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RealtyCrawl MCP server

io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawlrealtycrawlstreamable-httpv1.0.0Scanned

Search source-linked real estate observations with capability discovery and bounded credits.

5 tools: 1 change things and 4 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 4 read.
  • Reads private data · 0
  • Reads text others write · 5
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the RealtyCrawl MCP server can do

The RealtyCrawl MCP server is published by the GitHub account realtycrawl. It has 5 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: call_endpoint), but cannot delete data. 4 tools only read.

5 tools bring in text other people can write (list_platforms, get_capabilities, list_endpoints and 2 more).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 1.0.0.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

5 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • call_endpointExecute one source read or search.Reads text others write1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.
    • The server marks it read-only (readOnlyHint: true), but an annotation never lowers a class.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Execute one source read or search. May consume credits. No automatic retry or pagination. POST search requests need a stable idempotency key.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
Only reads 4Show 4 read-only tools
  • get_capabilitiesInspect current source operations, supported selectors, and markets before requesting data.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_capabilities" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Inspect current source operations, supported selectors, and markets before requesting data. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • get_endpointRead an operation’s parameters, request schema and referenced component schemas.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_endpoint" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Read an operation’s parameters, request schema and referenced component schemas.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_endpointsList API operations with source associations and evidence.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_endpoints" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List API operations with source associations and evidence. Contract inclusion does not guarantee live source availability.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true
  • list_platformsList researched real estate platforms and their current status.Reads text others writeNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "list_platforms" says "list": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • untrusted-inputThe server marks it openWorldHint: true: it reaches things outside the server's own data.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    List researched real estate platforms and their current status. Free.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • destructiveHint: false
    • openWorldHint: true

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged private-data or outbound.

Reads private data0
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write5
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 20, 2026, 19:10 UTC, unchanged since Oct 22, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://realtycrawl.dev/mcp: tools/list returned 5 tools to an anonymous client, including call_endpoint (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "call_endpoint" read-only (readOnlyHint: true), and its own name, description or input give the class "write".

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true}; The name "call_endpoint" says "call": a word for a change.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools1 changed.~1 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 1.0.0. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http realtycrawl https://realtycrawl.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'
claude mcp add --transport http realtycrawl https://realtycrawl.dev/mcp --header 'Authorization: <your-authorization>'

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__realtycrawl__list_platforms",
      "mcp__realtycrawl__get_capabilities",
      "mcp__realtycrawl__list_endpoints",
      "mcp__realtycrawl__get_endpoint"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__realtycrawl__call_endpoint"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as realtycrawl. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 5 rules
  • mcp__realtycrawl__list_platforms untrusted-input
  • mcp__realtycrawl__get_capabilities untrusted-input
  • mcp__realtycrawl__list_endpoints untrusted-input
  • mcp__realtycrawl__get_endpoint untrusted-input
  • mcp__realtycrawl__call_endpoint untrusted-input

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawl/verify?hash=b59d7a3825bb249e13c4fe589adc0ce9f68ce3c18d468ceedf31d3de84736d9c" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash b59d7a3825bb, from Nov 20, 2026, 09:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawl/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawl
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawl.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.realtycrawl/realtycrawl)

Source: MCP Registry · repository. Synced Oct 21, 2026, 18:45 UTC.

RealtyCrawl MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the RealtyCrawl MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 5 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the RealtyCrawl MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the RealtyCrawl MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the RealtyCrawl MCP server have?

5 tools: 1 write, 4 read. call_endpoint, list_platforms, get_capabilities, list_endpoints and get_endpoint.

Does the RealtyCrawl MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the RealtyCrawl MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the RealtyCrawl MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.