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Quay MCP server

io.github.quay21/quayquay21streamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Pay-per-call TRON fee, payment, and address checks. Agents pay USDT or USDC.

4 tools: 3 do something that can't be undone and 1 change things.

Tools: 0 delete, 3 irreversible, 1 write, 0 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 2
  • No findings

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

3 tools here do something that can't be undone. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Quay MCP server can do

The Quay MCP server is published by the GitHub account quay21. It has 4 tools. It can do things that cannot be undone, such as sending, paying or publishing (quay_fee_advisor, quay_payment_verifier and quay_transfer_preflight) and create or change data (1 tool: quay_address_check), but cannot delete data. None of its tools only reads.

2 tools can send data out of your system (quay_fee_advisor and quay_transfer_preflight).

None of the fixed checks matched anything in its tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 21, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Can't be undone 3Claude Code: ask
  • quay_fee_advisorEstimate energy, bandwidth, burn cost, and a stake-or-burn note for a TRX or USDT transfer.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Estimate energy, bandwidth, burn cost, and a stake-or-burn note for a TRX or USDT transfer.
  • quay_payment_verifierConfirm a TRX or USDT arrival: amount, sender, timestamp, confirmations, and mismatch flags.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "quay_payment_verifier" says "payment": a word that usually means money moves, which cannot be taken back.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Confirm a TRX or USDT arrival: amount, sender, timestamp, confirmations, and mismatch flags.
  • quay_transfer_preflightRead-only preflight before a TRX or USDT send: look-alike destination, dust, new or inactive recipient, USDT blacklist, and the token contract.Can send data outNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "quay_transfer_preflight" says "transfer": a word for a change that another call does not undo.
    • The input addresses people (input.to): what it sends cannot be taken back.

    What it can reach

    • outboundThe input takes a destination (input.to): what the tool writes goes there.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read-only preflight before a TRX or USDT send: look-alike destination, dust, new or inactive recipient, USDT blacklist, and the token contract.
Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • quay_address_checkCheck a TRON address using public data: activation, balances, contract flag, and the USDT blacklist bit.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check a TRON address using public data: activation, balances, contract flag, and the USDT blacklist bit.

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or untrusted-input.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out2
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
4
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • HighThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 4 tools that change things (3 irreversible, 1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://tron-agent-tools.sharkweather1.workers.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including quay_fee_advisor (irreversible), quay_payment_verifier (irreversible), quay_transfer_preflight (irreversible), quay_address_check (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

No check matched anything in these tool definitions. That is not a safety guarantee.

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 added.+1 addedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http quay https://tron-agent-tools.sharkweather1.workers.dev/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http quay https://tron-agent-tools.sharkweather1.workers.dev/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__quay__quay_fee_advisor",
      "mcp__quay__quay_payment_verifier",
      "mcp__quay__quay_address_check",
      "mcp__quay__quay_transfer_preflight"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as quay. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 2 rules
  • mcp__quay__quay_fee_advisor outbound
  • mcp__quay__quay_transfer_preflight outbound

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.quay21/quay/verify?hash=c481d98a1964cfebbec743c86db8ccf9643f85967730f9b0b5a815973cd09263" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash c481d98a1964, from Nov 21, 2026, 02:17 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.quay21/quay/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.quay21/quay
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.quay21/quay.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.quay21/quay)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

Quay MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Quay MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 4 of which can change, send or delete something, and 0 findings from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Quay MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Quay MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

Yes. 3 tools can send, pay, publish or merge: quay_fee_advisor, quay_payment_verifier and quay_transfer_preflight.

What tools does the Quay MCP server have?

4 tools: 3 irreversible, 1 write. quay_fee_advisor, quay_payment_verifier, quay_transfer_preflight and quay_address_check.

Does the Quay MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Quay MCP server send data to outside services?

2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): quay_fee_advisor and quay_transfer_preflight.

Has the Quay MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.