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Snapback MCP server

io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapbackra1labsworkx-wqstreamable-httpv1.8.4Scanned

Diagnose why an AI agent failed and get the verified fix instantly. Free, no token.

23 tools: 20 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 20 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 9
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

20 tools here change things. Govern them.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the Snapback MCP server can do

The Snapback MCP server is published by the GitHub account ra1labsworkx-wq. It has 23 tools. It can create or change data (20 tools: diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, preflight, submit_feedback and 16 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (search_docs); 9 tools bring in text other people can write (diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, submit_feedback and 6 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.8.4.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

23 tools

Changes things 20Claude Code: ask
  • agent_memorySee what YOU (this agent) tend to fail on — your recurring failure patterns across past diagnoses.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    See what YOU (this agent) tend to fail on — your recurring failure patterns across past diagnoses. Returns your top failure classes with counts and what share of your failures each is (e.g. 'loop_repeated_tool_call: 12 times, 40%'). Call it before a run to know what to guard against. Token-scoped to your own agent. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Agent Memory
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • budget_guardLive MID-RUN budget check (fast, no LLM).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Live MID-RUN budget check (fast, no LLM). Send whatever counters you have and get an advisory on context %, token burn, cost burn, step budget, and off-task drift - with concrete suggested_actions and the projected cost of NOT acting. Call it every few steps to catch a runaway BEFORE you hit a limit. Advisory only (never blocks). Params: step, max_steps, tokens_used, token_budget, cost_used_usd, cost_budget_usd, context_used, context_window.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Budget Guard
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • cascade_rootGiven an ORDERED list of errors from a run (oldest first), find the TRUE root — the error that cascaded or shouldn't have been retried — not just the final symptom you see.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Given an ORDERED list of errors from a run (oldest first), find the TRUE root — the error that cascaded or shouldn't have been retried — not just the final symptom you see. E.g. a 429 that got retried and triggered a downstream 401: the root is the 429, not the 401. Each error can be a string or {error, retried, action}. Free, no token, no LLM.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Cascade Root
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • convert_traceTurn your raw logs into a Snapback trace so you don't hand-craft JSON.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "convert_trace" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Turn your raw logs into a Snapback trace so you don't hand-craft JSON. Pass 'source' = a list of log/step entries, or an object with a spans/steps/messages/events/logs array (OTel spans, OpenAI/LangChain message lists, or generic {tool,input,output} arrays all work). Returns {trace} ready to pass straight to diagnose_trace. Free, no token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Convert Trace
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • detect_loopMID-RUN loop check (fast, no LLM, free).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    MID-RUN loop check (fast, no LLM, free). Send your recent steps DURING a run; get back whether you're stuck repeating a tool call and a concrete next move. Call this every few steps to catch a loop BEFORE you burn your step budget — don't wait for a postmortem. Non-blocking advice, not a verdict.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Detect Loop
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • diagnose_batchDiagnose SEVERAL traces in one call (up to 20).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Diagnose SEVERAL traces in one call (up to 20). Each trace is metered like a separate diagnose_trace. Returns a verdicts array (per-trace, order preserved); a bad trace in the batch is isolated and doesn't fail the rest. Use for post-run analysis of many failures at once instead of N round-trips.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Diagnose Batch
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • diagnose_infra_errorDiagnose a cryptic AGENT-INFRASTRUCTURE error — payments (x402/EIP-3009), Solana on-chain (ATA, blockhash, compute), MCP protocol, RPC/providers, EVM & Solana wallets, library of V…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Diagnose a cryptic AGENT-INFRASTRUCTURE error — payments (x402/EIP-3009), Solana on-chain (ATA, blockhash, compute), MCP protocol, RPC/providers, EVM & Solana wallets, library of VERIFIED fixes the base model often gets wrong. Pass the error text (and optional context). Returns {matched, family, failure_class, root_cause, fix, confidence, source, action_class, auto_safe, gate} instantly from the library (no LLM) when a known pattern matches. Free and no token. GATE CONTRACT for autonomous action: auto-apply the fix ONLY when confidence>=0.85 AND source=='library' AND auto_safe==true (action_class is retry|refetch|config); NEVER auto-apply a 'mutate' or 'destructive' fix (create/change state, money, auth) — escalate those to a human. gate.auto_apply_ok gives you the verdict. Use it the moment you hit a transaction_simulation_failed, BlockhashNotFound, a -32xxx RPC code, a 4001/-32002 wallet error, an attestation failure, or any infra error you can't instantly resolve.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Diagnose Infra Error
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • diagnose_traceDiagnose why an AI agent run failed.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Diagnose why an AI agent run failed. Returns a structured verdict (failure_class, failed_at_step, root_cause, fix_suggestion, confidence). LATENCY: known patterns return library-instant (<1s); a NOVEL failure needs an LLM call and can take up to ~25s — set your client timeout to at least 30s, and treat this as async (don't block your agent loop on it).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Diagnose Trace
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • my_impactSee how your feedback + pattern requests have shaped the shared library — how many verdicts you've rated, patterns you've requested, and how many were approved into the library.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    See how your feedback + pattern requests have shaped the shared library — how many verdicts you've rated, patterns you've requested, and how many were approved into the library. Turns your input into visible collaboration. Token-scoped to you.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: My Impact
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • my_usageSee YOUR current usage + remaining allowance so you can self-govern spend: snapbacks (diagnoses) used/cap/remaining, guard checks used/cap/remaining, estimated spend, % used, and w…No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    See YOUR current usage + remaining allowance so you can self-govern spend: snapbacks (diagnoses) used/cap/remaining, guard checks used/cap/remaining, estimated spend, % used, and when it resets. Call it periodically to avoid surprises. Token-scoped, free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: My Usage
