AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server
io.github.quitegoodproject/answerrail-mcpquitegoodprojectstreamable-httpv1.2.7Scanned
6-category AI readiness, Schema.org, robots.txt, /llms.txt & 25k-token audit + auto-fix MCP server
5 tools: 3 change things and 2 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 3
- Can send data out · 2
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
3 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server can do
The AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server is published by the GitHub account quitegoodproject. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (3 tools: audit_ai_readiness, generate_ai_manifests and extract_byte0_markdown), but cannot delete data. 2 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (audit_local_codebase); 3 tools bring in text other people can write (audit_ai_readiness, generate_ai_manifests and extract_byte0_markdown); 2 tools can send data out of your system (audit_ai_readiness and extract_byte0_markdown). On its own it has all three parts of a prompt-injection exfiltration path: private data, text others write, and a way out.
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.
Last scanned Nov 11, 2026, version 1.2.7.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
5 tools
Changes things 3Claude Code: ask
audit_ai_readinessAudits a live website URL or domain for AI crawler access (GPTBot, OAI-SearchBot, PerplexityBot, ClaudeBot), 25,000-token HTML RAG truncation, /llms.txt presence, Schema.org JSON-L…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Audits a live website URL or domain for AI crawler access (GPTBot, OAI-SearchBot, PerplexityBot, ClaudeBot), 25,000-token HTML RAG truncation, /llms.txt presence, Schema.org JSON-LD entities, and Google Lighthouse 13.5 /.well-known/ai-catalog.json compliance. Returns a structured Markdown diagnostic report containing a 0-100 AI Readiness Score, letter grade, raw-vs-clean token counts, per-check pass/fail status, and remediation links. Use this tool first when diagnosing why a live website is omitted by ChatGPT, Perplexity, or Claude; do not use it to extract full-page Markdown text (use extract_byte0_markdown instead), to synthesize manifest previews (use generate_ai_manifests instead), or to inspect local disk files (use audit_local_codebase instead). Bare domains automatically resolve to https://<domain>/, and deep URLs audit the exact page weight while checking /robots.txt and /.well-known/ai-catalog.json at the origin root. Read-only HTTP check; requires no API key, allows up to 60 requests/min, and returns a timeout message if the origin fails to respond within 8 seconds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit Website AI Readiness
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
extract_byte0_markdownStrips JavaScript hydration payloads, theme DOM bloat, and inline SVGs/CSS from a live web page URL, returning clean GitHub-Flavored Markdown (GFM) with front-loaded Schema.org tab…Reads text others writeCan send data outNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
- outboundThe input takes a URL (input.url): a request to a URL can carry data to whoever runs it.
Description, as the server wrote it Strips JavaScript hydration payloads, theme DOM bloat, and inline SVGs/CSS from a live web page URL, returning clean GitHub-Flavored Markdown (GFM) with front-loaded Schema.org tables that fit within the 25,000-token LLM context window. Use this tool when you need to read the actual text, pricing tables, or FAQs of a web page without HTML truncation; do not use it for a pass/fail readiness score (use audit_ai_readiness instead) or to generate /llms.txt manifests (use generate_ai_manifests instead). Preserves the exact URL path and query string passed in url rather than normalizing to the root domain. Read-only HTTP extraction; requires no API key, allows 60 req/min, and returns an isError flag if the remote URL returns HTTP 4xx/5xx or times out after 8 seconds.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Extract Byte-0 Markdown
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
generate_ai_manifestsSynthesizes a 6-line /llms.txt documentation index preview and a Google Lighthouse 13.5 /.well-known/ai-catalog.json (ARD 1.0) JSON preview from a live remote domain, returning bot…Reads text others write1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "generate_ai_manifests" says "generate": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "generate_ai_manifests" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_ai_manifests" says "generate": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Synthesizes a 6-line /llms.txt documentation index preview and a Google Lighthouse 13.5 /.well-known/ai-catalog.json (ARD 1.0) JSON preview from a live remote domain, returning both code blocks in Markdown alongside remediation links. Use this tool when a user wants to preview the discovery manifests needed to fix gaps found by audit_ai_readiness on a live domain; do not use it for full-page content extraction (use extract_byte0_markdown instead) or local filesystem inspection (use audit_local_codebase instead). If a full URL path is passed in domain, the generator automatically normalizes it to the registrable origin root before synthesizing root-level /llms.txt and /.well-known/ai-catalog.json URIs. Read-only synthesis that never modifies remote servers or local files; requires no API key, has a 60 req/min rate limit, and falls back to baseline origin metadata if the target blocks crawlers.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Generate /llms.txt & ARD 1.0 Manifests
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 2Show 2 read-only tools
audit_local_codebaseInspects a local project directory on disk (checking package.json, public/robots.txt, public/llms.txt, and public/.well-known/ai-catalog.json) and returns a Markdown compliance rep…Reads private dataNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "inspect": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe description's first sentence says "inspect" and "directory": it reads files.
