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MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server

io.github.projetnanocorp/mandateprojetnanocorpstreamable-httpv0.1.0Scanned

MCP server for mandates, delegation, policy-gated execution, credential grants, and audit.

11 tools: 2 can delete or cancel things, 7 change things and 2 only read.

Tools: 2 delete, 0 irreversible, 7 write, 2 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 6 findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

2 tools here can delete or cancel things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server can do

The MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server is published by the GitHub account projetnanocorp. It has 11 tools. It can delete or cancel things (2 tools: mandate.revoke and broker.revoke-grant) and create or change data (7 tools: mandate.mint, mandate.delegate, mandate.authorize-action, mandate.verify-proof and 3 more). 2 tools only read.

None of its tools reads private data, brings in text other people write, or sends data out.

The fixed checks matched 6 findings (credentials-mention). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

11 tools

Deletes or cancels 2Claude Code: deny
  • broker.revoke-grantRevokes a broker grant by id and records the revocation to the ledger.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "broker.revoke-grant" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.

    Findings

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Revokes a broker grant by id and records the revocation to the ledger.
  • mandate.revokeRevokes a mandate subtree and records the revocation to the hash-chained ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "mandate.revoke" says "revoke": a word for removing or ending something.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Revokes a mandate subtree and records the revocation to the hash-chained ledger.
Changes things 7Claude Code: ask
  • broker.register-credentialRegisters an opaque vault handle/reference only; plaintext secret fields are rejected and never ledgered.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Registers an opaque vault handle/reference only; plaintext secret fields are rejected and never ledgered.
  • broker.request-accessAsks the canonical Policy Engine for an ALLOW decision before issuing a short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry.2 findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "broker.request-access" says "request": a word for a change.

    Findings

    • Info

      The title mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      title: "Request short-lived credential grant"

      What this check looks for
    • Info

      The description mentions "credential".

      Matched text

      description: "...short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry."

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Asks the canonical Policy Engine for an ALLOW decision before issuing a short-lived HMAC-sealed grant bound to credential, mandate, agent, scope, and expiry.
  • broker.useRedeems a sealed grant for the bound acting agent and executes the bound action through the Gateway and Policy Engine; does not expose plaintext secrets.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    Findings

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Redeems a sealed grant for the bound acting agent and executes the bound action through the Gateway and Policy Engine; does not expose plaintext secrets.
  • mandate.authorize-actionSubmits an action through the Gateway and canonical Policy Engine; returns ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL with ledger proof.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "submit": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Submits an action through the Gateway and canonical Policy Engine; returns ALLOW, DENY, or REQUIRE_APPROVAL with ledger proof.
  • mandate.delegateCreates a child mandate only when it is a no-escalation subset of the parent mandate.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates a child mandate only when it is a no-escalation subset of the parent mandate.
  • mandate.mintCreates an active human-granted mandate for an agent and records it to the hash-chained ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "create": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Creates an active human-granted mandate for an agent and records it to the hash-chained ledger.
  • mandate.verify-proofRecords a proof payload hash and appends proof evidence to the hash-chained ledger.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Records a proof payload hash and appends proof evidence to the hash-chained ledger.
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
  • broker.introspect-grantValidates a grant token seal, reports active/revoked/expired state, and records introspection to the ledger.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "validate": a word for reading.

    Findings

    Description, as the server wrote it
    Validates a grant token seal, reports active/revoked/expired state, and records introspection to the ledger.
  • mandate.discoverReturns this self-describing tool manifest.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "return": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Returns this self-describing tool manifest.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
9
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 9 tools that change things (2 destructive, 7 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp: tools/list returned 11 tools to an anonymous client, including mandate.revoke (destructive), broker.revoke-grant (destructive), mandate.mint (write), mandate.delegate (write), mandate.authorize-action (write) and 4 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

6 info

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http mandate https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http mandate https://mandate.nanocorp.app/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_discover",
      "mcp__mandate__broker_introspect-grant"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_mint",
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_delegate",
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_authorize-action",
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_verify-proof",
      "mcp__mandate__broker_register-credential",
      "mcp__mandate__broker_request-access",
      "mcp__mandate__broker_use"
    ],
    "deny": [
      "mcp__mandate__mandate_revoke",
      "mcp__mandate__broker_revoke-grant"
    ]
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as mandate. Review it before you use it.

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate/verify?hash=2591ee47279a9bbb440f60157a10fe39bad10eb1f2a2937ec9c878783e028a91" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 2591ee47279a, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate/changes.xml

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Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.projetnanocorp/mandate)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 11 tools, 9 of which can change, send or delete something, and 6 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server delete data?

Yes. 2 tools can delete, cancel or revoke something: mandate.revoke and broker.revoke-grant.

Can the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server have?

11 tools: 2 destructive, 7 write, 2 read. mandate.revoke, broker.revoke-grant, mandate.mint, mandate.delegate, mandate.authorize-action, mandate.verify-proof, broker.register-credential, broker.request-access and 3 more.

Does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the MANDATE Credential Broker MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.