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runchr MCP server

io.github.rmngl/runchrrmnglstreamable-httpv0.1.2Scanned

A curated registry of agent stacks: search by job, get the tools, prompt, and install plan.

4 tools: 1 change things and 3 only read.

Tools: 0 delete, 0 irreversible, 1 write, 3 read.
  • Reads private data · 1
  • Reads text others write · 0
  • Can send data out · 0
  • 1 finding

Tools listed without sign-in. Remote posture

With Anlyon

1 tool here changes things. Govern it.

  • Anlyon lists the tools and adopts none.
  • Each tool you adopt gets approvals and receipts.
  • Your agent never holds the key.
Govern this server →

A tool your agent calls directly is not routed through Anlyon and is not governed by it. Anlyon Radar only lists and labels, and these labels are the same either way.

What the runchr MCP server can do

The runchr MCP server is published by the GitHub account rmngl. It has 4 tools. It can create or change data (1 tool: get_manifest), but cannot delete data. 3 tools only read.

1 tool reads private data (get_install_plan).

The fixed checks matched 1 finding (annotation-conflict). Each one comes with the text it matched.

Its remote endpoint lists its tools without sign-in, and its tools changed once since Anlyon Radar first saw them.

Last scanned Nov 20, 2026, version 0.1.2.

Tools

Grouped by what each tool does, most consequential first. Open one for its reasons and full description; descriptions are the publisher's own words.

4 tools

Changes things 1Claude Code: ask
  • get_manifestThe manifest a loader runs: the tools, the model, the harness, and the prompt.1 finding

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_manifest" says "get": a word for reading.
    • The server marks it as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false).

    Findings

    • Warn

      The server marks "get_manifest" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

      Matched text

      annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_manifest" says "get": a word for reading.

      What this check looks for
    Description, as the server wrote it
    The manifest a loader runs: the tools, the model, the harness, and the prompt. This is the thing to install.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: false
    • destructiveHint: false
    • idempotentHint: false
    • openWorldHint: false
Only reads 3Show 3 read-only tools
  • get_install_planHow to install a stack: the MCP servers to configure, the shell commands to run, and the notes (a path, a harness command) for the rest.Reads private dataNo findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_install_plan" says "get": a word for reading.

    What it can reach

    • private-dataThe description's first sentence says "note": it reads notes.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    How to install a stack: the MCP servers to configure, the shell commands to run, and the notes (a path, a harness command) for the rest. Deciding and configuring are open; the agent's host runs the commands.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • get_stackOne stack's card: its copy, its tools, its tier, and its revision.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "get_stack" says "get": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    One stack's card: its copy, its tools, its tier, and its revision.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false
  • search_stacksFind agent stacks by problem domain or text.No findings

    Why it is in this group

    • The name "search_stacks" says "search": a word for reading.
    Description, as the server wrote it
    Find agent stacks by problem domain or text. A query is split into words and any of them may match, against the name, the copy, and the prompt. When nothing matches, the reply is labelled and filled with the most established stacks.

    Annotations the server declares

    • readOnlyHint: true
    • idempotentHint: true
    • openWorldHint: false

This is not a safety rating, and no finding is not a safety guarantee. The groups and findings come from fixed checks of the tool definitions the server returned on the date shown, not from its code or what it does when called. How the checks work.

Exfil surface

Which tools read private data, which read text someone else can write, and which can send data out. One of each is a path a prompt injection can use.

No private-data, untrusted-input, outbound path in this server alone: no tool is tagged untrusted-input or outbound.

Reads private data1
Reads files, mail, messages, databases, secrets, calendars or repositories.
Reads text others write0
Brings in text someone else can write: web pages, inbound email, messages, issues and comments.
Can send data out0
Can carry data to people or systems: it sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Other servers in the same agent add their own tools to these paths. Audit your whole setup to see them together.

Remote posture

What anyone on the internet sees at the remote endpoint: an anonymous initialize and tools/list, and the public OAuth metadata.

Tools listed without sign-in

Looked at Nov 21, 2026, 19:22 UTC, unchanged since Nov 7, 2026. No credentials were sent and no tool was called. What is looked at.

