, preview, and delete voices
gen_watchlist_actionOnly watch sources/query findings.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it destructive (destructiveHint: true).
Description, as the server wrote it Only watch sources/query findings. add_watchlist_source(platform,target_type,target_value):Add a source to the named watchlist; next: read watchlist.detail. create_watchlist(name):Create a watchlist for supplied sources; next: read watchlist.detail. delete_watchlist():Delete the named source watchlist; next: read watchlist.list. pause_watchlist():Pause collection for the named watchlist; next: read watchlist.detail. query_watchlist(question):Query the named watchlist's findings; next: use returned evidence. remove_watchlist_source():Remove a source from the named watchlist; next: read watchlist.detail. resume_watchlist():Resume collection for the named watchlist; next: read watchlist.detail. update_watchlist():Change the named watchlist's configuration; next: read watchlist.detail.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: true
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Manage monitoring watchlists and their sources
Changes things 5Claude Code: ask
gen_discoverOnly records/options/job results/action schemas.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Only records/options/job results/action schemas.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
- readOnlyHint: true
- title: Discover
gen_feedbackOnly problems/product feedback to GEN.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Only problems/product feedback to GEN.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Send feedback about GEN
gen_generate_report_ideasOnly report ideas from supplied research.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_generate_report_ideas" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Only report ideas from supplied research.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Generate report ideas
gen_sign_in_linkOnly this MCP connection's sign-in link.Can send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_sign_in_link" says "link": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Only this MCP connection's sign-in link.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Create a GEN sign-in link
gen_upload_assetOnly upload local files to caller-owned assets.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "gen_upload_asset" says "upload": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Only upload local files to caller-owned assets.
Annotations the server declares
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
- readOnlyHint: false
- title: Upload a file into an asset library
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data.
- Reads private data0
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write10
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:09 UTC, unchanged since Nov 6, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 19
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- https://mcp.gen.pro/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Authorization servers
- https://mcp.gen.pro/
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- yes
- Client ID metadata documents
- yes
- HighThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 19 tools that change things (14 destructive, 5 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://mcp.gen.pro: tools/list returned 19 tools to an anonymous client, including gen_agent_action (destructive), gen_analyze (destructive), gen_ask (destructive), gen_asset_action (destructive), gen_billing_action (destructive) and 14 more
Posture changes
- Nov 6, 2026
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 18 to 19
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warngen_analyze
The server marks "gen_analyze" destructive (destructiveHint: true), and its name says "analyze", a word for reading.
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":true,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "gen_analyze" says "analyze": a word for reading.
- Infogen_analyze
The description is 2,861 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...ind media assets on web page; next: use assets. Finish: gen_task_action wait/get."
The description is 2,232 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...date_content_resource(filename,resource_id):Update source; read content.resource."
The description mentions "credential".
What this check looks forMatched text
description: "...create_api_key():Create a workspace API credential; next: give the person the returned dow..."
The description is 2,165 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...,request_id):Verify the requested email code as text; next: read the link result."
The description is 2,016 characters long, over the 2,000 this check looks for.
What this check looks forMatched text
description ends: "...g. update_layer():Save fields on an existing layer_id; next: read vidsheet.layer."
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools19 changed.~19 changedView diff
- Changed:gen_agent_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_analyzeDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_askDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_asset_actionDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:gen_billing_actionDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:gen_charactersDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:gen_content_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_discoverChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_feedbackChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:gen_generateDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_generate_report_ideasChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:gen_platform_actionDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:gen_publish_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_sign_in_linkChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:gen_task_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_upload_assetChanges thingsdescription
- Changed:gen_vidsheet_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_voice_actionDeletes or cancelsdescription
- Changed:gen_watchlist_actionDeletes or cancelsdescription
Tools19 changed.~19 changedView diff
- Changed:gen_agent_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_analyzeDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_askDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_asset_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_billing_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_charactersDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_content_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_discoverChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_feedbackChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_generateDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_generate_report_ideasChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_platform_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_publish_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_sign_in_linkChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_task_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_upload_assetChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_vidsheet_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_voice_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:gen_watchlist_actionDeletes or cancelsdescriptioninputSchema
PostureRemote posture changed. Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 18 -> 19.View diff
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials: 18 to 19
Install
Pinned to version 0.2.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http gen https://mcp.gen.proclaude mcp add --transport http gen https://mcp.gen.proRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [],
"ask": [
"mcp__gen__gen_discover",
"mcp__gen__gen_feedback",
"mcp__gen__gen_generate_report_ideas",
"mcp__gen__gen_sign_in_link",
"mcp__gen__gen_upload_asset"
],
"deny": [
"mcp__gen__gen_agent_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_analyze",
"mcp__gen__gen_ask",
"mcp__gen__gen_asset_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_billing_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_characters",
"mcp__gen__gen_content_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_generate",
"mcp__gen__gen_platform_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_publish_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_task_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_vidsheet_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_voice_action",
"mcp__gen__gen_watchlist_action"
]
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as gen. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 11 rules
- mcp__gen__gen_agent_action untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_analyze untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_ask untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_billing_action untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_characters untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_discover untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_generate untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_publish_action untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__gen__gen_sign_in_link outbound
- mcp__gen__gen_vidsheet_action untrusted-input
- mcp__gen__gen_voice_action untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.poweredbyGEN/gen-mcp-server/verify?hash=e7ae51fdb94c6669e4d55157fd10fdde1314131ec9983c1825a4b16f5ad74253" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash e7ae51fdb94c, from Nov 20, 2026, 08:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.poweredbyGEN/gen-mcp-server/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.poweredbyGEN/gen-mcp-server)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.
GEN MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the GEN MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 19 tools, 19 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the GEN MCP server delete data?
- Yes. 14 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: gen_agent_action, gen_analyze, gen_ask, gen_asset_action, gen_billing_action, gen_characters and 8 more.
Can the GEN MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the GEN MCP server have?
- 19 tools: 14 destructive, 5 write. gen_agent_action, gen_analyze, gen_ask, gen_asset_action, gen_billing_action, gen_characters, gen_content_action, gen_generate and 11 more.
Does the GEN MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the GEN MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): gen_publish_action and gen_sign_in_link.
Has the GEN MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, 2 times since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 20, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.