Snapback MCP server
io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapbackra1labsworkx-wqstreamable-httpv1.8.4Scanned
Diagnose why an AI agent failed and get the verified fix instantly. Free, no token.
23 tools: 20 change things and 3 only read.
- Reads private data · 1
- Reads text others write · 9
- Can send data out · 0
- 1 finding
Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture
With Anlyon
20 tools here change things. Govern them.
- Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
- Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
- Your agent never holds the key.
A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.
What the Snapback MCP server can do
The Snapback MCP server is published by the GitHub account ra1labsworkx-wq. It has 23 tools. It can create or change data (20 tools: diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, preflight, submit_feedback and 16 more), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.
1 tool reads private data (search_docs); 9 tools bring in text other people can write (diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, submit_feedback and 6 more).
The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.
Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in.
Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.8.4.
Tools
Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.
23 tools
Changes things 20Claude Code: ask
agent_memorySee what YOU (this agent) tend to fail on — your recurring failure patterns across past diagnoses.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it See what YOU (this agent) tend to fail on — your recurring failure patterns across past diagnoses. Returns your top failure classes with counts and what share of your failures each is (e.g. 'loop_repeated_tool_call: 12 times, 40%'). Call it before a run to know what to guard against. Token-scoped to your own agent. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Agent Memory
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
budget_guardLive MID-RUN budget check (fast, no LLM).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Live MID-RUN budget check (fast, no LLM). Send whatever counters you have and get an advisory on context %, token burn, cost burn, step budget, and off-task drift - with concrete suggested_actions and the projected cost of NOT acting. Call it every few steps to catch a runaway BEFORE you hit a limit. Advisory only (never blocks). Params: step, max_steps, tokens_used, token_budget, cost_used_usd, cost_budget_usd, context_used, context_window.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Budget Guard
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
cascade_rootGiven an ORDERED list of errors from a run (oldest first), find the TRUE root — the error that cascaded or shouldn't have been retried — not just the final symptom you see.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Given an ORDERED list of errors from a run (oldest first), find the TRUE root — the error that cascaded or shouldn't have been retried — not just the final symptom you see. E.g. a 429 that got retried and triggered a downstream 401: the root is the 429, not the 401. Each error can be a string or {error, retried, action}. Free, no token, no LLM.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Cascade Root
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
convert_traceTurn your raw logs into a Snapback trace so you don't hand-craft JSON.1 finding
Why it is in this group
- The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Findings
- Warn
The server marks "convert_trace" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Turn your raw logs into a Snapback trace so you don't hand-craft JSON. Pass 'source' = a list of log/step entries, or an object with a spans/steps/messages/events/logs array (OTel spans, OpenAI/LangChain message lists, or generic {tool,input,output} arrays all work). Returns {trace} ready to pass straight to diagnose_trace. Free, no token.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Convert Trace
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
detect_loopMID-RUN loop check (fast, no LLM, free).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it MID-RUN loop check (fast, no LLM, free). Send your recent steps DURING a run; get back whether you're stuck repeating a tool call and a concrete next move. Call this every few steps to catch a loop BEFORE you burn your step budget — don't wait for a postmortem. Non-blocking advice, not a verdict.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Detect Loop
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
diagnose_batchDiagnose SEVERAL traces in one call (up to 20).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Diagnose SEVERAL traces in one call (up to 20). Each trace is metered like a separate diagnose_trace. Returns a verdicts array (per-trace, order preserved); a bad trace in the batch is isolated and doesn't fail the rest. Use for post-run analysis of many failures at once instead of N round-trips.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Diagnose Batch
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
diagnose_infra_errorDiagnose a cryptic AGENT-INFRASTRUCTURE error — payments (x402/EIP-3009), Solana on-chain (ATA, blockhash, compute), MCP protocol, RPC/providers, EVM & Solana wallets, library of V…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Diagnose a cryptic AGENT-INFRASTRUCTURE error — payments (x402/EIP-3009), Solana on-chain (ATA, blockhash, compute), MCP protocol, RPC/providers, EVM & Solana wallets, library of VERIFIED fixes the base model often gets wrong. Pass the error text (and optional context). Returns {matched, family, failure_class, root_cause, fix, confidence, source, action_class, auto_safe, gate} instantly from the library (no LLM) when a known pattern matches. Free and no token. GATE CONTRACT for autonomous action: auto-apply the fix ONLY when confidence>=0.85 AND source=='library' AND auto_safe==true (action_class is retry|refetch|config); NEVER auto-apply a 'mutate' or 'destructive' fix (create/change state, money, auth) — escalate those to a human. gate.auto_apply_ok gives you the verdict. Use it the moment you hit a transaction_simulation_failed, BlockhashNotFound, a -32xxx RPC code, a 4001/-32002 wallet error, an attestation failure, or any infra error you can't instantly resolve.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Diagnose Infra Error