Reachable
yes
HTTP status of an anonymous initialize
200
tools/list served without credentials
yes
Tools that change things, listed without credentials
1
Protocol version
2025-06-18
WWW-Authenticate on 401
not observed
resource_metadata in WWW-Authenticate
not observed
RFC 9728 protected resource metadata
not observed
Authorization servers
not observed
Legacy HTTP+SSE transport
no
Dynamic client registration
not observed
Client ID metadata documents
not observed
  • WarnThe whole server

    The endpoint served tools/list without credentials, and the list has 1 tool that changes things (1 write). Whether a call also works without credentials was not tested: tools are never called.

    Matched text

    https://api.runchr.com/mcp: tools/list returned 4 tools to an anonymous client, including get_manifest (write)

    What this check looks for

Findings

Matches of fixed checks, with the text they matched.

1 warn
  • The server marks "get_manifest" as not read-only (readOnlyHint: false), and its words say it reads.

    Matched text

    annotations: {"readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":false}; The name "get_manifest" says "get": a word for reading.

    What this check looks for

History

Changes to its tool definitions and to its remote endpoint, newest first.

  1. Tools4 changed.~4 changedView diff

Install

Pinned to version 0.1.2. Values in angle brackets are yours to fill in.

claude mcp add --transport http runchr https://api.runchr.com/mcp
claude mcp add --transport http runchr https://api.runchr.com/mcp

Run in a terminal.

Claude Code permissions

Allow the reads, ask before a change or a way out, deny the deletes. Paste into .claude/settings.json.

.claude/settings.json
{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": [
      "mcp__runchr__search_stacks",
      "mcp__runchr__get_stack",
      "mcp__runchr__get_install_plan"
    ],
    "ask": [
      "mcp__runchr__get_manifest"
    ],
    "deny": []
  }
}

Tools that only read are allowed, tools that change things ask first, tools that delete or cancel are denied. A read that can send data out (it takes a URL, say) asks first too. It assumes the server is installed as runchr. Review it before you use it.

Capability tags behind 1 rule
  • mcp__runchr__get_install_plan private-data

Pin

Keep the decision: fail CI when the tools change, follow every change, or show a badge.

Pin in CI

Fail a build when the tools you reviewed are not the tools the server serves today.

curl -s "https://radar.anlyon.com/api/v1/servers/io.github.rmngl/runchr/verify?hash=1464f2644c9ae319cfae516ead4e6a8187ec14e97f67641c728ef123dad7b5b2" | jq -e '.changed == false'

Pinned hash 1464f2644c9a, from Nov 20, 2026, 14:18 UTC.

Watch

Get told when its tools change: a new tool, a new description, a new class.

https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.rmngl/runchr/changes.xml

An Atom feed. Works in any feed reader or Slack's RSS app.

Badge

Anlyon Radar badge for io.github.rmngl/runchr
[![Anlyon Radar](https://radar.anlyon.com/badge/io.github.rmngl/runchr.svg)](https://radar.anlyon.com/servers/io.github.rmngl/runchr)

Source: MCP Registry. Synced Nov 6, 2026, 13:18 UTC.

runchr MCP server: questions and answers

Answered from the scan above, not from the publisher's description.

Is the runchr MCP server safe?

No scan can promise that. What its definitions show: 4 tools, 1 of which can change, send or delete something, and 1 finding from fixed checks. Allow the reads, ask before each change, and deny the deletes; the permissions block on this page does that.

Can the runchr MCP server delete data?

No tool is classed as destructive: going by their definitions, none of them deletes, cancels or revokes anything.

Can the runchr MCP server do things that cannot be undone?

No tool is classed as irreversible: none of them sends, pays, publishes or merges, going by their definitions.

What tools does the runchr MCP server have?

4 tools: 1 write, 3 read. get_manifest, search_stacks, get_stack and get_install_plan.

Does the runchr MCP server need sign-in or OAuth?

Its remote endpoint listed its tools to an anonymous client, without sign-in.

Does the runchr MCP server send data to outside services?

None of its tools sends, posts or publishes, or takes a recipient, channel or URL.

Has the runchr MCP server changed its tools?

Yes, once since Anlyon Radar started tracking it, most recently on Nov 6, 2026. Every change is on this page and in its Atom feed.