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • preflightBEFORE running: get known failure patterns for a given agent setup so you can avoid them.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    BEFORE running: get known failure patterns for a given agent setup so you can avoid them. Returns a ranked list of {failure_class, root_cause, fix_suggestion} from Snapback's library. Call this before executing a plan and self-correct.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Preflight
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • recommend_failoverShould you RETRY the same target, SWITCH provider, FALL BACK to another chain, or STOP?Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Should you RETRY the same target, SWITCH provider, FALL BACK to another chain, or STOP? Pass the error + your configured topology (current_chain, available_chains, and/or current_provider, available_providers) and get deterministic routing advice with the reason — so a flaky Solana RPC doesn't get retried 5x when you should switch to Base. Free, no token, no LLM. Reads only what you tell it (no network calls).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Recommend Failover
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
  • report_outcomeReport the outcome of an auto-applied fix (the self-heal interceptor calls this after it gate-applied a fix and retried).Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report the outcome of an auto-applied fix (the self-heal interceptor calls this after it gate-applied a fix and retried). Pass failure_class, family, fix, confidence, action_class, and succeeded (did the retry work?). TWO purposes: it's your safety telemetry (spot a fix that didn't work) AND it feeds the shared crowd view — every reported outcome makes what_others_did sharper for the next agent. Token-scoped (so we know it's your org), free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Report Outcome
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • request_patternLeave us a message: ask us to add a failure pattern to the library, or report a problem we couldn't diagnose well.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "request_pattern" says "request": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Leave us a message: ask us to add a failure pattern to the library, or report a problem we couldn't diagnose well. Use this when diagnose_trace didn't have a good answer, when you keep hitting a failure we don't classify, or when you want a specific kind of problem supported. It goes straight to our roadmap/backlog. Free — no token needed.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Request Pattern
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • session_endClose a live session and get a short run summary (total steps, duration).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The description's first verb is "close": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Close a live session and get a short run summary (total steps, duration). Frees the session. Free, no token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Session End
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • session_startOpen a LIVE mid-run session so Snapback can watch your run step-by-step and warn you in real time (loop / token / cost / context) - the always-on guardian mode.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "session_start" says "start": a word for a change.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Open a LIVE mid-run session so Snapback can watch your run step-by-step and warn you in real time (loop / token / cost / context) - the always-on guardian mode. Returns a session_id. Free, no token. Call session_step as you run, session_end when done.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Session Start
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • session_stepReport ONE step of a live run and get back any warnings immediately (loop detected / budget breach).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Report ONE step of a live run and get back any warnings immediately (loop detected / budget breach). Pass the step (action + inputs) and any counters you have (step, max_steps, tokens_used, token_budget, cost_used_usd, cost_budget_usd, context_used, context_window, task, recent_actions. context_window). Warnings are advisory - act on them to self-correct mid-run. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Session Step
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
  • submit_feedbackTell Snapback whether a verdict was correct (correct=true/false), with an optional free-text note (did the fix work?Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "submit_feedback" says "submit": a word for a change.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Tell Snapback whether a verdict was correct (correct=true/false), with an optional free-text note (did the fix work? what was wrong?). ONE rating per verdict — call it AFTER you act on a verdict and see the outcome. Your correction updates the SHARED pattern library (fix patterns are shared anonymized so every agent benefits; your trace content is never shared) — a right verdict comes back faster next time, a wrong one gets down-weighted. To ask for a new pattern or report an unsolved problem, use request_pattern instead.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Submit Feedback
    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • suggest_budget_recoveryApproaching a token/context/cost budget mid-run?No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Approaching a token/context/cost budget mid-run? Pass your counters and get the LEAST-DISRUPTIVE recovery ranked: truncate context | switch to a cheaper model | batch steps | wrap up — scored by speed gained, accuracy lost, cost saved. Turns budget_guard's 'you're at 94%' into 'here's what to do about it'. Free, no token, no LLM.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Suggest Budget Recovery
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • what_others_didTHE CROWD: for a failure_class (or pass the family/error and we'll map it), see what OTHER agents did about the same failure and whether it worked — anonymized, aggregated across e…Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    THE CROWD: for a failure_class (or pass the family/error and we'll map it), see what OTHER agents did about the same failure and whether it worked — anonymized, aggregated across everyone. Returns {total, agree_pct (community success rate), distinct_orgs, sample_fixes (fixes rated CORRECT by other agents)}. Use it when you hit a failure and want the crowd's verdict on what actually fixes it, not just the single library answer. Free, no token. Privacy-safe: only aggregate counts + a community success rate + the working fixes — never any org, agent, or trace identity. Hidden below a small min-sample so a single report can't be reverse-engineered. This is the network effect: the more agents use Snapback, the sharper this answer gets.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: What Others Did
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_request_statusCheck what happened to a pattern you requested (from request_pattern's request_id).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_request_status" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Check what happened to a pattern you requested (from request_pattern's request_id). Returns pending / approved / rejected / in_library so you can see if your suggestion was actioned — the feedback loop isn't a black box. Free, no token.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Request Status
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_verdictFetch a previously produced verdict by its id or by trace_id (your org only).No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_verdict" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Fetch a previously produced verdict by its id or by trace_id (your org only).