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
diagnose_traceDiagnose why an AI agent run failed.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Diagnose why an AI agent run failed. Returns a structured verdict (failure_class, failed_at_step, root_cause, fix_suggestion, confidence). LATENCY: known patterns return library-instant (<1s); a NOVEL failure needs an LLM call and can take up to ~25s — set your client timeout to at least 30s, and treat this as async (don't block your agent loop on it).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Diagnose Trace
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
my_impactSee how your feedback + pattern requests have shaped the shared library — how many verdicts you've rated, patterns you've requested, and how many were approved into the library.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it See how your feedback + pattern requests have shaped the shared library — how many verdicts you've rated, patterns you've requested, and how many were approved into the library. Turns your input into visible collaboration. Token-scoped to you.
Annotations the server declares
- title: My Impact
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
my_usageSee YOUR current usage + remaining allowance so you can self-govern spend: snapbacks (diagnoses) used/cap/remaining, guard checks used/cap/remaining, estimated spend, % used, and w…No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it See YOUR current usage + remaining allowance so you can self-govern spend: snapbacks (diagnoses) used/cap/remaining, guard checks used/cap/remaining, estimated spend, % used, and when it resets. Call it periodically to avoid surprises. Token-scoped, free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: My Usage
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
preflightBEFORE running: get known failure patterns for a given agent setup so you can avoid them.No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it BEFORE running: get known failure patterns for a given agent setup so you can avoid them. Returns a ranked list of {failure_class, root_cause, fix_suggestion} from Snapback's library. Call this before executing a plan and self-correct.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Preflight
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
recommend_failoverShould you RETRY the same target, SWITCH provider, FALL BACK to another chain, or STOP?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Should you RETRY the same target, SWITCH provider, FALL BACK to another chain, or STOP? Pass the error + your configured topology (current_chain, available_chains, and/or current_provider, available_providers) and get deterministic routing advice with the reason — so a flaky Solana RPC doesn't get retried 5x when you should switch to Base. Free, no token, no LLM. Reads only what you tell it (no network calls).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Recommend Failover
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
report_outcomeReport the outcome of an auto-applied fix (the self-heal interceptor calls this after it gate-applied a fix and retried).Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Report the outcome of an auto-applied fix (the self-heal interceptor calls this after it gate-applied a fix and retried). Pass failure_class, family, fix, confidence, action_class, and succeeded (did the retry work?). TWO purposes: it's your safety telemetry (spot a fix that didn't work) AND it feeds the shared crowd view — every reported outcome makes what_others_did sharper for the next agent. Token-scoped (so we know it's your org), free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Report Outcome
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
request_patternLeave us a message: ask us to add a failure pattern to the library, or report a problem we couldn't diagnose well.Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "request_pattern" says "request": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Leave us a message: ask us to add a failure pattern to the library, or report a problem we couldn't diagnose well. Use this when diagnose_trace didn't have a good answer, when you keep hitting a failure we don't classify, or when you want a specific kind of problem supported. It goes straight to our roadmap/backlog. Free — no token needed.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Request Pattern
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
session_endClose a live session and get a short run summary (total steps, duration).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The description's first verb is "close": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Close a live session and get a short run summary (total steps, duration). Frees the session. Free, no token.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Session End
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
session_startOpen a LIVE mid-run session so Snapback can watch your run step-by-step and warn you in real time (loop / token / cost / context) - the always-on guardian mode.No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "session_start" says "start": a word for a change.