Description, as the server wrote it Inspects a local project directory on disk (checking package.json, public/robots.txt, public/llms.txt, and public/.well-known/ai-catalog.json) and returns a Markdown compliance report with per-file pass/fail status, a 6-line /llms.txt preview, and remediation links. Use this tool only when auditing local source files inside an IDE workspace; do not use it to scan a live HTTPS website (use audit_ai_readiness instead) or to synthesize manifests from a remote domain (use generate_ai_manifests instead). If targetDir contains a public/ subfolder, discovery files are checked inside public/ first before falling back to targetDir root. Performs a 100% read-only local check with zero file writes, requires no API key, has no rate limit, and returns an error message if targetDir is unreadable.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Audit Local Codebase AI Readiness
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
query_truncation_benchmarkRetrieves statistical summary data and domain-level findings from the 2026 50-Site SaaS & E-Commerce AI Truncation Study, returning a Markdown report with JSON metrics on 25,000-to…No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "query_truncation_benchmark" says "query": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Retrieves statistical summary data and domain-level findings from the 2026 50-Site SaaS & E-Commerce AI Truncation Study, returning a Markdown report with JSON metrics on 25,000-token RAG cutoff rates (74%), visible price omission (62%), /llms.txt adoption (87%), and ARD 1.0 adoption (19%). Use this tool when comparing a website against industry peers (such as Stripe, Vercel, Datadog, or Shopify) or citing empirical benchmark statistics; do not use it to run a live scan on an arbitrary URL (use audit_ai_readiness instead). When domain is omitted or empty, returns the full 50-site aggregate dataset; when a bare domain is provided, normalizes case/protocol and checks whether that domain appears in the top-truncating cohort. Read-only static dataset lookup; requires no API key, makes zero external network calls, and never fails on unknown domains.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Query 50-Site Truncation Benchmark
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
6 paths in this server alone from private data, through text someone else wrote, to a way out. Denying 1 private-data tool breaks every one.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write3
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out2
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
{
"permissions": {
"deny": [
"mcp__answerrail__audit_local_codebase"
]
}
}Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 18:24 UTC, unchanged since Oct 29, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 3
- Protocol version
- 2024-11-05
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 3 tools that change things (3 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://answerrail.com/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including audit_ai_readiness (write), generate_ai_manifests (write), extract_byte0_markdown (write)
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
The server marks "generate_ai_manifests" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "generate_ai_manifests" says "generate": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
Tools1 added, 4 changed.+1 added~4 changedView diff
- Added:audit_local_codebaseOnly reads
- Changed:audit_ai_readinessChanges thingstitledescription
- Changed:extract_byte0_markdownChanges thingsdescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:generate_ai_manifestsChanges thingstitledescriptioninputSchema
- Changed:query_truncation_benchmarkOnly readsdescriptioninputSchema
Install
Pinned to version 1.2.7. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http answerrail https://answerrail.com/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http answerrail https://answerrail.com/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__answerrail__audit_local_codebase",
"mcp__answerrail__query_truncation_benchmark"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__answerrail__audit_ai_readiness",
"mcp__answerrail__generate_ai_manifests",
"mcp__answerrail__extract_byte0_markdown"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as answerrail. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 4 rules
- mcp__answerrail__audit_local_codebase private-data
- mcp__answerrail__audit_ai_readiness untrusted-input, outbound
- mcp__answerrail__generate_ai_manifests untrusted-input
- mcp__answerrail__extract_byte0_markdown untrusted-input, outbound
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.quitegoodproject/answerrail-mcp/verify?hash=de716ecf63117ac5ef1074ff9f25a36d4dac33cb162ec8b29f4138dbd21af89c" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash de716ecf6311, from Nov 11, 2026, 00:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.quitegoodproject/answerrail-mcp/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.quitegoodproject/answerrail-mcp)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 29, 2026, 15:18 UTC.
AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 3 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server have?
- 5 tools: 3 write, 2 read. audit_ai_readiness, generate_ai_manifests, extract_byte0_markdown, audit_local_codebase and query_truncation_benchmark.
Does the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server send data to outside services?
- 2 tools can carry data out (it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL): audit_ai_readiness and extract_byte0_markdown.
Has the AnswerRail AEO, Schema.org & /llms.txt Audit MCP server changed its tools?
- Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 11, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.