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Get Verdict
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_docsSearch Snapback's documentation for how to use it — how to format a trace, what each tool does, the failure taxonomy, auth, pricing, and errors.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Search Snapback's documentation for how to use it — how to format a trace, what each tool does, the failure taxonomy, auth, pricing, and errors. Free and needs no token. Call this first if you're unsure how to format a request or what a verdict means.

    Annotations the server declares

    • title: Search Docs
    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write9
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
20
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 20 tools that change things (20 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.snapback.sh/mcp: tools/list returned 23 tools to an anonymous client, including diagnose_trace (write), diagnose_batch (write), preflight (write), submit_feedback (write), my_usage (write) and 15 more

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "convert_trace" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.

Install

Pinned to version 1.8.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http snapback https://api.snapback.sh/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http snapback https://api.snapback.sh/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__snapback__get_verdict",
      "mcp__snapback__get_request_status",
      "mcp__snapback__search_docs"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__snapback__diagnose_trace",
      "mcp__snapback__diagnose_batch",
      "mcp__snapback__preflight",
      "mcp__snapback__submit_feedback",
      "mcp__snapback__my_usage",
      "mcp__snapback__my_impact",
      "mcp__snapback__what_others_did",
      "mcp__snapback__report_outcome",
      "mcp__snapback__recommend_failover",
      "mcp__snapback__cascade_root",
      "mcp__snapback__suggest_budget_recovery",
      "mcp__snapback__request_pattern",
      "mcp__snapback__detect_loop",
      "mcp__snapback__session_start",
      "mcp__snapback__session_step",
      "mcp__snapback__session_end",
      "mcp__snapback__agent_memory",
      "mcp__snapback__budget_guard",
      "mcp__snapback__convert_trace",
      "mcp__snapback__diagnose_infra_error"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as snapback. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 9 rules
  • mcp__snapback__diagnose_trace untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__diagnose_batch untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__submit_feedback untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__what_others_did untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__report_outcome untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__recommend_failover untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__request_pattern untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__search_docs private-data, untrusted-input
  • mcp__snapback__diagnose_infra_error untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapback/verify?hash=113e6af505e41df39ba6c7131f737154af159de2b0479286e68170791c23b735" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 113e6af505e4, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapback/changes.xml

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Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

Snapback MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the Snapback MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 23 tools, 20 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the Snapback MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the Snapback MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the Snapback MCP server have?

23 tools: 20 write, 3 read. diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, preflight, submit_feedback, my_usage, my_impact, what_others_did, report_outcome and 15 more.

Does the Snapback MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the Snapback MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the Snapback MCP server changed its tools?

Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.