Description, as the server wrote it Open a LIVE mid-run session so Snapback can watch your run step-by-step and warn you in real time (loop / token / cost / context) - the always-on guardian mode. Returns a session_id. Free, no token. Call session_step as you run, session_end when done.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Session Start
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
session_stepReport ONE step of a live run and get back any warnings immediately (loop detected / budget breach).No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
Description, as the server wrote it Report ONE step of a live run and get back any warnings immediately (loop detected / budget breach). Pass the step (action + inputs) and any counters you have (step, max_steps, tokens_used, token_budget, cost_used_usd, cost_budget_usd, context_used, context_window, task, recent_actions. context_window). Warnings are advisory - act on them to self-correct mid-run. Free.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Session Step
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: false
submit_feedbackTell Snapback whether a verdict was correct (correct=true/false), with an optional free-text note (did the fix work?Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "submit_feedback" says "submit": a word for a change.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Tell Snapback whether a verdict was correct (correct=true/false), with an optional free-text note (did the fix work? what was wrong?). ONE rating per verdict — call it AFTER you act on a verdict and see the outcome. Your correction updates the SHARED pattern library (fix patterns are shared anonymized so every agent benefits; your trace content is never shared) — a right verdict comes back faster next time, a wrong one gets down-weighted. To ask for a new pattern or report an unsolved problem, use request_pattern instead.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Submit Feedback
- readOnlyHint: false
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: false
- openWorldHint: true
suggest_budget_recoveryApproaching a token/context/cost budget mid-run?No findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
Description, as the server wrote it Approaching a token/context/cost budget mid-run? Pass your counters and get the LEAST-DISRUPTIVE recovery ranked: truncate context | switch to a cheaper model | batch steps | wrap up — scored by speed gained, accuracy lost, cost saved. Turns budget_guard's 'you're at 94%' into 'here's what to do about it'. Free, no token, no LLM.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Suggest Budget Recovery
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
what_others_didTHE CROWD: for a failure_class (or pass the family/error and we'll map it), see what OTHER agents did about the same failure and whether it worked — anonymized, aggregated across e…Reads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- Nothing in its name or description says what it does, so it is counted as a write.
- The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.
What it can reach
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it THE CROWD: for a failure_class (or pass the family/error and we'll map it), see what OTHER agents did about the same failure and whether it worked — anonymized, aggregated across everyone. Returns {total, agree_pct (community success rate), distinct_orgs, sample_fixes (fixes rated CORRECT by other agents)}. Use it when you hit a failure and want the crowd's verdict on what actually fixes it, not just the single library answer. Free, no token. Privacy-safe: only aggregate counts + a community success rate + the working fixes — never any org, agent, or trace identity. Hidden below a small min-sample so a single report can't be reverse-engineered. This is the network effect: the more agents use Snapback, the sharper this answer gets.
Annotations the server declares
- title: What Others Did
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
get_request_statusCheck what happened to a pattern you requested (from request_pattern's request_id).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_request_status" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Check what happened to a pattern you requested (from request_pattern's request_id). Returns pending / approved / rejected / in_library so you can see if your suggestion was actioned — the feedback loop isn't a black box. Free, no token.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Request Status
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
get_verdictFetch a previously produced verdict by its id or by trace_id (your org only).No findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "get_verdict" says "get": a word for reading.
Description, as the server wrote it Fetch a previously produced verdict by its id or by trace_id (your org only).
Annotations the server declares
- title: Get Verdict
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: false
search_docsSearch Snapback's documentation for how to use it — how to format a trace, what each tool does, the failure taxonomy, auth, pricing, and errors.Reads private dataReads text others writeNo findings
Why it is in this group
- The name "search_docs" says "search": a word for reading.
What it can reach
- private-dataThe name "search_docs" says "search" and "doc": it reads documents.
- untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
Description, as the server wrote it Search Snapback's documentation for how to use it — how to format a trace, what each tool does, the failure taxonomy, auth, pricing, and errors. Free and needs no token. Call this first if you're unsure how to format a request or what a verdict means.
Annotations the server declares
- title: Search Docs
- readOnlyHint: true
- destructiveHint: false
- idempotentHint: true
- openWorldHint: true
This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.
Exfil surface
Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.
No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged outbound.
- Reads private data1
- Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
- Reads text others write9
- Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
- Can send data out0
- Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.
Remote posture
What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.
Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.
- Reachable
- yes
- HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
- 200
- tools/list served without credentials
- yes
- Tools that change things, listed without credentials
- 20
- Protocol version
- 2025-06-18
- WWW-Authenticate on 401
- not observed
- resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
- not observed
- RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
- not observed
- Authorization servers
- not observed
- Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
- no
- Dynamic client registration
- not observed
- Client ID metadata documents
- not observed
- WarnThe whole server
The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 20 tools that change things (20 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.
What this check looks forMatched text
https://api.snapback.sh/mcp: tools/list returned 23 tools to an anonymous client, including diagnose_trace (write), diagnose_batch (write), preflight (write), submit_feedback (write), my_usage (write) and 15 more
Findings
Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.
- Warnconvert_trace
The server marks "convert_trace" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".
What this check looks forMatched text
annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "convert_trace" says "convert": a word for a change.
History
Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.
No change seen yet. Its tools are rescanned every day, and a remote endpoint is looked at once a week.
Install
Pinned to version 1.8.4. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.
claude mcp add --transport http snapback https://api.snapback.sh/mcpclaude mcp add --transport http snapback https://api.snapback.sh/mcpRun in a terminal.
Claude Code permissions
Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.
{
"permissions": {
"allow": [
"mcp__snapback__get_verdict",
"mcp__snapback__get_request_status",
"mcp__snapback__search_docs"
],
"ask": [
"mcp__snapback__diagnose_trace",
"mcp__snapback__diagnose_batch",
"mcp__snapback__preflight",
"mcp__snapback__submit_feedback",
"mcp__snapback__my_usage",
"mcp__snapback__my_impact",
"mcp__snapback__what_others_did",
"mcp__snapback__report_outcome",
"mcp__snapback__recommend_failover",
"mcp__snapback__cascade_root",
"mcp__snapback__suggest_budget_recovery",
"mcp__snapback__request_pattern",
"mcp__snapback__detect_loop",
"mcp__snapback__session_start",
"mcp__snapback__session_step",
"mcp__snapback__session_end",
"mcp__snapback__agent_memory",
"mcp__snapback__budget_guard",
"mcp__snapback__convert_trace",
"mcp__snapback__diagnose_infra_error"
],
"deny": []
}
}Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as snapback. Review it before you use it.
Capability tags behind 9 rules
- mcp__snapback__diagnose_trace untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__diagnose_batch untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__submit_feedback untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__what_others_did untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__report_outcome untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__recommend_failover untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__request_pattern untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__search_docs private-data, untrusted-input
- mcp__snapback__diagnose_infra_error untrusted-input
Pin
Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.
Pin in CI
Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.
curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapback/verify?hash=113e6af505e41df39ba6c7131f737154af159de2b0479286e68170791c23b735" | jq -e '.changed == false'Pinned hash 113e6af505e4, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.
Watch
Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.
https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapback/changes.xmlAn Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.
Badge
[](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.ra1labsworkx-wq/snapback)Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.
Snapback MCP server: questions and answers
Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.
Is the Snapback MCP server safe?
- No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 23 tools, 20 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.
Can the Snapback MCP server delete data?
- No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.
Can the Snapback MCP server do things that cannot be undone?
- No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.
What tools does the Snapback MCP server have?
- 23 tools: 20 write, 3 read. diagnose_trace, diagnose_batch, preflight, submit_feedback, my_usage, my_impact, what_others_did, report_outcome and 15 more.
Does the Snapback MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?
- Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.
Does the Snapback MCP server send data to outside services?
- None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.
Has the Snapback MCP server changed its tools?
- Not since Anlyon Radar started tracking it. Last scanned Nov 20, 2026.